Dealing with Derivatives. Studies on the role, informational content and pricing of financial derivatives by Jong, C.M. (Cyriel) de
Dealing with Derivatives:
Studies on the role, informational content and pricing of financial
derivatives
The aim of this thesis is to improve the understanding of derivatives
markets, which should ultimately lead to a better diversification of
risks among market participants. The author first analyzes the impact
of derivatives on the market quality of the underlying asset. With
experiments and a theoretical model it is shown that derivatives
generally make markets more efficient, although volatility may
increase, depending on the exact market structure. Next, the author
presents two methods that derive information about the underlying
price process from traded options. The models approximate the option
prices well and the extracted information explains future volatility
better than historical data. Finally, a model for the valuation of
options in electricity markets is presented that deals with the special
characteristics of electricity spot prices and may serve to value
electricity generation plants. 
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research
School (Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the
Rotterdam School of Management and the Rotterdam School of
Economics. ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by
the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The
research undertaken by ERIM is focussed on the management of the
firm in its environment, its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its
business processes in their interdependent connections. The objective
of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer
an advanced graduate program in Research in Management. Within
ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and Ph.D. candidates are
active in the different research programs. From a variety of academic
backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving
for excellence and working at the forefront of creating new business
knowledge.
The ERIM Ph.D Series contains Dissertations in the field of Research in
Management defended at Erasmus University Rotterdam. The Disser-
tations in the Series are available in two ways, printed and electronical.
ERIM Electronic Series Portal: www.research-in-management.nl.
www.research-in-management.nl/ ISBN 90-5892-043-7
CYRIEL DE JONG
Dealing
with Derivatives:
Studies on the role, informational
content and pricing of financial
derivatives
C
Y
R
IE
L
 D
E
 JO
N
G
D
e
a
lin
g
 w
ith
 D
e
riv
a
tiv
e
s
23
Erim - 03 omslag deJong  29-04-2003  14:27  Pagina 1
               
Dealing with Derivatives: 
Studies on the role, informational content  
and pricing of financial derivatives 
Over derivaten: 
Studies naar de rol, informatieve waarde en waardering van financiële 
derivaten 
Proefschrift 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus 
Prof.dr.ir. J.H. van Bemmel 
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties. 
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op 
donderdag 19 juni 2003 om 13:30 uur 
door 
Cyriel de Jong 
geboren te Valkenburg aan de Geul 
         
Promotiecommissie 
Promotor: Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk 
Overige leden: Prof.dr. C.G. de Vries
               Prof.dr. P.H.B.F. Franses
               Prof.dr. F.C. Palm 
              
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Internet: http://www.erim.eur.nl 
ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
ERIM Ph.D. Series Research in Management 23 
ISBN 90 – 5892 – 043 –7 
© 2003, Cyriel de Jong 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or 
by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any 
information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the author. 
Gwen, voor jou 

Voorwoord 
                 
Dit proefschrift is het resultaat van vier jaar onderzoek bij de vakgroep 
Financieel Management van de Erasmus Universiteit in Rotterdam. Het begon 
allemaal in Maastricht, waar ik als student door Kees werd overgehaald om met hem 
mee te gaan naar Rotterdam. Hoewel ik daarmee een geweldige stad en omgeving 
achter me liet, heb ik nooit spijt gehad van deze keuze. Het leven als onderzoeker was 
inspirerend, en bood mij de mogelijkheid om veel te leren, nieuwe ideeën op te doen 
en eigen interesses verder uit te diepen.  
Vanaf het begin van mijn tijd in Rotterdam was Kees de natuurlijke begeleider 
van mijn proefschrift. Hoewel hij het altijd druk had, heeft hij me steeds op 
belangrijke momenten van waardevol advies kunnen dienen. Speciaal waren voor mij 
de vrijheid die hij gaf om in het buitenland conferenties te bezoeken en de nodige 
buiten-universitaire activiteiten te ontplooien. Voor het vertrouwen dat hij me daarmee 
schonk, ben ik Kees zeer erkentelijk.  
Een speciale band heb ik in de afgelopen vier jaar daarnaast opgebouwd met 
Chuck. Als co-auteur van het experimenten-onderzoek hebben we gezamenlijk met 
Kees vele ups en downs meegemaakt, maar met een resultaat dat ik beschouw als het 
beste van dit proefschrift. Chuck heeft me daarnaast veel bijgebracht over het 
uitvoeren van wetenschappelijk onderzoek, en het geduld en de precisie die daarbij 
horen. Op het gezamenlijke werk en mijn twee perioden in Tucson, Arizona, kijk ik 
dan ook met een goed gevoel terug. Thanks Chuck! 
De vakgroep Financieel Management is gedurende mijn onderzoeksperiode 
sterk van samenstelling veranderd. Veel van die oude en nieuwe collega's hebben mijn 
verblijf aan de universiteit tot een heel leuke periode gemaakt. Wat na het eerste half 
jaar echter niet meer veranderd is, is een altijd positieve en hulpvaardige Ben als 
kamergenoot. Eveneens een collega, maar dan van de universiteit Maastricht, is 
Thorsten. Zijn enthousiasme en bedrevenheid in Gauss-programmeren hebben 
geresulteerd in een mooi hoofdstuk in onze beider proefschriften.  
Een dankwoord ben ik daarnaast verschuldigd aan alle studenten die hebben 
meegedaan aan de experimenten. Hun geduld als de software het weer eens begaf , is 
niet voor niets geweest.  
Mijn meeste dank gaat uit naar familie en vrienden, die zorgen voor de 
noodzakelijke ondersteuning, maar ook relativering van mijn werk. Papa, mama, 
Monique en vooral natuurlijk Gwen: dit boekje is er dankzij jullie. 
Cyriel 
Gouda, april 2003 
Contents 
Voorwoord (Foreword) 
Chapter 1: Introduction         1 
Part I: Microstructure studies in derivatives markets 
Chapter 2: Introduction to the first part     11 
Chapter 3: Stock market quality in the presence of a traded option  15 
 3.1  Experimental design and procedures     18 
 3.2   Results        24 
 3.3   Discussion        44 
 3.4   Conclusion        45 
Chapter 4: Insider strategies with options     47 
4.1  The model        48 
4.2  Market quality criteria      53 
4.3  Results        56 
4.4   Conclusion        70 
Chapter 5: Conclusion of the first part     73
Part II: Empirical studies in derivatives markets 
Chapter 6: Introduction to the second part       79
Chapter 7: The skewed-t  implied distribution model      83
  7.1  Methodology          86 
 7.2   Empirical results            91 
 7.3  Concluding remarks       102 
Chapter 8: Implied GARCH volatility forecasting    105
 8.1  Methodology        108 
 8.2  Data         114 
 8.3  Empirical results       119 
 8.4  Concluding remarks       128 
   
Chapter 9: Pricing the spikes in power options    131 
9.1   The two regimes model for spot electricity prices   134 
9.2   Model estimation results      140 
9.3   Option valuation       148 
9.4   Concluding remarks       161 
Chapter 10: Conclusion of the second part     165
Chapter 11: Summary and concluding remarks    169
   11.1  Summary first part       169 
   11.2  Summary second part       170 
   11.3  Concluding remarks and future research    172 
References         175
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)      189 
Curriculum vitae        195


 1
1  Introduction 
Financial derivatives are the subject of this thesis. Although ‘derivative’ is a 
very common term in financial markets, it is instructive to dive a little deeper into its 
meaning. A derivative is a financial instrument whose value depends on the value of 
another, more basic or primitive, underlying instrument. ‘Derivative’ is in fact a very 
general term that can be applied to a whole range of underlying instruments and pay-
off structures, ranging from forwards, futures, swaps, call and put options, to complex 
exotic structures such as swaptions, caps, floors, straddles, spreads, butterflies and 
barriers. This list is constantly growing, and only limited by the fantasy of the 
financial community. A list of possible underlying values is equally endless and may 
include stocks, bonds, foreign currencies, gold, oil, electricity, credit, emission rights, 
transportation costs, and even weather. Why derivatives encompass such a wide 
variety of instruments becomes clear when one realizes that a popular underlying, a 
stock, may in itself already be considered as a derivative, namely as an option on the 
assets or profits of the issuing firm. So although a derivative seems well defined, in 
practice the distinction between primitive (underlying) securities and derivative 
securities is more diffuse. In the most general definition, every financial instrument 
may be termed a derivative, since its value depends on one or more factors.  
Luckily, in individual cases it is often clear what is the underlying asset and 
what is the derivative. For example, if we price an option on a stock, then we consider 
the option to be the derivative and the stock to be the underlying security. Less clear 
however is the interaction between the two, which is the central theme of this thesis. 
Moving forward through this thesis we will increasingly narrow our focus. Part I 
(Chapters 2-5) starts with a general theoretical and experimental study on how 
standard options affect trading and efficiency in the underlying asset. In part II 
(Chapters 6-10) we first explore two specific econometric methods to infer 
information about future price movements in stock indices from market option prices. 
The final subject of part II is the most classical, in the sense that it is about derivative 
pricing. It presents an approach to price options on electricity spot prices, a very 
peculiar and risky underlying asset. 
2The part in this thesis on electricity options highlights the widespread 
acceptance of derivatives in different segments of the economy. Derivatives are used 
for two main and partly opposing reasons: hedging and speculation. Both are 
indispensable for a sound functioning market. Hedging is the reduction of financial 
exposure, and trade in derivative contracts offer a way to achieve this. Derivatives 
may facilitate risk reduction, because they are in general easier to trade and more 
flexible in their pay-off structures than the underlying security itself. A well-known 
example in which derivatives are used to hedge price risks, is an airline company with 
an exposure to fuel-price increases. The airline company is unable to pass fuel price 
rises immediately through in the flight tariffs, without losing part of the customer 
base. Since fuel costs represent a major component of an airline’s costs, fuel price 
fluctuations may seriously put profitability and company viability at stake. The 
positive aspect of this risk is that the airline is not the only company with an exposure 
to it, and a very liquid market in fuel derivatives has emerged. The airline company 
can fixate (part of) its fuel costs by buying fuel futures or forwards, or create an upper 
bound on costs by buying call options. These strategies act like an insurance policy. 
Without a market for fuel derivatives, the only way to insure against fuel price rises 
would be to maintain a large stock of fuel. In comparison, derivatives provide a more 
convenient and cheaper solution.  
The other purpose of derivative trading is speculation. While trading 
derivatives is only a secondary business for hedgers, it is the primary business for 
speculators. Speculators try to predict market movements and make a profit out of it. 
Unfortunately, speculation has a very negative image and is often associated with 
casino-like transactions. However, speculators provide the necessary liquidity for 
hedgers to trade and thus maintain a market. Furthermore, wise speculators carefully 
manage their positions to limit exposures. A well-known speculator for example is 
George Soros, who reportedly amassed a fortune of around €7 billion with his 
speculative Quantum Fund. His finest hour was on a single day in 1992, when he 
earned around $1 billion by betting correctly that the British pound would fall in 
value. By hedging, traders bring risks to the market, whereas by speculation they bring 
information and liquidity to the market. 
The two examples of hedging and speculation may falsely lead to the 
conclusion that only large investors and corporations have to do with derivatives. 
However, nearly every man and woman in the western world is exposed to 
derivatives. Money tied up in life insurance or pension funds is often managed with 
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derivatives. Most mortgages contain option-like provisions, whose value depends on 
market interest rates. And some individuals trade derivatives directly. Especially the 
Amsterdam options exchange (now Euronext) has traditionally been a popular venue 
for individuals. 
Over the years, derivatives have attracted increasing attention by traders, 
journalists and researchers alike. Trading volumes have reached astonishing levels: on 
the two main European exchanges for example, Euronext – Liffe and Eurex, in 2001 a 
total of 216 and 675 million contracts changed hands. On Liffe’s electronic trading 
platform derivatives trading represented a total underlying value of $138 trillion in 
2001 (figure for Eurex not published). This is around 300 times Dutch Gross National 
Product and growing at a much faster rate than GNP. 
Instrumental to the enormous trading volumes are the advances in trading 
platforms. To date nearly all trades are closed electronically, either through organized 
exchanges or over-the-counter by derivative dealers. This explains the fast 
internationalization of the trading flows and the difficulty to control cross-border 
money flows, which is often cited as a reason for the increase in financial market 
volatility. The perceived volatility increase is not the only negative aspect associated 
with derivatives. Derivatives caused several large financial disasters and bankruptcies 
that received massive attention in the press. Probably most well known are the 
misfortunes that Nick Leeson brought to the Barings Bank (and himself ultimately) in 
1995. From Barings’ Singapore office he used financial futures to speculate on an 
increase in the Japanese Nikkei 225 stock index. Doubling his bet after each loss1 he 
destroyed a total value of $1.3 bln and induced the collapse of an old reputable 
London investment bank, whose clients included the British Royal family. Even more 
ironic for the derivative community however was the disaster concerning the hedge 
fund Long Term Capital Management amidst the financial turmoil of 1998. The fund 
had been successfully exploiting market inefficiencies for a couple of years with the 
help of professors Merton and Scholes, the two most acclaimed researchers in 
financial derivatives. Together with Fischer Black, the two professors were the bright 
heads behind the famous Black-Scholes option price formula for which they received 
the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1997. Even their brainpower could however not 
avoid losses accumulating to $3.7 bln. The fund only survived thanks to a savings 
1 Brown, S.J. and O.W. Steenbeek, 2001, “Doubling: Nick Leeson’s trading strategy”, Pacific 
Basin Finance Journal, 9, p.  83-99 
4operation lead by the US Central Bank. Confidence in derivatives in general and the 
professionals who use them in particular, had however been severely damaged. 
The famous pricing framework that earned Scholes and Merton the Nobel 
Prize, relied on the assumption that derivatives are redundant assets. This means that a 
derivative contract can be exactly replicated with a dynamic portfolio in the 
underlying assets. For example, it is assumed in the Black-Scholes-Merton framework 
that a standard European call or put option on a stock can be replicated with a 
continuously updated portfolio of the stock. This assumption is convenient for pricing 
purposes, since its consequence is that the risk of a derivative can be hedged away and 
is thus irrelevant. This assumption is however at odds with all the positive and 
negative properties of derivatives we just discussed. If a derivative is a redundant 
asset, why would we trade it, and how could it cause financial disasters? The 
assumption of redundancy is of course a simplification; in practice, derivatives can 
hardly ever be replicated completely. Transaction costs, the lack of continuous trading 
opportunities, non-normal return distributions and non-storability of the underlying 
asset prohibit traders from replicating derivative trade-offs exactly. That’s how 
derivative markets continue to flourish. They attract other traders (or the same traders 
at different moments) than markets in the underlying. Since both markets are 
interrelated, information flows from one market to the other, as we analyze in this 
thesis.  
Part I consists of two market microstructure studies in which we explore how 
derivatives trading affects the price process of the underlying. More specifically, in a 
world of asymmetric information (some traders know more than others) we investigate 
how a derivative changes the quality of a market. Apart from studying information 
flows in general, we test whether option trading increases bid-ask spreads (trading 
costs), price volatility, losses to uninformed traders, and pricing errors. We use two 
research methodologies: experiments (Chapter 3) and a theoretical model (Chapter 4). 
Although there are some related experiments, the use of it is really new to this 
research topic. We use experiments, because they permit control of a number of 
confounding factors that plague empirical studies. When we study for example assets 
on which options are traded and compare them to assets with no related derivatives, 
we cannot simply ascribe differences in market quality to the trade in derivatives. 
Assets with derivatives are in general the more liquid assets not because of these 
derivatives; rather, they have derivatives because they are the most liquid and 
interesting to trade in. Even so plagued by natural biases are event studies that 
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investigate what happens to an underlying security when derivatives are introduced. 
The main problem with empirical studies is namely that the introduction of derivatives 
is not a random event, but may be biased towards more volatile assets (Vijh (1990)). 
To avoid such biases we use experiments where students trade in a simulated 
computerized market environment. This allows us to set the conditions for trading 
ourselves, and place all actions under a microscope. The study reveals important 
information flows from one market to the other, and overall indicates that an option 
improves the quality of a market.    
Experiments and empirical studies are obsolete if theory would provide clear 
guidance. There are however only a few theoretical studies on this topic, and the few 
studies have limited applicability to real world markets. For example, two studies 
(Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas (1998) and John, Koticha, Narayanan and 
Subrahmanyam (2000)) use a single-trade setting, and thus ignore any dynamic 
strategic behavior or learning effects. In the theoretical model of Chapter 4 we show 
the importance of such dynamics. We furthermore show the mutually interacting, non-
linear and sometimes opposing effects of three main variables: the number of 
informed trades, the proportion of liquidity motivated option trades, and the effective 
leverage that the option market provides to the informed trader. Though abstracting 
from real human behavior, the model helps to clarify what conditions lead to 
improvements in market quality. Just as the experiments, the model makes clear that 
an option market improves informational efficiency in the underlying in terms of 
reduced price errors (market prices are closer to their theoretical value). In an initial 
phase of derivative market development, liquidity motivated traders are however 
better off without derivatives. In the course of its development, this effect gradually 
reverses, but stock market volatility increases.  
The first part of this thesis addresses a very fundamental issue of derivatives: 
are they good or bad? The second part has a slightly narrower defined topic. It 
presents three different option pricing methodologies that deviate from the standard 
assumption of normally distributed returns. In the first two main chapters, we explore 
two econometric methodologies to infer from option prices information about future 
price movements in the underlying stock index. The interest in this topic arose from 
the observed skews, smiles and term-structure effects in implied volatility curves. One 
of the most plausible explanations is that returns do not follow a Brownian motion, as 
assumed in the standard Black and Scholes pricing formula. The first method we 
explore, translates the smile and skew patterns into a skewed version of the well-
6known Student-t distribution. The main advantages of this distribution are that it nests 
the normal distribution and that it contains direct parameters for the first three 
distributional moments (apart from the mean): variance, skewness and kurtosis. We 
describe how the parameters can be obtained and compare it with three other methods 
on FTSE index options. The comparison indicates that the skewed Student-t method 
yields a good fit to option prices, somewhat better than a popular implied tree 
approach. Compared to an approach that directly fits the implied volatility curve, it 
performs however worse. We explain this by the increased attention of option traders 
on implied volatility curves.  
The approach that we present in Chapter 8 is more complete than the one in 
Chapter 7. It does not just yield a distribution of returns at one future point in time, but 
a complete price process. It uses the whole implied volatility term structure: options 
with different maturities and different strikes. We use a GARCH-type price process, 
for which option-pricing procedures have recently become available. The strength of 
the implied GARCH approach is its ability to map a risk-neutral distribution to an 
actual distribution, whereas the skewed Student-t approach just yields risk-neutral 
distribution and is thus in fact only suitable to price other options. The implied 
GARCH approach on the other hand can be applied to the real world. It provides 
traders, risk managers and market regulators with an approach to infer the market's 
view on actual future price movements.  
The final study focuses on the energy market. Electricity markets worldwide, 
including all European Union countries, are in the process of liberalization and 
deregulation. This has opened a whole new field for financial researchers. Chapter 9 
presents a methodology to price European-style options on a very peculiar underlying 
asset: electricity spot prices. Electricity is a pure flow variable that can only be stored 
at high costs. That's why its spot price2 in liberalized markets is truly the result of 
supply and demand at that particular point in time, since no storage arbitrage can be 
applied. In combination with the relative inelasticity of both supply and demand, this 
results in prices with exceptionally high volatility, due to daily price changes of over 
1000%. A few so-called 'spikes', prices that temporarily deviate largely from ordinary 
levels, account for a large part of this volatility. Spikes represent a non-negligible risk 
in electricity markets, and are extremely relevant for option pricing, but it has proven 
to be no sinecure to model them properly. Instead of using the popular jump-diffusion 
2 Spot electricity is electricity with a very short delivery period, usually one day ahead. 
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models, we rely on a regime-switching model. In this model the spikes represent a 
regime that is separate from the normal mean-reverting process. This yields a better 
representation of electricity price behavior and permits the separation of an option 
price in a mean-reverting and a spike component. Based on Dutch electricity prices, 
we show that the spike component may represent nearly all of the value of out-of-the-
money call options. The pricing framework is relevant for the energy industry, in 
which this kind of options are increasingly traded to manage uncertain demand. It can 
furthermore be applied to price the large number of capped end-user power contracts 
and for the valuation of real assets, such as (flexible) power plants. 
8
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Part I 
Microstructure studies 
in derivatives markets 
10
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2 Introduction to the first part
In this part of the thesis we investigate the implications of asymmetric 
information for informational linkages between an asset market and a call option on 
that asset. This is an interesting issue because of the empirical evidence that option 
listings are associated with higher market quality for the underlying asset. A plausible 
explanation for this effect is that the presence of a correlated asset permits the sharing 
of effective price discovery across markets. Market makers in the stock can set more 
accurate prices if they learn from transactions in the option. We use two research 
methodologies to study this hypothesis: experiments and a theoretical model. With the 
experiments (Chapter 3) we place a market in which we observe all information sets 
under a microscope. This allows us to examine the implications of the strategic 
interactions of an insider, demanders of liquidity, and suppliers of liquidity for the 
linkages between the two markets and the time series of prices in general. With the 
theoretical model (Chapter 4) we analyze on a very detailed level how the price 
discovery process on stock and option market interact, and how this impacts the 
quality of a market.  
A number of insider-trading cases involving options suggest an increasing 
importance of options markets as an outlet for information based-trade3. At the same 
time, we observe a growth in the number of multiple listings of options across 
exchanges and an increased computerization of options trading4. These developments, 
along with increased liquidity, are accompanied by a reduction in bid-ask spreads, 
which make options an increasingly attractive product for informed trading.  
The empirical evidence for informational linkages between the market for 
listed options and the underlying stock is however mixed. Fleming, Ostdiek and 
3 See for example “Where Have the Insider Traders Gone? Options Markets are Their New 
Home,” The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1997, p. C1.  
4 See for example “Handel op optiebeurs verstomd” (trade on options exchange has fallen 
silent), Volkskrant, August 27, 2002 that describes the transfer on the Amsterdam options 
exchange from floor-based trading to screen-based trading.  
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Whaley (1996) find that stocks lead options, which the authors attribute to the overall 
lower trading costs in the stock market. Likewise, Vijh (1990) finds that very large 
option trades have limited effects on option prices, and concludes that they are 
unlikely to be information based. Sheikh and Ronn (1994) on the other hand find 
systematic patterns in option returns that are inconsistent with the view of options as 
redundant assets. They attribute these patterns to strategic behavior by informed and 
discretionary liquidity traders. Similarly, Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) find 
evidence that option markets are a venue for information based trading. Their results 
show that properly defined “bullish” and “bearish” option market volumes have 
predictive power for price movements in the underlying asset. 
Earnings announcements are typical events around which information 
becomes public. Jennings and Starks (1986) and Amin and Lee (1997) study the effect 
of options trading on price discovery around such earnings announcements. They 
provide evidence that the stock price adjustment to earnings announcements is faster 
for firms with traded options. 
There is a large body of empirical work that examines the influence of stock 
option listings on the time series properties of the market for the underlying asset.  
Much of this evidence suggests that the presence of listed options is associated with 
higher market quality in the market for the underlying stock. For example, Kumar, 
Sarin, and Shastri (1998) find that bid-ask spreads decline while quoted depth and 
informational efficiency increase subsequent to the listing of options. Numerous event 
studies find that option listing causes a decrease in volatility, although in several other 
studies the results are mixed or insignificant5. In recent subperiods Mayhew and 
Mihov (2000) even document increased volatility after option listings.  
As shown above, the amount of empirical work on the impact of option 
trading is huge. Many of those empirical studies have certainly been fuelled by the 
lack of clear guidance that theoretical models provide. For example, Biais and Hillion 
(1994) show that with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, the 
introduction of a nonredundant option has ambiguous consequences for informational 
efficiency. Although the option can help avoid a market breakdown, it enlarges the set 
5 The following studies find a decrease in volatility: CBOE (1975 and 1976), Trennepohl and 
Dukes (1979), Skinner (1989), Conrad (1989), Detemple and Jorion (1990), Damodaran and 
Lim (1991), Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1998). In the following the results are mixed or 
insignificant: Klemkosky and Maness (1980), Whiteside, Dukes and Dunne (1983), Fedenia 
and Grammatikos (1992), Fleming and Ostdiek (1999). 
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of trading strategies the insider can follow, and can reduce informational efficiency by 
making it more difficult for market makers to interpret the information content of 
trades. Back (1993) extends the Kyle (1985) framework to include a call option. His 
main result is that the listing of an option leaves average volatility unchanged.  
Of the comparatively small number of theoretical papers, at least two use a 
sequential trade model in the spirit of Glosten and Milgrom (1985): Easley, O’Hara 
and Srinivas (1998), and John, Koticha, Narayanan and Subrahmanyam (2000). Both 
models are developed in an asymmetric information setting in which informed traders 
may trade in stock or option markets. Easley et al. (1998) study whether option 
markets attract informed trading and whether they incorporate information more 
quickly than stock markets. They derive that under certain conditions options are 
attractive to traders with superior information. John, Koticha, Narayanan and 
Subrahmanyam (2000) use a single-trade model to study the impact of option trading 
and margin rules on the microstructure of stock and option markets. They analyze 
opening quotes and show that the introduction of option trading increases quoted 
spreads, but improves the informational efficiency of stock prices irrespective of 
whether or not binding margin requirements are in place. The increase in the 
informativeness of the trading process results because with option trading private 
information can be inferred from two sources – order flow in the stock and option 
markets.  
In the next chapter we use a controlled economic experiment where students 
trade in a laboratory environment. In that chapter we study the implications of 
derivative trading in an asymmetric information setting. The use of laboratory asset 
markets is relatively new to the market microstructure research, and the derivative 
research in particular. Although experimental research poses some difficulties (see for 
example Kagel and Roth (1995), and Friedman and Sunder (1994)), we will show in 
the next chapter that it may provide valuable insights. With experiments, the 
researcher can change some aspects of the economic environment while keeping other 
aspects constant. The researcher is furthermore able to control the amount of each 
trader’s information. Finally, experiments permit the researcher to study detailed 
trading information, not only including executed trades, but also all dealer quote 
revisions, and profits and losses incurred by the participants in the market.   
With the experiments we present a unique approach to study the overall effect 
of option trading on market quality in the underlying. In order to better understand the 
different mechanisms that lead to the results, in Chapter 4 we set up a dynamic 
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theoretical model that resembles the experimental design. The model is sequential, 
which means that only one trade is executed at a time, and has a similar design as the 
single-period models in Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas (1999) and John, Koticha, 
Narayanan and Subrahmanyam (2000). The experiments made convincingly clear that 
the effect of options must be analyzed in a dynamic setting, and not in a single-trade 
setting as do those theoretical studies. Options allow informed traders to strategically 
switch between two markets: traders are for example willing to forego immediate 
profits for larger profits at a later point in time. At the same time, dealers can infer 
information from both markets to set more accurate quotes. We therefore extend the 
single-trade model into a multi-trade model in which traders may trade more than once 
in a period and dealers update information after each trade. Because of the increased 
model complexity, outcomes are not available in closed form, but generated by 
simulating trading sequences.  
With the experiments we obtain insights beyond empirical studies in a 
relatively realistic setting including real human behavior. The theoretical model on the 
other hand is more stylized, but yields additional insights. In the model we assume for 
example that dealers are completely rational, competitive and risk-neutral, whereas in 
the experiments risk-aversion, fierce competition and collusion between dealers play a 
role. Abstracting from these behavioral aspects, the simulations provide new insights 
in the complex price discovery process that determines the quality of a market.  
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3 Stock market quality in the presence  
of a traded option 6
Theoretical evidence on the implications of options trading for market quality 
of the underlying does not provide clear guidance, and the empirical evidence for 
informational linkages between both markets is mixed and may be biased. Vijh (1990) 
for example makes an important note on all the event study results around option 
listings: because the listing of options is by no means a random event, the research 
results may be biased, especially when options are most likely to be introduced on 
options and in periods with high volatility. To circumvent the problem of empirical 
studies to control for such biases, we use a controlled economic experiment. The 
experimental results clarify the implications of asymmetric information for 
informational linkages between a stock market and a traded call option on that stock. 
Our experimental design incorporates both an asset and a call option on that 
asset (for simplicity we refer to the asset as a stock). The framework is based on the 
Kyle model with a single insider who knows the ex post liquidation value of the asset. 
Liquidity shocks in the stock and option are exogenously determined as in Back 
(1993), although we permit liquidity traders to act strategically in an attempt to 
minimize trading costs. We also employ a transparent quote-driven trading protocol, 
with all trades executed by competing dealers, and all trades visible to all participants. 
We thus obtain a standard trading mechanism, and impose no constraints on the 
strategies of the insider, dealers or liquidity traders. 
One experimental approach would be to compare a market with a traded 
option to a market operating in isolation. We do not attempt this since it would 
introduce control problems, as follows. Adding a traded option with dedicated option 
dealers would increase the supply of liquidity services and confound our attempt to 
isolate differences due to information flows. Adding a traded option without dedicated 
6 This chapter is based on: C. de Jong, C.G. Koedijk and C.R. Schnitzlein, 2002, “Stock market 
quality in the presence of a traded option”, working paper.  
16
dealers (requiring the stock dealers to make a market in both the stock and the call 
simultaneously) would dramatically increase the difficulty of the dealers’ task. 
Rather than take this approach we focus on the role of the ex post intrinsic 
value of the option. We set the strike price of the option equal to the (uninformed) 
expected value of the stock. With the stock distribution approximately Gaussian, the 
option distribution is highly skewed around its expected value. When the intrinsic 
value of the option is positive, the linkage between the two markets is direct in the 
sense that knowing the liquidation value in one market is perfectly informative with 
respect to the liquidation value in the other. The potential for option trading to 
contribute to price discovery in the stock here is large. When the option’s intrinsic 
value is zero, knowledge of the option liquidation value only permits a truncation of 
the stock value distribution, with a corresponding decoupling of price discovery. 
Therefore, the informational linkage between the two markets depends on the intrinsic 
value of the option. This allows an examination of how price discovery in the markets 
depends on the presence of a highly correlated asset. We argue below that differences 
in market quality for the underlying asset as a function of the ex post intrinsic value of 
the option will provide evidence for how and why the introduction of a traded option 
matters.  
Our major findings are the following. The insider trades aggressively in both 
the stock and the option, and typically trades in the market that affords the most 
profitable trading opportunity. Liquidity traders concentrate their trades at the end of 
the trading period when trading costs are low, and insider trading patterns mimic those 
of liquidity traders. Price discovery with respect to intrinsic value takes place in both 
markets and this leads to informational linkages: dealers in each market revise quotes 
in the direction consistent with an information story in response to trades in the other. 
A strong set of results pertains to the effect of the intrinsic value of the option 
on liquidity and price efficiency. When the intrinsic value of the option is positive, 
convergence to intrinsic value in the stock is faster, liquidity trader losses in the stock 
are smaller, and the volatility of transactions prices is lower than when the option’s 
intrinsic value is zero. This appears due to the greater information content of trades in 
the option market in this case: this information is used by the dealers in the stock to 
more rapidly pinpoint intrinsic value. Of particular importance here is how differences 
in the dealers’ conditional expectations for the stock and option values interact with 
the strategy of the insider to increase the message space of the dealers, and help 
dealers more rapidly pinpoint fundamental value. 
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Although the experimental asset market literature is large and growing, there 
are relatively few studies that incorporate derivatives. For example, Forsythe, Palfrey 
and Plott (1982, 1984) and Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984) find that in a 
private-value setting7 the inclusion of a futures market speeds convergence to 
informationally efficient pricing, although while the latter study finds that futures 
reduce spot-price variability, the former study does not. Plott and Sunder (1988) 
compare private-value markets organized with two or three trader types and three 
states with two other types of markets. In the first there is a single trader type 
(common values) and in the second there are three option-like contingent claim 
securities, each paying off in one (and only one) state. They find that the contingent 
claims markets aggregate information better than the single security market and 
propose possible explanations including the importance of knowledge of others’ 
preferences as a necessary condition for the aggregation of diverse information. 
However they conclude their understanding of the issue is so incomplete they cannot 
even provide a precise conjecture (p. 1116). Finally, Kluger and Wyatt (1995) find 
that in a two-state private-value setting, an alternating asset market and option market 
(that are never open simultaneously) converge to equilibrium faster than an asset 
market alone. What distinguishes our experimental design from previous experimental 
work therefore is its focus on information flows in a common-value setting, where the 
option market and the stock market are open continuously. 
A barrier to experimental research that incorporates options is the necessary 
complexity of such markets. In order to ensure that our subjects could master the 
trading environment and employ sophisticated strategies we used only advanced 
finance students who were already familiar with options and their associated non-
linear payoffs. We also developed and employed custom software that aided subjects 
in mastering a setting that involves the trading of two interdependent assets. Finally, 
7 In a private-value experimental setting, a motive for trade is induced by introducing a limited 
number of states (two or three) and giving two or three different trader types state contingent 
payoffs that are negatively correlated (e.g., trader type I receives a high payoff in state A and a 
low payoff in state B while type II traders have payoffs that are reversed).  Typically subsets of 
traders are given information with respect to which states can or cannot occur in a given 
period. Allocative efficiency measures the extent to which the trader type with the highest state 
contingent valuation holds the assets (which are in fixed supply) at the end of the period, and 
price efficiency measures the extent to which prices converge to the highest dividend in the 
realized state. 
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we relied on extensive training and multiple replications in order to verify the effect of 
experience on outcomes: each cohort of subjects was kept intact for a minimum of 
four experimental sessions in addition to an initial training session. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1 we describe the 
experimental design and procedures. In Section 3.2 the data are presented and 
analyzed. In Section 3.3 we discuss our results in the context of theoretical models and 
in Section 3.4 we conclude. 
3.1  Experimental design and procedures 
Our experimental design is roughly based on the Kyle (1985) model, 
generalized to include a single call option. There is a single insider that knows the 
intrinsic value of the stock and two liquidity traders who receive asset specific 
exogenous liquidity shocks in both the stock and the call. Three competing dealers 
maintain outstanding bids and asks for the stock and three additional dealers make a 
market in the call. 
We impose no constraints on the timing, number, or direction of trades the 
insider may make in either market. For example, the insider is permitted to trade 
against her information in either market in an attempt to camouflage her information. 
We do not impose borrowing constraints or short-sales constraints, so leverage effects 
that might make options attractive to informed traders are not present in the 
experimental markets. The insider’s choice to trade in the option or the stock is 
dictated entirely by the relative magnitude of profitable trading opportunities in the 
stock and the option, and the price responsiveness to order flow implied by the timing 
and direction of her trades. We do limit all trades to a single unit in order to reduce the 
difficulty of the dealer’s task, and sharpen our ability to make inferences with respect 
to the informational content of the order flow. 
As is standard in the microstructure literature (and more specifically in 
microstructure models that incorporate an option, e.g., Back (1993), Easley, O’Hara, 
and Srinivas (1998), and John, Koticha, Narayanan, and Subrahmanyam (2000)) we 
impose liquidity shocks in each market that are exogenous to intrinsic value. This 
avoids a “no trade” equilibrium as in Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Biais and 
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Hillion (1994).8 An exogenous liquidity trading motive is particularly natural in 
options markets where many trades are hedging related and by their nature non-
informational. We operationalize liquidity shocks by giving each liquidity trader a 
required end-of-period position in both the stock and the call. We make these demands 
inelastic by imposing penalties of sufficient magnitude that are proportional to the 
distance between a liquidity trader’s final position and his required position. Although 
their required positions are exogenously determined each period, there are no 
constraints on how liquidity traders arrive at these positions: they are free to choose 
the timing of trades in both markets in order to minimize trading costs.9 We also 
impose larger liquidity shocks on average in the stock market. This matches a feature 
of field markets, and is a possible impediment to an equilibrium in which the insider 
trades the option.10
We employ a transparent quote-driven trading protocol: dealers maintain 
standing bids and asks in separate centralized limit-order books for the stock and the 
option. This is a standard feature of many field markets, and reduces the complexity of 
the task for subjects since they transact against known prices. A dealer is free to 
compete for order flow by adjusting his bid or ask at any time and there are no 
8 The imposition of exogenous liquidity shocks has also become a standard feature of market 
microstructure experiments. The use of computerized liquidity traders (Schnitzlein (1996), 
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1998)) has the advantage of reducing the required number of subjects 
while allowing the perfect control of the timing and size of liquidity shocks. In this study, 
subjects are employed in the role of liquidity traders to allow the examination of issues 
pertaining to their strategic timing of trades in order to minimize transactions costs. Other 
studies that employ strategic liquidity traders include Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (1997), and 
Cason (2000). Finally Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999, 2000) employ both strategic and 
computerized liquidity traders. 
9 We give each liquidity trader uncorrelated required positions in the stock and the option for 
experimental expediency: it reduces the number of agents required - an important consideration 
since our design required keeping cohorts of subjects intact for four sessions. This design 
feature does not change the incentives of liquidity traders to act strategically in order to 
minimize trading costs.  
10 In Easley, O’Hara, and Srinavas (1998), whether an informed trader only uses stocks or 
trades both stocks and options depends in part on the fraction of liquidity traders in the option. 
Theory is silent on the relationship between the magnitude of liquidity shocks in the stock and 
option. Relative stock and option volumes suggest that non-informationally motivated trade is 
probably larger in absolute terms in stocks than options. We therefore match this feature of 
field markets with our experimental design.  
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constraints or costs associated with quote revisions. Unlike most theoretical models 
where dealers are assumed to be risk-neutral agents that set quotes equal to conditional 
expectations, dealers in the experimental markets are motivated to engage in price 
discovery in order to earn trading profits.  
We include only one call option (and no put options) to create the following 
asymmetry. When the intrinsic value of the option is zero, knowledge of the option 
liquidation value only permits a truncation of the stock value distribution. When the 
intrinsic value of the option exceeds zero, the liquidation value in one market is 
perfectly informative with respect to the liquidation value in the other. This design 
allows us to analyze how the introduction of a correlated asset like an option affects 
market quality while enhancing experimental control: since the same group of subjects 
participates in multiple market periods when the intrinsic value of the option is either 
positive or zero, we control for the influence individuals might have on market quality 
as a function of (positive or zero) intrinsic option value.  
3.1.1 Parameter values and variable distributions 
Agents begin the first market period of a session with a cash balance that 
differs across the type of agent. Cash balances and all other values are expressed in 
laboratory dollars (L$). The insider has a starting cash balance of L$450, the stock and 
option dealers of L$550, and the liquidity traders of L$900. The differences in starting 
cash balances are intended to minimize differences in profits by trader type. The 
starting cash balances average L$617. Trading profits (losses) are carried forward to 
subsequent periods. At the end of the final market period, the cash balances are 
multiplied by 0.08 to convert laboratory dollars to Dutch Guilders (NLG)11, and each 
subject is privately paid his earnings. Given the zero-sum nature of the trading game, 
cash payments (net of any penalties incurred by traders) average L$617 (NLG 50) per 
subject per session. 
Each market period the stock value is known to be drawn from an 
approximate normal distribution with mean of L$100, standard deviation of L$12, and 
support on the whole laboratory dollars between L$50 and L$150, both inclusive. The 
11 One Dutch Guilder equals approximately € 0.45, or US$ 0.50 at the time the experiments 
took place. 
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value of the European call option with a strike of L$100 is max[Stock – 100, 0]. A 
riskless asset (cash) is included that for simplicity pays an interest rate of zero. 
3.1.2 Traders 
Four different types of agents are present in each market period: one insider, 
two liquidity traders, three stock dealers and three option dealers. We define a cohort 
to be the nine subjects that always trade together. Every cohort participates in four or 
five different sessions. Each session consists of between five and nine different market 
periods, with each market period defined by a different set of random draws for the 
asset values and liquidity shocks.   
The insider is the only agent to learn the end-of-period stock and option value 
prior to the start of the trade. Each of the two liquidity traders is required to finish the 
trading period with a randomly determined position in the stock and the option. Each 
trader’s required position is determined by an independent draw from a discrete 
uniform distribution. The draws range from –6 to +6 for the stock, and from –3 to +3 
for the option, each integer-valued and excluding 0. If a trader does not meet this 
requirement, a penalty is assessed at the end of the period equal to L$100 times the 
absolute value of the deviation between the required position and the actual end-of-
period position. The magnitude of the penalty ensures that demand is inelastic at the 
required position. Each period, total trading profits and losses of each trader are added 
to starting cash balances and carried forward to the next period. Therefore, traders 
have an incentive to minimize trading costs. Each liquidity trader privately learns his 
required position prior to the start of each market period. 
Three stock dealers make a market in the stock and three option dealers make 
a market in the option. The dealers have to provide quotes at all times, with the only 
restriction that they must lie in the interval [50, 150] for the stock and [0, 50] for the 
option. Dealers see the quotes reported by all other dealers and are allowed to revise 
their quotes at any time. Apart from providing bids and asks, they can initiate trades 
themselves as well, either in the market for which they provide quotes, or in the other 
market. At the beginning of each market period, dealers do not learn either the end-of-
period stock or option value nor the liquidity traders’ required positions, and they do 
not receive required positions. All information pertaining to distributions, parameters, 
and the rules governing trade is common knowledge. 
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3.1.3  Communication 
All interactions among subjects are conducted on a series of networked 
personal computers with custom software. The computer screen in front of each 
subject contains continuously updated market information, including trade history, 
cash balance, stock and option positions, net market order imbalance (buyer initiated 
trades less seller initiated trades), current bids and asks, and the time remaining in the 
current trading period. The trade history shows the trades that have occurred, whether 
a buyer or seller initiated them, the price of the trade, and each agent’s own 
transactions. In addition, the insider’s screen shows the end-of-period value of both 
assets, and each liquidity trader’s screen shows his end-of-period required positions 
for the stock and option.  
3.1.4  Trading procedures 
Before the trading interval can begin, each dealer in the stock and each dealer 
in the option must submit a bid and an ask.12 A dealer’s bid represents the price at 
which he/she is willing to buy a single unit of the risky asset while a dealer’s ask 
represents the price at which he/she is willing to sell a single unit. Only the stock 
dealers submit quotes in the stock market, and only the option dealers submit quotes in 
the option market. After all dealers have entered their quotes, the markets open and 
the trading interval clock begins a 60-second countdown. Each dealer does not 
observe the other dealers’ quotes until the market opens. During the trading period 
traders are free to hit inside quotes in both markets, and each dealer is free to revise 
his outstanding quotes at any time. The quotes are displayed on each agent’s computer 
screen so that bids are in ascending order and asks are in descending order, with the 
inside quotes highlighted. A dealer can move to the “inside” on either side of the 
spread by improving on the current inside quote. When a trader initiates a trade at the 
inside bid or ask, all traders and dealers observe the transaction and the price, but they 
do not learn which trader initiated the trade. The market period clock is stopped while 
the dealers go through the process of resubmitting quotes. Therefore, the actual 
12 Starting bids and asks in the stock must bracket the expected value of L$100, starting bids 
and asks in the option must bracket the expected value of L$4.78.  
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trading interval requires considerably more than 60 seconds: most took between ten 
and twelve minutes. Trades represent a zero-sum game, with the profitability of each 
trade determined on the basis of the relation between the trading price and the end-of-
period asset value. Trading profits on a trade are equal to the signed trade (+1 for a 
buy, -1 for a sell) times the end-of-period asset value less the transaction price. All 
transactions are for a single unit of the risky asset. 
At the end of each market period each subject is informed of the actual end-
of-period value of the stock and the option, personal trading profits (or losses), any 
penalties incurred (in case of the liquidity traders), and his final cash balance after 
liquidation of end-of-period positions at stock and option intrinsic value. 
3.1.5 Subjects and experimental procedures 
The participants in the experiments are students in the Rotterdam School of 
Management at Erasmus University. All were students with a specialization in finance 
(32 undergraduates and 4 graduate students). The first set of markets involving cohort 
I was conducted in September of 1999, followed by a set of markets involving cohort 
II in January 2000. In order to verify our results, we formed cohorts III and IV and ran 
an additional set of markets in March and April 2001.  
Each cohort went through training in the information structure, variable 
distributions, and parameter values, and on average five market periods of trade. The 
training round lasted between two and three hours, and ensures that subjects possess a 
good understanding of the rules of the market.  
Each session was preceded by a review of trading rules, parameter values and 
distributions. The review became progressively shorter as the subjects became more 
experienced. In the first session, subjects were randomly assigned to roles. In the 
second to fourth sessions, the roles of subjects were changed according to a predefined 
scheme of which they were unaware: subjects are insiders at most once, and liquidity 
traders, stock dealers and option dealers at least once and at most twice. The benefit of 
this role-switching scheme is that it controls for differences across participants - we do 
not want those differences to drive differences between trader types – and it provides a 
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deep understanding of the market setting that comes from assuming the roles of 
different agent types.13
3.2  Results 
Each of the four cohorts participated in an initial training session and then 
four (or in one case, five) two-hour sessions. Since subjects were assigned to new 
roles at the beginning of each session, we exclude the first two market periods from 
each session in order to allow subjects to refamiliarize themselves with their roles, the 
trading rules, and the software. This yields an initial data set of 17 sessions, 132 
market periods and 3,475 transactions. 
Our initial data analysis revealed mild learning effects before the third 
session: dealer losses are sometimes large over the first two sessions, with the dealers 
on average incurring losses. In contrast over the last two sessions the dealer industry is 
profitable in all four cohorts. Since dealers’ quote-setting strategies are completely 
unconstrained (dealers may set bids and asks at the support of the asset value 
distribution – prices that cannot be unprofitable) dealer losses are clearly inconsistent 
with equilibrium behavior. Since our intention is to present “equilibrium” results, we 
therefore report analysis based on the last two sessions from each cohort. Our 
“experienced” data set consists of 8 sessions, 62 market periods, and 1,630 
transactions. As a robustness check we also performed the analyses that follow with 
all 17 sessions. Major results are unchanged although on most dimensions behavior 
shows more variation when the initial sessions are included. 
Each market period in each session is distinguished by a distinct set of random 
draws for the stock value, the option value, and the liquidity traders’ demands. 
Summary statistics pertaining to these draws are reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.  
13 Ball, et al. (1991) find that convergence to equilibrium strategies in bargaining games with 
adverse selection is speeded by rotating the roles of subjects. 
 25
O
p
ti
o
n
d
ea
le
rs
-2
.2
3
.6
-5
.1
-1
3
.5
1
5
.6
0
.2
3
.8
1
0
.2
1
.6
3
.2
L
iq
.
tr
ad
er
s
-9
.5
-1
4
.6
-1
1
.2
-5
.5
-1
2
.9
-3
.7
-9
.6
-1
1
.3
-9
.8
1
.3
In
si
d
er
 
1
1
.4
1
1
.1
1
7
.2
2
2
.8
6
.7
3
.0
8
.1
1
.0
1
0
.2
2
.5
S
to
ck
d
ea
le
rs
 
2
5
.5
9
.6
8
.8
1
6
.8
1
6
.4
-1
4
.1
4
2
.4
3
9
.5
1
8
.1
6
.4
L
iq
.
tr
ad
er
s
-7
0
.7
-3
5
.9
-6
4
.9
-6
6
.4
-5
3
.7
-1
3
.7
-9
9
.7
-5
5
.0
-5
7
.5
9
.0
In
si
d
er
4
4
.5
2
6
.7
5
5
.2
4
9
.8
3
3
.4
2
9
.7
5
2
.8
2
0
.8
3
9
.1
4
.6
L
iq
.
tr
ad
er
s
3
.7
3
.4
3
.9
4
.0
3
.6
4
.4
4
.0
4
.1
3
.9
In
si
d
er 7
.1
6
.0
3
.3
4
.1
3
.1
1
.8
4
.8
5
.5
4
.4
L
iq
.
tr
ad
er
s
7
.4
9
.1
7
.9
8
.0
7
.4
7
.8
7
.5
7
.3
7
.8
In
si
d
er 8
.1
4
.9
7
.0
5
.9
9
.3
4
.1
5
.9
4
.5
6
.2
O
p
ti
o
n
3
.7
4
.7
4
.9
4
.4
8
.6
3
.4
2
.6
3
.8
4
.5
(6
.5
)
S
to
ck
1
0
0
.1
9
9
.7
1
0
0
.1
9
8
.1
1
0
4
.1
9
8
.6
9
7
.0
9
7
.3
9
9
.4
-1
1
.7
P
er
io
d
s
7
.0
7
.0
8
.0
8
.0
8
.0
8
.0
8
.0
8
.0
S
es
si
o
n
1
-1
1
-2
2
-1
2
-2
3
-1
3
-2
4
-1
4
-2
S
to
ck
T
a
b
le
 3
.1
.
A
ss
et
 v
a
lu
es
, 
tr
a
d
in
g
 a
ct
iv
it
y 
a
n
d
 p
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y.
 
T
h
is
 t
ab
le
 r
ep
o
rt
s 
as
se
t 
v
al
u
es
, 
tr
ad
in
g
 a
ct
iv
it
y 
an
d
 p
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 o
f 
th
e 
6
2
 m
ar
k
et
 p
er
io
d
s,
 
ag
g
re
g
at
ed
 b
y 
se
ss
io
n
.
O
p
ti
o
n
S
to
ck
P
ro
fi
ts
A
ss
et
 v
al
u
e
A
v
er
ag
e
O
p
ti
o
n
M
ea
n
S
td
.E
rr
. 
(D
ev
)
#
 T
ra
d
es
 /
  
P
er
io
d
26
A principal finding that we analyze in detail below is that price efficiency in 
the market for the stock is higher when the intrinsic value of the option is positive (in-
the-money). This effect is very strong, is present in all four cohorts, and is highly 
significant when we use a matched-pairs t-test to compare a single mean level of price 
efficiency for each cohort when the ex post value of the option is in-the-money, with a 
single mean when the option is out-of-the-money (t = 6.86, p<0.01).14 A comparably 
strong result obtains for the effect of a positive intrinsic option value on stock price 
volatility (t = 6.48, p<0.01). Later in this section we analyze the behavior that leads to 
these main results. This requires analysis on the level of the session, market period, 
and in some cases individual transactions. In order to account for possible session-
level interdependencies in the data, we report all regressions with p-values that are 
based on GMM t-statistics statistics that are consistent in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.15 All reported p-values are for two-tailed tests. 
3.2.1 Stock market quality and the intrinsic option value 
In this section we characterize stock market quality as a function of whether 
the ex post intrinsic value of the option is positive or zero. Our initial measures of 
market quality are price efficiency, volatility, and liquidity trader losses. 
We define price errors (PE) as the difference between intrinsic value and the 
transaction price, in absolute value. We also report price errors relative to the midpoint 
of the inside bid-ask spread (average of highest bid and lowest ask) in absolute value. 
Relative price errors provide a measure of how rapidly information in the order flow is 
14 We report both t-tests and results from the non-parametric randomization (permutations) test. 
With four cohorts, the randomization test yields the theoretical minimum p-value for a two-
tailed test (0.125). 
15 Analysis on the level of the cohort is most conservative since observations across sessions 
are by definition independent. We test for cohort effects (dependencies across sessions within 
cohorts) by analyzing realized bid-ask spreads. We choose bid-ask spreads because although 
we change the roles of agents between sessions, the task of dealers is most complex and 
potentially subject to the influence of previously observed behavior. We test for dependencies 
by performing both parametric and nonparametric ANOVA on average session realized 
spreads in the option, with the data grouped by cohort. None of the tests approach even 
marginal significance. The variation in behavior across sessions is primarily due to the agents 
that assume the role of dealer, and not the cohort to which the dealers pertain. 
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incorporated into market prices in the presence of a strategic insider who chooses 
between transacting in the option and the stock. 
When the intrinsic value of the option is positive, mean price errors in the 
stock market are significantly lower. This effect is very strong, and is present at the 
level of cohorts, sessions, market periods, and individual transactions. We augment 
the cohort level analysis reported above by calculating for each session both a “within 
session” mean of the periods in which the intrinsic value of the option is zero, and a 
“within session” mean when the intrinsic value is positive. In seven out of eight 
sessions mean price errors are smaller when the intrinsic value of the option is 
positive16. Both a matched pairs t-test and the non-parametric randomization test yield 
a highly significant difference (p<0.01). 
Realized spreads in the stock (ask minus bid at the time of each transaction) 
are only slightly smaller when the intrinsic value of the option is positive. Aggregating 
on the level of the session as above, the difference is insignificant. The reduction in 
realized spreads does not explain the increase in price efficiency: the informational 
efficiency of the midpoint of the bid-ask spread also increases when the intrinsic value 
of the option is positive (p=0.03 and p=0.06 for the t-test and randomization tests 
respectively). Mean price errors measured relative to transaction prices and spread 
midpoints, and realized spreads by session are reported in Table 3.2. 
16 The first session of cohort 4 is the only exception, and can be explained as follows. In all 
three periods in which the option is in-the-money, both liquidity traders had to sell the stock. 
As a result, all liquidity traders traded in the opposite direction from the insider, complicating 
price discovery. 
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Sess. Per. Avg. Stock Option PES PES PEC PEC PESC PESC Stock  Option DPS
stock trades trades (price) (mid) (price) (mid) (price) (mid) spread Spread (mid)
1-1 5 95.0 15.2 12.6 9.9 10.7 2.0 5.2 6.3 8.2 16.2 8.7 1.8
1-2 4 91.3 18.8 8.8 6.7 8.2 3.6 4.7 5.7 7.1 11.1 6.7 1.3
2-1 4 90.5 18.8 8.8 11.2 11.9 5.5 7.5 9.4 10.5 9.9 9.0 1.2
2-2 6 91.7 16.3 8.5 11.1 10.7 2.9 3.7 8.3 8.3 10.5 3.7 1.6
3-1 3 88.0 20.3 9.7 8.9 11.1 1.8 4.3 6.6 8.9 15.4 7.0 0.9
3-2 5 92.4 13.2 6.2 7.3 8.4 1.4 3.7 5.4 6.9 8.2 6.4 1.0
4-1 5 91.0 15.6 12.6 12.4 13.8 1.4 3.5 7.5 9.2 13.2 5.4 2.1
4-2 5 89.6 12.8 12.6 9.3 9.8 2.8 4.2 6.1 7.0 17.3 5.9 0.8
Avg 91.2 16.4 10.0 9.6 10.6 2.7 4.6 6.9 8.3 12.7 6.6 1.3
1-1 2 113.0 20.5 15.5 7.0 11.0 7.7 7.5 7.3 9.5 14.6 7.3 1.6
1-2 3 111.0 10.3 12.0 4.3 3.4 3.9 6.4 4.1 5.0 10.6 9.4 1.1
2-1 4 109.8 15.3 9.5 5.8 7.3 4.5 5.5 5.3 6.6 10.3 7.6 1.0
2-2 2 117.5 9.5 12.5 10.1 11.4 10.6 11.9 10.4 11.7 8.7 5.5 1.5
3-1 5 113.8 21.8 12.2 5.3 8.5 4.7 6.3 5.1 7.7 12.4 10.8 0.8
3-2 3 109.0 13.0 8.7 4.0 4.2 3.0 4.7 3.6 4.4 7.8 7.5 0.7
4-1 3 107.0 14.3 14.3 13.0 9.9 5.4 5.3 9.2 7.6 17.3 6.2 1.0
4-2 3 110.0 12.7 8.7 5.4 10.3 5.4 6.1 5.4 8.6 15.2 6.8 0.6
Avg 111.4 14.7 11.7 6.9 8.3 5.7 6.7 6.3 7.6 12.1 7.6 1.0
1.7 -1.7 2.7 2.3 -3.0 -2.1 0.6 0.7 0.6 -1.0 0.3
0.4% 3.0% 2.1% 7.2% 43.5% 49.7% 45.5% 14.9% 3.7%
70.0% 5.8% 1.7% 3.5% 41.9% 47.8% 45.7% 15.9% 0.0%p-value: matched pairs rand. test
Difference
Panel A: Intrinsic value of the option is zero
Panel B: Intrinsic value of the option is positive
p-value: matched pairs t-test
 29
Table 3.2. Price efficiency, spreads, volatility and the intrinsic value of the option.
This table reports price errors, realized bid-ask spreads and volatility for each of the eight 
sessions in the experiments. Panel A is based on the periods where the end-of-period intrinsic 
value of the option is zero; Panel B is based on the periods where the end-of-period intrinsic 
value is positive. PES (price) is the mean of the absolute difference between the stock 
transaction price and the intrinsic stock value. PES (mid) also measures price errors in the 
stock, but relative to the midpoint of the bid-ask spread. PESC (price) is the mean of the 
absolute difference between the transaction price and the stock or option intrinsic value 
depending on the asset traded, and is our measure of price efficiency in the aggregate. PESC
(mid) is defined similarly. Stock (Option) spread is the realized stock (option) bid-ask spread at 
the time of a stock (option) transaction. DPS is the mean change in the midpoint of the bid-ask 
spread, and is a measure of market volatility. In all cases, an average is calculated for each 
market period in a session, and then each market period is weighted equally. When option 
intrinsic value is positive, stock price errors and volatility are significantly lower, and option 
price errors are higher. 
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What causes the dramatic increase in price efficiency when the option is in 
the money? The short answer is that the insider’s trades in the option are more 
informative only when the option’s ex post intrinsic value is positive. This in turn 
allows dealers in the stock market to benefit from price discovery in the option 
market. We analyze this phenomenon in detail in Section 3.2.2. 
Higher price efficiency when the intrinsic value of the option is positive is 
also associated with lower stock price volatility. Our measure of volatility is 
constructed as follows. First we calculate the change in the midpoint of the bid-ask 
spread for each transaction in a market period (|mpt – mpt-1|), and then compute the 
average for each market period. Spread midpoints are used in order to control for bid-
ask bounce, with changes in the midpoint serving as a proxy for the transaction-
induced revision in the conditional expectation of the intrinsic stock value.17 Market 
period averages are calculated for each session and reported in Table 3.2. Weighting 
each session equally, mean midpoint price changes are 27% less when the intrinsic 
value of the option is positive (p=0.04 and p<0.01 for the t-test and randomization 
tests respectively). This effect is present in all eight sessions (and all four cohorts), 
and indicates a more direct convergence to intrinsic value in the stock. 
Our third measure of stock market quality is the magnitude of liquidity trader 
losses. Liquidity traders have inelastic demands that are uncorrelated with intrinsic 
value, and as expected incur large significant losses from their stock market activity. 
These losses decline by 44% when the intrinsic value of the option is positive (Table 
3.3). This effect occurs in six of the eight sessions and is due to liquidity traders on 
average trading at prices closer to intrinsic value. In the two sessions where it does not 
occur, it is explained by the average direction of liquidity trades relative to the 
intrinsic value of the stock (for example, in the first session with cohort 4, in all three 
periods in which the option is in-the-money, both liquidity traders had to sell the 
stock, resulting in very large liquidity trader losses). In Table 3.4 we present an 
analysis that controls for the direction of liquidity trades relative to the value of the 
stock and option, and we find a highly significant reduction in liquidity trader losses in 
the stock in the presence of an option with positive intrinsic value (p<0.01). 
17 Inventory effects may imply this conditional expectation need not be centered at the spread 
midpoint. We assume these effects are of second order importance. 
 31
3.2.2 Price errors and time 
In this section we examine the role of the option’s intrinsic value on the 
convergence to informationally efficient pricing in the stock using transactions level 
data and a parsimonious specification. In every market period, the trading activity of 
the insider causes stock and option prices converge to intrinsic value by the end of the 
market period; our focus here is on how the intrinsic value of the option affects the 
speed of convergence to strong-form efficiency. 
Recall that at the beginning of a market period, dealers know that the 
probabilities of the option being in or out-of-the-money at the end of the period are 
roughly equal. We regress stock price errors on a constant, the absolute difference 
between the stock value and its unconditional expectation (DEV), the product of the 
net liquidity shock in the stock and the difference between the stock value and its 
unconditional expectation (COR(S)),18 an indicator variable that indicates whether or 
not the insider initiated the trade (INSIDER), the transaction time (TIME), and the 
transaction time interacted with a variable that indicates whether or not the intrinsic 
option value is positive (TIME*ITM). To derive the transaction time we order the 
stock transactions and divide them by the total number of transactions in a period. 
This definition of time accounts for the clustering of transactions in clock time. The 
number of observations is 974 and the adjusted R2 is 25.8%.  
PE = b0 + b1DEV + b2COR(S) + b3INSIDER + b4TIME + b5TIME*ITM  (1) 
  10.32  0.20  -0.03          -3.51   -3.79      -4.87   
  (9.09) (2.62) (-4.57)        (-4.83) (-2.57)    (-3.41) 
All parameter estimates have the expected sign and are significant at the 1% 
level. When the asset value is extreme, price errors are significantly higher: in this 
case convergence to informationally efficient pricing requires more time. When the 
net liquidity trade is in the direction of the insider’s information price errors are lower. 
This is due to fewer trades on the “high price error” side of the spread as price 
converges to intrinsic value, and a simpler information extraction problem for the 
dealers. When the insider transacts price errors are lower, because her trades are on the 
“low price error” side of the spread as insider activity moves price toward intrinsic 
18 This variable measures the extent to which the liquidity traders trade in the same direction as 
the insider’s information. 
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value: it is the cumulative effect of insider trading that causes price errors to decline 
with time. 
The coefficient on the time of trade variable interacted with the positive 
option value indicator is negative and highly significant. This indicates more rapid 
convergence when the option is in-the-money. This is because when the option is in-
the-money, the option value is perfectly correlated with the stock value: trades in the 
option help dealers pinpoint the value of the stock. When the option is out-of-the-
money, trades in the option only aid the dealers in truncating the stock value 
distribution. We analyze in detail in Section 3.2.6. below the informational linkages 
between the two markets. 
3.2.3 Insider profits and behavior 
Market period data on profitability by trader type are reported in Table 3.1. 
Profits on each trade are (V-P)*Q, where V is the end-of-period value of the asset, P is 
the transaction price, and Q is an indicator (+1 for a buy, -1 for a sale). An agent’s 
market period profits are the sum of the profits on all transactions that agent 
participated in during that market period. Because the insider is the only agent who 
knows the terminal value of the stock and option, the behavior of the insider is critical 
in determining patterns in informational efficiency. 
The profits earned by the insider are significantly greater than zero in both the 
stock market and the option market. In most market periods (56%) the insider earns 
profits in both the stock market and the option market. Over the 62 trading periods, the 
insider traded 384 times in the stock and 234 times in the option.  
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Figure 3.1. Temporal patterns in trading activity and the bid-ask spread.
This figure shows the concentration of both insider and liquidity trader activity at the end of 
the trading period and the temporal decline in realized bid-ask spreads. The temporal 
consolidation of trading is consistent with the theoretical model of Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988) in which both insiders and a subset of liquidity traders are given discretion over the 
timing of their trades. Liquidity traders prefer to trade when the market is deep (when trades 
have little impact on price). This in turn gives liquidity traders strong incentives to trade 
together. The insider also prefers to trade when the market is deep. The tendency of spreads to 
narrow over time is also observed in another dealer market experiment (Lamoureux and 
Schnitzlein (1997)). This type of disequilibrium behavior is roughly consistent with the ad-hoc 
price adjustment rule posited by Bulow and Klemper (1994). 
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Most insider trades occur late in the trading period (Figure 3.1): on average, 
one-quarter of insider volume is not transacted until over two-thirds of the trading 
interval has expired. Temporal patterns in insider trading almost exactly match 
patterns in liquidity trading, with the correlation between the time of insider trades and 
liquidity trades 87% (p<0.01). The temporal concentration of trades is consistent with 
the theoretical model of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) in which both insiders and a 
subset of liquidity traders are given discretion over the timing of their trades. Unlike 
the model, most trading is concentrated late in the trading period. This important 
difference is due in part to the complete absence of ex ante constraints on when 
liquidity traders must trade in the experimental markets. With absolute discretion over 
the timing of trades liquidity traders prefer to trade late when bid-ask spreads are more 
closely centered on intrinsic value.  
The insider infrequently engages in unprofitable trades (3.7% of all insider 
trades). The majority of these trades are in the option in the opposite direction of the 
insider’s information. This is evidence that these trades are intended to mislead 
dealers, since in most trading periods this is the least unprofitable trade when an 
insider trades in the opposite direction of her information.19 At the time of most 
insider trades (72.6%) the insider can trade profitably in either the stock or option 
market. In most of these cases (86.3%) the insider chooses to transact in the market 
that at that instant offers the more profitable trading opportunity. When the option is 
in-the-money, insiders make 51.4% of their trades and earn 44.0% of their trading 
profits by transacting in the option. When the option is out-of-the-money, insiders 
make 34.5% of their trades and earn only 8.8% of their profits from trading in the 
option: the option market’s role in the price discovery process is more limited in this 
case. 
19 Bloomfield and O’Hara (2000) is an experimental study that investigates whether transparent 
markets can survive in the presence of less transparent markets. In their design, both a liquidity 
trader and an insider may conceal their trades by trading with a low transparency dealer. They 
conclude that strategic trading does not play an important role in their markets and traders are 
unwilling to pay a premium to have their trades concealed, although there is evidence that 
insiders sometimes trade against their information with transparent dealers in order to fool the 
market. The strategy space is rich in the sense that traders can choose among multiple trade 
sizes, however they have limited ability to choose the timing of trades: all trades are executed 
simultaneously at one of eight trading rounds each period, and therefore time per se does not 
play an explicit role. 
 35
We decompose insider profits by regressing insider profits on a constant, an 
indicator that takes on the value of one when the liquidation value of the option is 
positive (ITM), the distance of the stock value from its unconditional expectation 
(DEV), the number of liquidity trades in the stock (LIQ(S)), the number of liquidity 
trades in the option (LIQ(O)), the product of the net liquidity shock in the stock and 
the difference between the stock value and its unconditional expectation (COR(S)), 
and a similar statistic for the option (COR(O)). 
PROFINS,STOCK = b0 + b1ITM + b2DEV + b3LIQ(S) + b4LIQ(O) + b5COR(S) + b6COR(O) (2) 
The results (Table 3.4) indicate that insider profits are increasing in the 
distance between the stock value and its unconditional expectation (p<0.01). Profits 
are also higher when the net liquidity shock in the stock is in the opposite direction of 
the insider’s information: the insider can more easily disguise her information while 
making profitable trades (p<0.01). A similar effect obtains for the net liquidity shock 
in the option (p=0.06). When the end-of-period option value is positive the insider 
earns lower profits in the stock (p<0.01). This is due to a greater number of profitable 
trades in the option (which stock dealers learn from). A regression identical to (2) but 
where the dependent variable is insider profits in the option (Table 3.4) indicates 
insider profits in the option are higher when the end-of-period option value is positive 
(p<0.01).  
Aggregate insider profits (profits derived from trading in the stock and the 
option) are higher when the option is out-of-the-money. Using session level data 
(Table 3.3) the difference is not significant (p=0.32 and p=0.29 for the parametric and 
nonparametric test respectively), but the analysis in Table 3.4 reveals a significant 
difference (p=0.02). If real, this result would be puzzling, since the insider is free to 
forego option trading. It is driven however by two unusual trading periods when the 
intrinsic value of the option is zero, and is not a robust result20.
20 In both of these trading periods, there is a large positive net liquidity shock. In one case, 
eleven consecutive liquidity trades in the stock and the option at the beginning of the period are 
purchases. Interspersed among these trades are additional (unusual) buy orders initiated by 
dealers that move price further away from intrinsic value. When the insider finally begins to 
trade, price moves very slowly toward intrinsic value: the dealers are apparently convinced by 
the initial 18 consecutive buy orders that the stock value is above its unconditional expectation. 
In the second case, a single dealer lowers the inside bid unusually slowly in the face of a large 
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3.2.4 Liquidity trader profits and behavior 
Liquidity traders are free to choose the timing of trades, but the exogenous 
liquidity shocks are enforced by penalties that make liquidity demands (by the end of 
a market period) perfectly inelastic. Each liquidity trader receives an independent 
shock in the stock and the option. Over the 62 market periods, the liquidity traders 
never incurred a penalty for failing to exactly fulfil liquidity requirements. 
As noted above, liquidity traders tend to trade late: 86.3% of liquidity trades 
are in the second half of the trading interval, when spreads are narrower. 
Requirements to sell options are on average satisfied earlier than requirements to buy 
options and to buy or sell units of the stock. This may be due to the fact that with the 
highly skewed unconditional option value distribution, price discovery is on average 
easiest for option sell orders. The desire of liquidity traders to trade near the 
unconditional asset value distribution therefore dictates earlier liquidity trading in this 
case, although two-thirds of these trades are still in the second half of the trading 
interval. 
sell order imbalance. In the first case, insider profits exceed their mean by 3.9 standard 
deviations, and in the second by 4.8 standard deviations. The high insider profits in these two 
periods explain the significance of the ITM coefficient estimate, but seem unrelated to the 
relationship between the level of insider profits and the presence of a positive intrinsic value 
option. We verify this by repeating the regressions from Table 3.4 but flagging these two 
periods with an indicator variable that takes on the value of one in these two periods and zero 
otherwise. The ITM coefficient estimate becomes insignificant in the aggregate insider profits 
regression. Importantly, other qualitative results in the other eight regressions in the table are 
unchanged.  
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Table 3.3. Profitability by trader type and the intrinsic value of the option.
This table reports profitability by trader type for each of the eight sessions. Panel A is 
based on periods where the intrinsic option value is zero, Panel B on the periods 
where it is positive.  
Liq. Stock Liq. Option Liq. Stock Option
Session Periods Insider Traders Dealers Insider Traders Dealers Insider Traders Dealers Dealers
1-1 5 41.1 -99.7 58.6 7.5 -10.7 2.7 48.6 -110.4 59.1 2.7
1-2 4 46.5 -38.1 -9.2 4.1 -8.7 4.6 50.5 -46.8 -9.2 5.5
2-1 4 82.9 -100.1 24.5 15.2 -6.9 -5.8 98.1 -107.0 22.0 -13.0
2-2 6 60.7 -86.9 26.4 7.3 -1.1 -1.1 67.9 -88.0 21.3 -1.3
3-1 3 42.6 -77.1 41.8 2.3 -9.2 4.1 44.9 -86.2 44.5 -3.2
3-2 5 43.6 -6.2 -35.7 1.1 -4.5 2.8 44.7 -10.7 -35.1 1.1
4-1 5 73.7 -63.1 -18.8 5.1 -2.3 -1.6 78.7 -65.4 -20.0 6.7
4-2 5 14.6 -78.9 72.6 -1.9 -5.2 7.2 12.7 -84.1 72.6 -1.1
Avg 50.7 -68.8 20.0 5.1 -6.1 1.6 55.8 -74.8 19.4 -0.3
1-1 2 53.0 1.9 -57.4 21.0 -6.3 -14.6 74.0 -4.4 -57.6 -12.1
1-2 3 0.3 -33.0 34.7 20.4 -22.5 2.2 20.7 -55.5 34.7 0.2
2-1 4 27.5 -29.8 -6.9 19.2 -15.5 -4.4 46.7 -45.3 -6.1 4.8
2-2 2 17.0 -5.0 -12.0 69.3 -18.8 -50.6 86.3 -23.8 -12.0 -50.6
3-1 5 27.9 -39.7 1.1 9.3 -15.1 22.4 37.2 -54.8 -15.5 33.1
3-2 3 6.7 -26.2 21.8 6.2 -2.4 -4.0 12.9 -28.7 22.1 -6.3
4-1 3 18.0 -160.6 144.5 13.0 -21.9 12.9 31.0 -182.5 140.5 11.0
4-2 3 31.1 -15.2 -15.7 6.0 -21.3 15.3 37.1 -36.5 -15.7 15.0
Avg 22.7 -38.5 13.8 20.6 -15.5 -2.6 43.2 -53.9 11.3 -0.6
28.0 -30.3 6.3 -15.5 9.4 4.2 12.5 -20.9 8.1 0.3
3.0% 23.2% 85.0% 5.7% 2.2% 59.9% 30.6% 41.8% 80.7% 97.6%
3.9% 21.6% 86.6% 0.0% 3.0% 66.4% 27.7% 40.9% 78.0% 96.5%
Panel B: Intrinsic value of the option is positive
p-value rand. test
p-value t-test
Difference
Stock profits Option profits Total profits
Panel A: Intrinsic value of the option is zero
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Market Trader Type constant ITM DEV LIQ(S) LIQ(O) COR(S) COR(O) Adj R2
Stock Insider 9.91 -36.20 3.93 -3.39 8.44 -0.23 -0.46 28.50%
(0.30) (-3.34) (2.72) (-1.50) (2.11) (-3.15) (-1.96)
Stock Liq. traders 3.53 25.12 0.90 -10.45 0.62 0.70 0.06 65.60%
(0.19) (3.10) (2.46) (-4.41) (0.13) (6.96) (0.37)
Stock Dealers -13.43 11.07 -4.83 13.84 -9.06 -0.47 0.40 46.90%
(-0.43) (0.79) (-3.38) (3.84) (-2.00) (-3.42) (1.54)
Option Insider -7.25 11.55 0.83 0.89 -0.43 -0.04 -0.18 20.10%
(-1.04) (3.44) (2.68) (0.93) (-0.24) (-1.28) (-2.22)
Option Liq. traders 0.87 -11.01 0.02 0.66 -3.23 0.00 0.29 42.10%
(0.18) (-5.49) (0.12) (1.34) (-2.20) (-0.15) (5.42)
Option Dealers 6.38 -0.54 -0.85 -1.55 3.65 0.04 -0.11 8.70%
(0.90) (-0.16) (-2.35) (-1.71) (1.97) (0.95) (-1.44)
Stock Insider 2.65 -24.65 4.76 -2.50 8.01 -0.27 -0.63 32.40%
 & Option (0.08) (-2.44) (3.63) (-1.11) (2.06) (-2.87) (-2.94)
Stock Liq. traders 4.40 14.11 0.92 -9.79 -2.61 0.70 0.35 59.50%
 & Option (0.21) (1.53) (2.27) (-3.64) (-0.48) (6.85) (2.28)
Stock Dealers -7.05 10.53 -5.68 12.29 -5.40 -0.43 0.29 40.60%
 & Option (-0.22) (0.73) (-4.19) (3.20) (-1.00) (-2.71) (1.02)
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Table 3.4 Determinants of profitability
In order to examine the determinants of profitability by trader type we estimate the following 
model with GMM (t-statistics that are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation are reported in parentheses). Each of the 62 observations summarizes the 
random draws (asset values and liquidity shocks) for a single market period. 
PROFtype, market = b0 + b1ITM + b2DEV + b3LIQ(S) + b4LIQ(O) + b5COR(S) + b6COR(O) 
Variable definitions are as follows. PROFtype, market is the per period profit of all subjects of the 
same type (insider, liquidity traders or dealers) in a specific market (stock, option or both). 
ITM is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 when the intrinsic value of the option 
is positive and 0 otherwise. DEV is the absolute difference between the stock value and its 
unconditional expectation of 100. LIQ(S) is the number of liquidity trades in the stock. LIQ(O) 
is the number of liquidity trades in the option. COR(S) is the product of the net liquidity shock 
in the stock and the difference between the stock value and its unconditional expectation (a 
measure of the extent to which liquidity traders trade in the direction of the insider’s 
information). COR(O) is the product of the net liquidity shock in the option and the difference 
between the stock value and its unconditional expectation.
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Liquidity traders suffer large significant losses in both the stock and option 
market (Tables 3.1 and 3.3). As noted in Section 3.2.1, average liquidity trader losses 
in the stock when the option intrinsic value is positive are lower than when the option 
intrinsic value is zero, although this difference is only marginally significant. In order 
to control for other determinants of liquidity trader profitability, we regress liquidity 
trader profits in the stock on the liquidity shock variables, the extremeness of the asset 
draw and the positive option intrinsic value indicator variable (Table 3.4).  
Overall liquidity trader profits are decreasing in the magnitude of the liquidity 
shocks, but increasing in the correlation between the net liquidity shock and the 
insider’s information: when the liquidity traders are required to trade in the direction 
of the insider’s information, their profits are higher. Both of these effects are highly 
significant (p<0.01). The extremeness of the asset value draw is also significant 
(p=0.02). Finally, when the option’s intrinsic value is positive, liquidity trader losses 
are lower (p<0.01). This is because liquidity traders trade at prices closer to intrinsic 
value in this case. 
3.2.5 Dealer profits and behavior 
Recall that the three stock dealers are required to make a market in the stock. 
They are also permitted to transact against quotes submitted by other dealers in the 
stock and the option. The option dealers participate in 6.7% of the transactions in the 
market for the stock and the stock dealers participate in 11.0% of the transactions in 
the option.
Since both stock and option dealers are permitted to trade in either asset we 
define dealer profits in the stock to be the sum of all stock dealers’ profits in a market 
period, with option dealer profits similarly defined. Weighting each of the sessions 
equally, stock dealer profits are about half the magnitude of insider profits, and 
significantly greater than zero (p=0.03 for both the t-test and the randomization test). 
Option dealer profits are positive, but lower, and are not significantly different from 
zero. In order to investigate the determinants of dealer profitability, we estimate the 
regression from (2) and report the results in Table 3.4.  
The results are similar when we use either stock market dealer profits or the 
sum of stock and call option dealer profits (aggregate dealer profits) as the dependent 
variable. Dealer profits are decreasing in the extremeness of the asset value draw, and 
increasing in the magnitude of the stock liquidity shock. When stock dealer profits is 
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the dependent variable the negative coefficient on the COR(S) variable indicates that 
when the liquidity traders trade in the direction of the insider’s information, stock 
dealer profits are lower. This is intuitive since in this state dealers take fewer highly 
profitable liquidity trades that are in the opposite direction of intrinsic value. When 
aggregate dealer profits is the dependent variable, the coefficient estimate for the 
COR(S) variable decreases in absolute value. This is because when the stock liquidity 
traders tend to trade in the direction of the insider’s information, option dealers learn 
more rapidly from trades in the stock and earn higher profits. In general, dealer profits 
are not related to whether the intrinsic value of the option is positive. This is evidence 
that the dealer competitive dynamic accounts for the informational content of the 
order flow as a function of trading patterns (that depend on the intrinsic value of the 
option). 
3.2.6 Informational linkages between the stock and option markets 
In the previous sections we document the impact of the intrinsic value of the 
option on price errors, volatility and profitability by trader type. In this section we 
examine the informational linkages between the markets that give rise to these effects. 
As noted earlier, the insider trades aggressively in both the stock and the 
option. This is consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium in Easley, O’Hara, and 
Srinavas (1998), and indicates that a trade in one market will have informational 
implications for the other market. We document the informational linkages by 
examining changes in bid-ask spread midpoints induced by transactions (Table 3.5). 
We define a quote midpoint price change as the difference in the midpoint of the 
inside bid and ask after a transaction and before a subsequent transaction. If there are 
multiple quote changes (by one or more dealers) that affect the inside quote, they are 
summed together.  
Average quote changes are consistent with a strong informational linkage 
between the two markets. Quote midpoints in both markets are revised upwards after a 
stock or option transaction at the ask, and downwards after a stock and option 
transaction at the bid.  
Transaction induced quote changes are not symmetric across the stock and 
option. First, a transaction induces larger quote changes in the stock than in the option. 
This is expected because the option's density covers only half the range of the stock's 
density. Second, the average responsiveness of stock quotes in absolute value to an 
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option purchase (L$1.16) is 68% larger (though not significantly, p=0.12) than the 
responsiveness to an option sale (L$-0.69). The skewness of the option value 
distribution provides a logical explanation for this effect. In the beginning of the 
trading period, the insider can profitably buy options only when the true stock value is 
sufficiently larger than the unconditional expectation of 100, whereas the insider can 
always profitably sell options when the true stock value is 100 or lower. An option 
purchase therefore signals on average a more extreme stock value than an option sale, 
and this market feature seems to be well understood by the stock dealers.21 Third, 
transactions in the option lead to larger quote changes in the option than in the stock 
market; a phenomenon consistent with the lower liquidity shocks (and hence greater 
informational content) of trades in the option. 
21 On average, opening asks in the stock and call respectively are L$110.43 and L$10.42. 
Average opening bids are L$91.52 and L$1.34. 
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Table 3.5 Linkages between the Stock and Option Markets
This table documents the informational linkages between the option and stock market by 
reporting the responsiveness of quotes to trades in both markets. We report changes in the 
midpoint of “inside” bid-ask spread (the average of highest bid and lowest ask). Panel A 
summarizes changes in stock quotes that occur after a transaction but before a subsequent 
transaction. The stock quote changes are broken out as a function of the direction of the 
transaction (buyer or seller initiated), and the market in which the transaction was made (stock 
or option). Panel B summarizes changes in option quotes. Both stock and option quotes change 
in the direction consistent with dealers in one market updating their beliefs with respect to 
intrinsic value on the basis of transactions in the other. 
Stock sell Stock buy Option sell Option buy
# Positive stock changes 45 311 33 72
# Negative stock changes 339 37 86 20
Average -1.12 0.85 -0.69 1.16
Standard Error 0.14 0.09 0.18 0.24
Stock sell Stock buy Option sell Option buy
# Positive option changes 36 65 24 187
# Negative option changes 119 68 229 33
Average -0.44 0.20 -0.61 0.63
Standard Error 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.09
Panel B
Changes in option quotes in response to a stock or call transaction
prior to the subsequent transaction (stock or option)
Panel A
Changes in stock quotes in response to a stock or call transaction
prior to the subsequent transaction (stock or option)
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3.3  Discussion
When the intrinsic value of the option is zero, the insider concentrates her 
trading activity in the stock. Stock dealers update their beliefs primarily on the basis of 
stock market order flow and prices gradually converge to the informationally efficient 
level. 
When the intrinsic value of the option is greater than zero, the insider splits 
her trading activity between the stock and the option. In this case stock dealers learn 
from both stock market order flow and price discovery in the option. This leads to a 
significant increase in stock market informational efficiency relative to the case where 
the intrinsic option value is zero (and most price discovery occurs in the market for the 
stock). Importantly, differences in opinion among stock and option dealers (and the 
insider response) are particularly informative, and speed the price discovery process. 
This effect is not a feature of theoretical models. Although the concentration of insider 
trading in the stock depends on the ex post moneyness of the option, the insider trades 
in both assets in both states, as in the mixed strategy equilibrium derived by Easley, 
O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998). 
These results highlight the mechanisms by which the introduction of a traded 
option can improve the market quality of the underlying asset, and are consistent with 
the theoretical result of John, Koticha, Narayan, and Subrahmanyam (2000): “..even 
though the addition of option trading enhances the ability of informed traders to 
disguise and profit from their trades, the informativeness of the trading process is 
greater because the market can now infer private information from two sources – order 
flow in the stock and option markets.” We believe it is noteworthy that we find 
support for this result in a richer setting than their model since we allow both insiders 
and liquidity traders to be strategic. We also show the exact mechanism by which this 
occurs in a dynamic setting. Unlike the aforementioned model, we do not find 
evidence in support of bid-ask spreads increasing in the presence of options.  
Biais and Hillion (1994) focus on the introduction of a nonredundant option 
that completes the markets and find ambiguous consequences for the informational 
efficiency of the market. In their single period model there are three states and three 
different types of liquidity traders with state-dependent endowments that trade in order 
to hedge their risk exposures. The introduction of the option can reduce the 
informational efficiency of the market by enlarging the set of strategies the insider can 
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follow. This makes it more difficult for the dealers to interpret the informational 
content of trades. 
Although our setting is very different, we do not find evidence for the 
intuition that a larger strategy space for the insider will reduce informational 
efficiency. This is most likely due to our dynamic setting with exogenous liquidity 
shocks in both the stock and the option: the insider uses the cover of liquidity trading 
to gradually but fully exploit profitable trading opportunities. Since the insider trades 
more aggressively in the call when it has a positive value, we find that the required 
number of trades in the stock to reach a given level of efficiency is less than when it 
has no value. This sharing of price discovery strongly suggests a gain in price 
efficiency relative to a case without a traded option.  
Unlike the theoretical results of Back (1993), our results suggest a decline in 
the average level of stock volatility as a result of option introduction. A correlated 
asset in our experiments allows dealers to set their prices with greater precision, 
because they learn from trades in the other market. We speculate that an important 
difference between the model and the experimental design that helps account for this 
result is the presence of strategic liquidity traders in the experiment: in Back’s model 
the liquidity trader arrival process is a Brownian motion and trading is continuous. 
3.4  Conclusion
We analyze the informational linkages between a stock market and a traded 
option by performing a controlled experiment. This allows the observation of all 
information sets and all actions in a setting based on the Kyle (1985) framework, but 
beyond the reach of tractable modeling. We examine the hypothesis that the presence 
of an option improves the market quality of the underlying asset by permitting the 
effective sharing of price discovery across markets. 
We find that an insider trades aggressively in both the option and the stock, 
with most trades directed to the asset that affords the most profitable trading 
opportunity. This leads to price discovery occurring in both markets, and hence 
important feedback effects: trades in the stock market imply quote revisions in the 
options market and vice versa. We believe this result sheds light on why most 
empirical studies find an improvement in market quality after the introduction of 
traded options. 
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The focus of most related theoretical and empirical literature concerns the 
effect of the option on the time series properties of the price of the underlying asset. 
We find a significant relationship, but one that varies dramatically with the ex post 
intrinsic value of the option: when the option is in-the-money the convergence to 
informationally efficient pricing is more rapid and the volatility of transaction prices is 
lower. This is due to option trades making a greater contribution to price discovery. 
Here the linkage between the two markets is direct in the sense that liquidation values 
are perfectly correlated. When the option is out-of-the-money, price discovery in the 
option only helps truncate the stock value distribution. The dependence of market 
quality in the stock on the option’s intrinsic value is very strong, and we thus 
demonstrate the implications of the presence of a correlated asset for price discovery. 
Importantly, the fundamental way in which information is extracted from order flow 
changes in the presence of an option with positive moneyness. The tendency of 
insiders to trade where the magnitude of the profitable trading opportunity is greatest, 
provides a richer set of signals to dealers than when there is only a single asset in 
which the insider can trade profitably. We show therefore that not only does the 
presence of a correlated asset effectively split price discovery across markets; it also 
fundamentally changes the process by which conditional expectations are updated. We 
furthermore show that the less strategic the insider (due to risk-aversion, impatience, 
or noisy signals), the more powerful we expect this effect to be. 
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4 Insider strategies with options 22
In this chapter we analyze the same question as in the previous chapter: how 
does option trading affect market quality in the underlying asset, as measured by 
speed of convergence to intrinsic value, volatility and spreads. As we outlined in the 
introduction to both chapters, the amount of empirical work on the impact of option 
trading is huge. Many of those empirical studies were motivated by the lack of clear 
guidance that theoretical models provide. With this chapter we aim to produce a better 
guide: one that clarifies under what conditions a derivative asset improves market 
quality. For example, in a theoretical paper Biais and Hillion (1994) show that 
although the option can help avoid a market breakdown, it enlarges the set of trading 
strategies an insider can follow, and can reduce informational efficiency by making it 
more difficult for market makers to interpret the information content of trades. The 
major finding of Back (1993), in an extension of the Kyle (1985) model, is that the 
listing of an option leaves average volatility unchanged, which contrasts a lot of 
empirical work.  
Instead of experiments we now develop a sequential trade model in the spirit 
of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) to obtain deeper insights. Of the comparatively small 
number of theoretical papers, at least two use a sequential trade model in the spirit of 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) as well: Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas (1998; further 
referred to as Easley et al), and John, Koticha, Narayanan and Subrahmanyam (2000; 
further referred to as John et al). Both models are developed in an asymmetric 
information setting in which informed and uninformed traders trade in stock and 
option markets. Easley et al (1998) study whether option markets attract informed 
trading and whether they incorporate information more quickly than stock markets. 
They derive that under certain conditions options are attractive to traders with superior 
information. John et al (2000) focus on the impact of option trading on the market 
quality of the underlying price process, and the role of margin requirements. Whether 
options decrease or increase market quality depends on the criterion they employ.  
22 This chapter is based on: C. de Jong, 2001, “Informed option trading strategies: the 
dynamics of the underlying price process”, ERIM research paper 
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We start from the viewpoint that as long as some superiorly informed traders 
use options, option trades convey information about the underlying. In this chapter we 
provide two important additions to the existing models, that provide valuable new 
insights under what conditions and with what mechanisms option trading may 
improve market quality in the underlying security. First, we extend the single-trade 
markets to a dynamic multi-trade environment. Second, we analyze market quality 
under different levels of option leverage, the main distinguishing property of options. 
Initially, we elaborate on a standard sequential trade model, and show that it is 
inherently dynamic. Expectations are updated after every trade, which allows us to 
study a sequence of trades and analyze new and more precise criteria for market 
quality. Because of the multiple interacting dynamics of the model, we cannot derive 
the results in closed form, but rely on simulations to report the main dynamics. We 
show that the focus of the existing sequential trade literature on only first trades leads 
to the use of inaccurate criteria for market quality. Our analysis indicates that an 
option may serve as an extra source from which information can be inferred, which 
speeds up convergence. In trading performance, uninformed traders only benefit from 
this speedier convergence in well-developed derivatives markets. Uninformed traders 
are best off in a derivatives market that allows for relatively large (informed) trades, 
whereas the number of informed traders should be relatively small. This corresponds 
to well-developed derivatives markets. In terms of price volatility, our model shows 
that the effect of option trading is rather the opposite: trading in well-developed 
derivatives markets leads to higher volatility. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 4.1 we describe the model and 
in Section 4.2 the associated criteria for market quality. In Section 4.3 we analyze the 
main dynamics of the model and in Section 4.4 we conclude. 
4.1  The model 
We develop a sequential trade model that is similar in nature to that of Easley 
et al (1998) and John et al (2000). These two papers add one or two plain-vanilla 
options to the model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In our model trading takes place 
in a stock and a call option on that stock, and traders choose either of the two assets. 
Results are qualitatively the same if a put instead of a call option, or both, would be 
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included. We include only one option type to facilitate the derivations and the insights 
in the most important mechanisms.  
The model is a standard adverse selection model in market microstructure and 
covers one period. It explains how market mechanisms lead prices to efficient values 
when some traders have information superior to others. For a discussion of the 
different assumptions and the resemblance with real world markets, we especially 
refer to the papers by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987). The 
market is quote driven, which means that buyers and sellers trade with a market maker 
(also referred to as dealer or specialist), who is responsible for providing liquidity 
through bid and ask quotes. We assume market makers are profit maximizing and 
risk-neutral and trading takes place for one unit of one asset at a time. Liquidity and 
inside traders initiate trades. The liquidity traders trade for reasons of liquidity, such as 
portfolio rebalancing and time-varying consumption and income. We do not further 
specify their motives for trade, but assume their demand and supply are completely 
inelastic, so independent of the outstanding quotes, which excludes the possibility of a 
market breakdown. The informed traders get private and perfect signals regarding the 
true asset value. They are completely free to engage in trades and will do so in the 
pursuit of profits. Competition between informed traders causes available profits to 
vanish quickly and ensures that informed traders maximize profits at every individual 
trade.
The random variable S represents the intrinsic value of the stock, the random 
variable C the intrinsic value of the option. The true asset value may be regarded as a 
value that every market participant agrees upon after all information has become 
public. The stock value can either take on a low value X-v or a high value X+v. These 
stock values occur with respective probabilities of įL and įH, whose sum equals unity. 
The option has an exercise price of X, exactly in between the high and low value, and 
its value can directly be derived from the value of the stock: C = Max[0, S-X].  
All possible outcomes of a single transaction and their relative probabilities 
are depicted in Figure 4.1. Here we give an explanation of the trading process. At the 
beginning of a period, informed traders know whether the stock value is high or low. 
Next, trading for that period begins. Dealers set quotes to buy or sell during the 
trading period, execute orders as they arrive, and then revise their quotes. Informed 
traders optimally buy (stock or option) when the stock value is high, sell when it is 
low. The probability that they trade the stock is π (πL when the stock value is low and 
πH when it is high), and will be determined endogenously within the model in the 
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results section. Liquidity traders' behavior on the other hand is completely exogenous. 
Liquidity traders randomize their trades across stock and option markets, with a 
propensity for the stock of β and for the option of 1-β, and have an equal probability 
to buy or sell23. Informed and uninformed traders anonymously post trades at random 
intervals in both markets, making it for the dealers a priori impossible to determine 
whether they trade with a superiorly informed trader or not. The probability that they 
trade with an informed trader is µ, with an uninformed trader 1-µ. To summarize the 
probability of all different types of trades: 
Pr[Insider buys Stock]    = ½ µ πH   (1a) 
Pr[Insider sells Stock]    = ½ µ πL   (1b)  
Pr[Insider buys Call]    = ½ µ (1-πH)   (1c) 
Pr[Insider sells Call]    = ½ µ (1-πL)   (1d) 
Pr[Liquidity trader buys Stock]   = ½ (1-µ) β   (2a) 
Pr[Liquidity trader sells Stock]  = ½ (1-µ) β   (2b) 
Pr[Liquidity trader buys Call]   = ½ (1-µ) (1-β)   (2c) 
Pr[Liquidity trader sells Call]   = ½ (1-µ) (1-β)   (2d) 
23 Changing the assumption of equal uninformed buying and selling makes the derivation of 
results more cumbersome, but leaves the results qualitatively unchanged. 
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Stock value:  Trader type:    Trade type:
       Buy stock (ʌH)
   Informed (µ)    Buy call (1-ʌH)
        Buy stock (β/2) 
        Sell stock (β/2) 
High (įH)  Uninformed (1-µ)   Buy call ((1-β)/2) 
        Sell call ((1-β)/2) 
        Sell stock (ʌL)
Low (įL)  Informed (µ)    Sell call (1-ʌL)
        Buy stock (β/2) 
        Sell stock (β/2) 
   Uninformed (1-µ)   Buy call ((1-β)/2) 
        Sell call ((1-β)/2) 
Beginning of period During period 
Figure 3.1 The structure of trading
The tree diagram shows the structure of trading. Competitive market makers provide liquidity 
to informed and uninformed traders who may trade in a stock and a call option. The 
probabilities of the different outcomes of the game are in brackets. The game repeats from the 
dotted line throughout the period. The game begins at the first node when nature decides 
whether the true stock value in that period is high or low. Then trading starts and a market 
maker randomly selects a trader who is allowed to trade. This trader can be informed or 
uninformed. The variable įH is the probability of a high stock value, įL the probability of a low 
stock value; µ is the fraction of informed traders, 1- µ of uninformed traders; π is the fraction 
of informed traders who trade in the stock; β is the fraction of uninformed traders who trade in 
the stock; uninformed traders buy and sell with equal probability. 
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It can be shown that even if an insider is a monopolist, he is better off not 
entering in unprofitable trades (see for example John et al, 2000). Although 
unprofitable trades may confuse dealers, the losses incurred cannot be recouped 
sufficiently to justify such a strategy. If there is at least some probability of 
uninformed trader activity, the dealers' bids and asks in the stock are strictly in 
between their minimum and maximum theoretical values. Therefore, when the stock 
value is high, insiders can profitably buy both assets; when it is low, insiders can 
profitably sell both assets. As a result, insiders always have two profitable trading 
opportunities, one in the stock and one in the option.24
From the outset it is unclear what trading strategy would be optimal for the 
insider. We show that the optimal trading strategy depends on the leverage of the 
option and explore different levels of leverage. In the first situation the call option 
gives the right to buy one share of the stock. Although in real world markets an option 
gives the right to buy several (often 100) shares, this limited leverage might be 
realistic if we take into account the depth of the market. Since the depth in the option 
market is generally lower than in the stock market, a representative trade in the option 
might be for the same number of underlying assets as a representative trade in the 
stock. A leverage of one may also be realistic from a trading costs point of view. If the 
order processing costs (excluding bid-ask spread) of one option trade equal that of a 
trade in the leveraged number of stocks, the actual leverage may also be treated as 
one. This is the situation explored in John et al (2000). As we will see later in the text, 
it leads to a relative preference by the insider for the stock market, because the stock 
has a wider distribution than the option.  
In the second situation we allow insiders to trade for a larger (underlying) size 
in the option than in the stock, as in Easley et al (1998). We pay special attention to 
the situations where a representative option trade is twice and four times as large as a 
representative stock trade. This increased leverage is most realistic in modern liquid 
option markets where order-processing costs are moderate and large option trades do 
not attract special attention. Obviously, this improves the attractiveness of the option 
market and leads to an increased number of informed trades in the option.  
24 It is informative to list some differences with the experimental design, apart from the 
important real human behavior a model naturally lacks. The designs are very similar, but in the 
experiments the asset distribution is more complete, an option never provides leverage 
(variable in the model), traders are free to enter the market (not randomized, as in several other 
experiments), and liquidity traders have a fixed (though random) demand for both securities.  
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As noted earlier, we analyze the model in a dynamic setting, contrary to the 
existing sequential trade literature. We do so, because a dynamic setting highlights the 
main effect of derivatives on the underlying asset, which is that dealers in the stock 
use the information in the derivatives market to set more accurate prices. We 
introduce dynamics by generating a sequence of trades instead of looking only at 
opening quotes. An important choice has to be made on where the sequence of trades 
should stop. The model covers one single period, which could be compared to one 
trading day in practice, so we should formulate a criterion on how long one period 
lasts. Important is that the stopping rule is independent of whether the option is traded 
or not, since the results due to differences in the level of option trading should not be 
due to differences in the stopping rule. We use the logical assumption that the number 
of stock trades by uninformed traders is the same for every day, independent of 
whether options can be traded or not. Implicitly we assume that liquidity based trading 
in derivative assets is used in addition to trading in the underlying asset, and does not 
substitute it, as several experimental studies (CBOE, 1975 and 1976) have shown. 
Under this assumption we can define the end of the day as the moment when 
uninformed traders have executed a fixed number (N) of trades in the stock. As this 
does not yet specify the appropriate value for N, the stopping rule is still flexible. We 
show the results for the situation where N = 1, because this is most simple and because 
higher values for N (we analyzed N = 2 and N = 3), does not change the paper's 
conclusions. We thus analyze a sequence of trades in the stock and option that ends 
with the first liquidity trade in the stock.  
 4.2 Market quality criteria 
Market quality is a rather general term, which may include a number of 
characteristics of the underlying market. Based on simulated trading sequences of the 
model described in the previous section we will calculate and analyze different 
criteria: realized spreads, realized pricing errors and realized price volatility. These 
criteria are explained later in the text, but since our model is an extension of John et al 
(2000), we first describe what criteria they use and why they are not appropriate for 
evaluating efficiency in a multi-asset world.  
John et al (2000) study two different criteria, of which the first is the bid-ask 
spread in the stock at an initial trade. If we define the bid in the stock at the time of the 
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t’th transaction (either stock or option) as Bs,t, the corresponding ask as As,t, then the 
initial spread ∆s,1 equals: 
∆s,1  := As,1 – Bs,1    Initial stock spread  (3) 
The authors call their second criterion "the amount of information revealed 
through trading". It is defined as the ratio of two stock variances: the numerator 
contains the variance of expectations after the first trade, the denominator the variance 
of intrinsic values: 
η  := Var(E1[S]) / Var(S)  Variance ratio   (4) 
The idea of the variance ratio is that the higher it is, the more information the 
first trade reveals, the more efficient the market. John et al (2000) find that the 
inclusion of an option market increases the initial spread (decreases market quality), 
and increases the variance ratio (increases market quality). In the discussion of results 
they place more emphasis on the variance ratio and conclude that an option market 
improves overall market quality.  
We strongly believe that these two criteria are inappropriate for evaluating 
market quality if trade takes place in more than one asset. The criteria ignore the 
essential difference an option market introduces, which is that the first trade is not 
necessarily in the stock, but may be in the option instead. The analysis of opening 
spreads and opening expectations therefore misses the learning mechanism by which 
dealers update their quotes. In the results section we will show that the two criteria 
always yield conflicting outcomes, since a larger initial spread (lower market quality) 
implies a larger variance ratio (higher market quality). For a sound analysis of market 
quality, only transaction prices in the relevant asset should be included. That’s why we 
explore more direct methods to evaluate market quality, which are solely based on 
realized trades in the stock.  
We agree with John et al (2000) that an option market may improve market 
quality, but for a different reason. If an option trade precedes a stock trade, 
expectations are updated, and bids and asks in the stock are adjusted to the new 
information. This ‘cross-learning’ behavior is the main reason that we expect an 
option market to speed up convergence in the underlying. Ignoring this dynamic effect 
yields an underestimation of the option's beneficial influence. It should be noted that 
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John et al (2000) were inspired by Kyle (1985) in the choice of their market quality 
criteria. In that model however, the difference between expected and realized stock 
values does not exist, because every trade, and thus every first trade, takes place in the 
stock. Let us now specify our first two dynamic market quality statistics:  
∆s  := As - Bs  Realized stock spread   (5) 
PEs  := | Ps - S |  Realized stock price error   (6) 
where Ps is the realized stock price. We call these criteria dynamic, because 
they require the generation of a sequence of trades. The disadvantage of these 
dynamics is that the solutions can no longer be derived analytically, but need to be 
based on numerical simulations. That’s why the statistics we report later in the text are 
the averages of the above statistics for a large number of simulations.  
A straightforward way to calculate the above statistics would be at all stock 
trades, which may occur after a sequence of option trades. An alternative is to analyze 
the above statistics only at liquidity trades in the stock. This can be justified by the 
notion that new entrants to a market will normally have no specific knowledge about 
fundamental values. For example, they won’t directly bother about the average price 
errors faced by an insider, at least not beyond the effect it has on their own trades and 
their own profitability. In order to define the attractiveness of a market, we believe the 
most logical focus is on uninformed trades. Because the definition of market quality 
can still be a matter of taste, where it is informative we report market quality both 
from the viewpoint of an outsider and of all traders (including informed).  
Another statistic of interest is the volatility of prices or returns. For a given 
intrinsic value we calculate volatility as the standard deviation of realized stock prices 
over a large number of simulations.  
Vols := σ( Ps) Standard deviation (σ(.)) of realized stock price  (7) 
A large body of empirical work is devoted to the influence of option trading 
on volatility in the underlying. Volatility may be regarded as an important criterion for 
market quality, since traders generally prefer few fluctuations in prices. Numerous 
studies find that option listings cause a decrease in volatility, although in several other 
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studies the results are mixed or insignificant.25 However, as Skinner (1989) points out, 
the results should be interpreted with care, because the introduction of an option is not 
a random event. Market participants and exchanges prefer options on volatile stocks. 
Reported decreases in volatility after an option introduction may therefore be the 
result of volatility returning from exceptionally high to normal levels.  
4.3  Results 
This section reports the effect of option trading on the price errors, volatility 
and spreads under different levels of option leverage. We analyze the criteria in a state 
of market equilibrium. For market equilibrium, we first derive the equilibrium dealer 
quotes for a given insider strategy and then determine what strategy yields an 
equilibrium outcome. We start in a market where options provide no effective 
leverage, then continue to higher levels of effective leverage that make options more 
interesting to trade in.  
4.3.1 Equilibrium quotes 
Because we assume that dealers are fully competitive and risk-neutral, they set 
bids and asks in a way that yields zero profits on average. The dealers are uninformed 
and thus lose on every transaction with a better-informed trader. Uninformed liquidity 
traders are necessary in this design for the dealers to break even on average. Dealers' 
quoted bid-ask spread gives them a relative advantage over the liquidity traders, who 
lose on average. 
The zero-profit assumption of dealers can be motivated by the presence of 
competing dealers or zero entrance costs for new competitive dealers. The dealer sets 
for example a bid price that equals the stock value conditional on receiving a sales 
order (Q = -S). If he trades with an insider (probability µ), he knows that an insider 
only sells when the stock value is low (X-v, probability įL) and when the insider 
25 The following find a decrease in volatility: CBOE (1975 and 1976), Trennepohl and Dukes 
(1979), Skinner (1989), Conrad (1989), Detemple and Jorion (1990), Damodaran and Lim 
(1991), Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1998). In the following the results are mixed or 
insignificant: Klemkosky and Maness (1980), Whiteside, Dukes and Dunne (1983), Fedenia 
and Grammatikos (1992), Fleming and Ostdiek (1999). 
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prefers to trade the stock instead of the option (probability ʌL). If the dealer trades 
with a liquidity trader (probability 1-µ), he knows this trader sells the stock with 
probability ½ȕ, independent of the true stock value. Using Bayesian inference we 
obtain: 
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Similarly, the dealer sets an ask price that equals the stock value conditional 
on receiving a purchase order (Q = +S): 
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The bid and the ask for the option can be derived likewise, keeping in mind 
that the option value is zero if the stock value is low: 
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4.3.2 Profit maximization without leverage 
Throughout the paper we make the assumption that informed traders 
maximize profits at every individual trade, because they are afraid that otherwise other 
informed traders will steal away available profits. Furthermore, we assume that 
informed traders have sufficient investment resources, such that they do not bother 
about required investments. We believe this is quite realistic, because the information 
in our model is perfect and because empirical evidence indicates that most informed 
trading is from large financial institutions with abundant investment resources. In the 
first part of our analysis we furthermore assume a representative trade in the option is 
for the same number of shares as a representative trade in the stock. This means that 
the option market offers no effective leverage. The insider’s no-leverage-strategy must 
logically be of the following form, and depend on the dealer quotes in the market. 
Strategy without leverage: 
If an insider receives signal L (low stock price), then:
ʌL = 0   if BS - X + v < BC always sell the option  
ʌL = 1   if BS - X + v > BC always sell the stock 
0 < ʌL < 1  if BS - X + v = BC randomize between stock and option 
If an insider receives signal H (high stock price), then:
ʌH = 0   if AS - X  > AC  always buy the option
ʌH = 1   if AS - X < AC  always buy the stock  
0 < ʌH < 1  if AS - X  = AC  randomize between stock and option 
We now determine under what conditions each of the above situations hold. 
Suppose an insider receives the signal L and suppose further that the profit of selling 
the stock equals that of selling the option. Equating both profits and using the 
expressions for the bid in stock (8) and option (10), we can derive that insiders 
transact the stock with probability ʌL and the option with probability 1- ʌL, both 
between zero and one: 
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If insiders receive the signal H, and the available profits in both markets are 
equal, the probability of buying the stock is: 
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It can be shown that the above ʌ's exceed ȕ, so insiders have a larger preference for 
the stock than the liquidity traders have. Please note that if insiders increase their 
relative preference for the stock (ʌH or ʌL), the stock spreads widen and the option 
spreads narrow. This makes it possible to see that if one of the above formulae 
exceeds one, and so the actual ʌ equals one, the profit of trading the stock is higher 
than of trading the option. It is also possible to see that the above expressions never 
equal zero (except for some unrealistic boundary values) and so insiders will never 
solely trade the option. This is intuitive, because the stock has a larger variability (is 
more 'information sensitive') and hence cannot offer lower absolute profits than the 
option.  
Static criteria 
We start with the static criteria used in other research to show why they yield 
conflicting results and to obtain first insights. The initial stock spread can be derived 
analytically, using the expressions for bid and ask (8 and 9), the insiders' equilibrium 
strategy (12 and 13), and assuming an equal probability of an upward and downward 
move (įL = įH = ½).  
If ʌL<1 and ʌH<1, then: 
            (14) 
The initial spread increases linearly in the probability of an informed trade 
(µ), and in the distance between the low and high signal (v), and decreases in the 
( ) ( )( ) vs ⋅−⋅−+=∆ βµµ 1121,
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relative preference of the liquidity traders for the stock market (ȕ). If the insiders' 
preference for trading the stock (ʌ) hits its upper bound of one, the initial spread will 
be lower than the above expression, because insiders cannot trade the stock as much as 
they would have wanted. Most interesting is that the initial spread decreases in ȕ, so 
uninformed traders initially face a higher spread in the stock market the more they 
trade the option. We obtain a market with only stock trading by setting ȕ equal to its 
maximum value of one. Then the liquidity traders only trade the stock, and so do the 
insiders. Using this static criterion we therefore find that the introduction of an option 
decreases the market quality in the underlying, as does a larger proportion of informed 
trading. 
The second static criterion is the variance ratio. The denominator of the 
variance ratio, the unconditional stock variance, equals v2. The numerator, the 
variance in expected stock values after one trade, is more complicated. Following a 
transaction in the stock, the dealers have updated expectations of the stock value equal 
to the bid (8) or ask (9). Following a trade in the option, the expected stock values are 
similar to expression (8) and (9), but with ʌ replaced by 1-ʌ, and ȕ replaced by 1- ȕ,
the probabilities for the option. If we weigh these updated expectations with the 
probability of the respective trades, we can derive the analytical expression for the 
variance ratio (in a mixed strategy) 
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In contrast to the initial spread, the above criterion reports higher market quality the 
larger the proportion of informed trading. Furthermore, the above expression is 
minimal for ȕ equal to zero and one, and has a unique maximum in between (recall 
that π=πL=πH is a function of ȕ and µ). This implies that a market with only stock 
trading (ȕ=1) is less efficient than a market with trading in both assets, which is in 
contrast with the implications from the initial spread.  
 61
Dynamic criteria 
We derive dynamic criteria, because we believe that static criteria are 
inappropriate for evaluating the beneficial influence of an option. They ignore the fact 
that the stock dealers 'learn' from the trades in the option. If the dealers observe for 
example an option purchase, they know an uninformed trader initiated it with 
probability 1-µ, and that it then does not contain any information about intrinsic 
values. However, they know that it could also have been an informed trade, and that 
the stock value must then be high. They update their beliefs according to the following 
scheme: 
After a stock purchase: 
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After a stock sale:
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After an option purchase:
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After an option sale:
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After a purchase in stock or option, the probability of a high stock value is 
revised upwards, and revised downwards after a sale. The larger the insiders' 
preference for the stock (ʌH), and the larger the proportion of informed traders (µ), the 
more a stock purchase signals a high stock value. The updated beliefs form the basis 
to generate a sequence of trades. At every point in time, we randomly select a trade 
and trader type according to the different probabilities. Then we update beliefs and 
randomly select a new trade and trader type. We continue a sequence of trades till we 
obtain a (liquidity) trade in the stock, either a purchase or a sale, as we motivated in 
the ‘model’-section. Since there is an infinite number of possible sequences, and 
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because the beliefs are updated differently in every sequence, we are unable to derive 
our dynamic market quality statistics theoretically. Therefore, we rely on a large 
number (one million) of simulations26 to clarify the dynamics.  
The parameters X and v are only necessary to scale the stock and option, but 
do not affect the insiders' strategy or the updating of beliefs. Without loss of 
generality, we can therefore fix them, for example to 100 and 10 respectively. It is 
also reasonable that a priori there is no higher probability of an upward move than a 
downward move, so we keep įH=įL=½. The parameters ȕ and µ, that govern the 
liquidity traders' behavior and the proportion of informed traders, are more delicate, so 
we will carefully study various values. But first we assume there is an equal 
proportion of informed and uninformed traders (µ=½), and the uninformed trade as 
often in the stock as in the option (ȕ=½).  
Table 4.1 Updating of expectations
This table reports expectations about the true stock value (įH is the probability that the stock 
value is high), the insider trading strategy (ʌ is the probability that the insider trades the stock), 
and dealer quotes. Values are reported at the beginning of trading and after one trade has been 
executed.  
In this base case, the initial available profits in stock and option are equal 
(Table 4.1). That's why insiders start with a mixed strategy, although they prefer the 
stock five times to the option. Initially, they face a spread in the stock market of 12.50, 
in the option of 2.50. If a liquidity trader trades before an insider, and trades in the 
opposite direction of the correct value, an insider trades the stock even more 
26 The simulation program (written in Gauss) is available on request. 
Previous trade įH π Stock bid Stock ask Call bid Call ask
First trade 0.50 0.83 93.75 106.25 3.75 6.25
Second trade Stock purchase 0.81 0.77 99.29 108.93 8.13 8.93
Stock sale 0.19 1.00 91.07 100.71 1.07 1.88
Call purchase 0.63 0.80 95.36 107.50 5.36 7.50
Call sale 0.38 0.89 92.50 104.64 2.50 4.64
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intensively. However, if he or another trader trades in the correct direction, he 
subsequently shifts more trading to the option. This happens, because his preference 
for the stock (π) decreases in the correct expectation. Spreads narrow after the first 
trade, irrespective of the trade type, because a trade directs the expectations into one 
direction (the stock distribution becomes skewed). Table 4.1 also shows that a stock 
trade is followed by a stronger update of beliefs than an option trade. This is due to the 
relatively higher preference for the stock of insiders than of liquidity traders (π>ȕ).  
Table 4.2 Market quality with no leverage 
This table reports market quality criteria for various levels of uninformed stock trading. Trades 
are initiated by an informed trader with probability µ, by an uninformed trader with probability 
1- µ. Uninformed traders have an equal probability to buy or sell. They trade with probability ȕ
in the stock, otherwise in the option. Insiders maximize profits at every individual trade. 
Trading stops after the first liquidity trade in the stock. The statistics in panel A apply to all 
trades in the stock market, those in panel B to the liquidity trade in the stock market. Spread
measures the average difference between realized stock bid and ask; price error is the average 
absolute difference between the transaction price and stock value; volatility is the standard 
deviation of stock transaction prices. 
ȕ = 0.10 ȕ = 0.25 ȕ = 0.50 ȕ = 0.75 ȕ = 0.90 ȕ = 1.00
µ = 0.50 Spread 2.78 4.04 4.52 4.32 4.05 3.84
Price error 1.14 2.00 3.08 4.07 4.64 5.03
Volatility 3.15 3.87 4.34 4.50 4.51 4.50
µ = 0.25 Spread 3.99 4.03 2.80 1.79 1.41 1.21
Price error 3.46 4.76 6.64 7.94 8.41 8.64
Volatility 4.58 4.54 4.09 3.35 2.96 2.75
µ = 0.50 Spread 3.63 5.73 7.20 7.67 7.71 7.67
Price error 2.27 3.80 5.22 6.17 6.65 6.94
Volatility 4.93 5.81 5.99 5.76 5.55 5.39
µ = 0.25 Spread 6.68 7.67 7.00 5.81 5.21 4.86
Price error 5.02 6.55 8.01 8.82 9.12 9.24
Volatility 5.89 5.58 4.53 3.52 3.08 2.83
Panel B: Market quality statistics based on the uninformed stock trade
Panel A: Market quality statistics based on all stock trades
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Table 4.2 reports the static and dynamic market quality statistics 
corresponding to this base case and various fractions of uninformed trading in the 
stock (ȕ). We first focus on the data corresponding to an equal proportion of informed 
and uninformed traders (µ=½). The statistics of panel A are based on the first trade in 
the stock, those of panel B on the first liquidity trade in the stock. All reported values 
are independent of whether the true stock value is low (90) or high (110). We can infer 
the following results from Table 4.2 for increasing levels of uninformed trading in the 
option (decreasing ȕ).
Thanks to the increased coverage of the option market, insiders are able to 
execute more option trades before the first stock trade. This increased trading activity 
makes it easier for dealers to form their opinion on the correct stock value, which in 
turn leads to lower realized price errors in the stock for all trader types.  
The effect on stock price volatility is ambiguous: volatility is highest for 
intermediate levels of option trading. This can be explained by the phenomenon that 
realized stock prices depend on the number and direction of previous option trades, 
which vary most for intermediate levels of option trading.  
The effect of increased option trading on stock spreads is ambiguous as well. 
From equation (14) we know that the initial quoted spread increases in the fraction of 
option trading, but this result does not hold for realized spreads. Realized spreads may 
increase or decrease with option trading. Both insiders and liquidity traders may face 
an increased spread. Liquidity traders face only somewhat larger stock spreads when 
they execute few trades in the option (ȕ=0.9) compared to when they only trade the 
stock (ȕ=1.0). Although the difference is very limited, their modest option trading will 
harm their performance in the stock market.  
To clarify the ambiguous results on realized spread and volatility, we restrict 
the fraction of informed traders to a more realistic 25% (Table 4.2). It is then easier to 
see that uninformed traders do not necessarily benefit in the stock market from their 
activity in the option market. In fact, if uninformed traders form a large proportion of 
the total population, realized stock spreads (and so stock losses) and volatility increase 
the more they trade the option. This phenomenon is due to the insiders' strategy, which 
is aimed at maximizing profits at every individual trade. This strategy leads to a larger 
preference for the stock than the liquidity traders' preference for the stock. This in turn 
causes informed traders to reap a relatively large part of all stock trades. 
Mathematically (see equation 12 and 13), ʌ/(ʌ+ȕ) increases in the fraction of 
uninformed traders (1-µ) and the amount of uninformed option trading (1-ȕ).  
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If the option market provides no effective leverage, the following summarizes 
the effect of option trading on the price process of the underlying. First, option trading 
decreases stock price errors. Second, option trading has ambiguous consequences for 
volatility, realized spreads and losses of uninformed traders. In a market where 
informed traders form a large part of the population, volatility, spreads and losses may 
increase or decrease, depending on the exact intensity of uninformed option trading. In 
a market with a small proportion of informed traders (which is likely to be true in 
liquid markets), an option market increases volatility, spreads and liquidity traders' 
losses in the underlying asset.  
4.3.3 Profit maximization with leverage 
In the above analysis we assumed that the option market provides no effective 
leverage in the sense that a representative trade in the option is for the same number of 
shares as a trade in the stock. This situation causes insiders to have a relative 
preference for the stock, and this preference increases for higher levels of uninformed 
trading and for higher levels of uninformed trading in the option. Here we relax the 
leverage assumption and let the parameter γ govern the level of option leverage. 
Equilibrium bid and ask spreads and optimal insider behavior are now functions of the 
leverage. They can be obtained by equating the profit in the stock to the profit in the 
option. Since insiders can trade an option on γ shares, the profit on an option for one 
share should be equal to 1/γ the profit on the stock.  
A special case is the situation in which the option offers a leverage of two. 
Then the insiders have the same propensity to trade stock and option as the liquidity 
traders, as can be shown by equating insider profits in stock and option. 
Informed stock trading probabilities with leverage γ = 2: ʌL = ʌH = ȕ  (20) 
With a leverage of two, the insiders in fact mimic the liquidity traders, which 
makes it hard for the dealers to detect them. This strategy is independent of the quoted 
bids and asks, the fraction of informed traders and the fraction of uninformed option 
trading. Because insiders follow the same strategy as the uninformed traders, the 
probability that a trade in the stock is informed is independent of the uninformed 
intensity of option trading. Therefore, the initial spread is independent of β and 
smaller than without leverage: 
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vs ⋅=∆ µ1,         (21) 
In Table 4.3 we present the dynamic market quality statistics when insiders 
mimic the liquidity traders. Although the effect of option trading on volatility is 
mixed, realized price errors and spreads become smaller the more options are traded, 
for all trader types. Since insiders and liquidity traders direct an equal proportion of 
trades to the stock market, the efficiency gain is solely due to the increased learning 
ability of the dealers, and not affected by differences in preferences between informed 
and uninformed traders. A leverage of two thus separates the learning effect from the 
insider strategy effect: an improved market makers' understanding of trades reduces 
realized price errors and stock spreads. 
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Table 4.3 Market quality when option leverage is two
This table reports market quality criteria for various levels of option trading. Trades are 
initiated by an informed trader with probability µ, by an uninformed trader with probability 1- 
µ. Uninformed traders have an equal probability to buy or sell. They trade with probability ȕ in 
the stock, otherwise in the option. Insiders maximize profits at every individual trade, taking 
into account that an option trade is for twice as many shares as an option trade (Ȗ = 2). With 
this leverage of two they imitate the liquidity traders' preference for the stock relative to the 
option. Trading stops after the first liquidity trade in the stock. The statistics in panel A apply 
to all trades in the stock market, those in panel B to the liquidity trade in the stock market. The 
statistics are based on one million simulations. Spread measures the average difference 
between realized stock bid and ask; price error is the average absolute difference between the 
transaction price and stock value; volatility is the standard deviation of stock transaction prices. 
ȕ = 0.10 ȕ = 0.25 ȕ = 0.50 ȕ = 0.75 ȕ = 0.90 ȕ = 1.00
µ = 0.50 Spread 1.08 2.03 2.92 3.46 3.70 3.84
Price error 1.59 2.90 4.03 4.63 4.89 5.03
Volatility 3.61 4.41 4.63 4.58 4.53 4.50
µ = 0.25 Spread 0.76 0.99 1.12 1.18 1.20 1.21
Price error 5.56 7.23 8.09 8.44 8.57 8.64
Volatility 4.87 4.23 3.50 3.06 2.86 2.75
µ = 0.50 Spread 2.17 4.05 5.85 6.92 7.40 7.67
Price error 2.13 3.91 5.49 6.36 6.74 6.95
Volatility 4.39 5.33 5.58 5.51 5.44 5.39
µ = 0.25 Spread 3.02 3.97 4.50 4.73 4.82 4.86
Price error 5.93 7.70 8.65 9.03 9.17 9.25
Volatility 5.05 4.37 3.60 3.15 2.95 2.83
Panel B: Market quality statistics based on the uninformed stock trade
Panel A: Market quality statistics based on all stock trades
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Table 4.4 Market quality when option leverage is four
This table reports market quality criteria for various levels of option trading. Insiders maximize 
profits at every individual trade, taking into account that an option trade is for four times as 
many shares as an option trade (Ȗ = 4). See table 4.3 for details of the trading mechanism. 
Compared to the situation without leverage, the average spread, losses and 
volatility in the stock are lower, because the stock dealers do not fear the insiders so 
much. On the other hand, with this mimicking strategy prices converge more slowly. 
Dealers have now more difficulty to detect where insiders are trading. Their prices are 
less accurate and realized price errors larger (but lower than without options)27.
27 One small exception can be detected in Tables 2 and 3 with respect to the smaller price 
errors. Additional analysis made clear that price errors are only smaller with leverage than 
without leverage for a combination of unrealistically high proportions of insider trading and 
uninformed option trading. 
ȕ = 0.10 ȕ = 0.25 ȕ = 0.50 ȕ = 0.75 ȕ = 0.90 ȕ = 1.00
µ = 0.50 Spread 0.03 0.12 0.53 1.58 2.75 3.84
Price error 1.63 3.02 4.19 4.83 5.03 5.03
Volatility 3.68 4.55 4.81 4.75 4.63 4.50
µ = 0.25 Spread 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.54 1.21
Price error 5.74 7.37 8.03 8.17 8.50 8.64
Volatility 4.94 4.40 3.98 3.77 3.26 2.75
µ = 0.50 Spread 0.27 0.82 2.13 4.24 6.11 7.67
Price error 1.89 3.46 4.86 5.84 6.48 6.95
Volatility 3.99 4.88 5.24 5.37 5.41 5.39
µ = 0.25 Spread 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.04 3.05 4.86
Price error 5.73 7.37 8.07 8.35 8.82 9.25
Volatility 4.94 4.40 3.96 3.75 3.32 2.83
Panel B: Market quality statistics based on the uninformed stock trade
Panel A: Market quality statistics based on all stock trades
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We now move on to the general case of leverage. Equating the per trade profit 
in the stock to the per trade profit in the option and using Bayesian inference we 
obtain the following probabilities for insiders to trade the stock: 
Informed stock trading probabilities with leverage γ:
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Again, if one of the above expressions exceeds one, insiders only trade the 
stock. Not surprisingly, insiders trade the stock less intensively when the option 
provides effective leverage (Ȗ>1). It is now also possible for the above expressions to 
fall below zero, namely if Ȗ>2. If option leverage is high enough then insiders may 
only trade the option. With leverage the traders face an initial spread of: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) vs ⋅−⋅−⋅−+=∆ βµγµ 11221,     (24) 
The larger the option leverage, the heavier insiders trade the option and the smaller is 
the difference between initial stock bid and ask.  
In Table 4.4 we analyze a market for which the leverage is factor four. Results 
are similar for other values of Ȗ that exceed two. The results indicate that option 
trading leads to smaller price errors and smaller realized spreads. Unfortunately, it is 
hard to predict the impact of option trading on volatility. The effect depends on the 
exact amount of option trading and the fraction of informed trading.  
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4.4  Conclusion 
The current sequential trade literature with a derivative asset has been 
concentrated on initial quotes. Under the assumption that option markets provide no 
effective leverage, opening spreads were found to increase, although trades reveal 
more information. We use a dynamic setting since the focus on just initial quoted 
spreads precludes the learning mechanism to take effect. The mechanism by which 
dealers learn from trades in the other asset to set more accurate prices can only be 
observed in a sequence of trades. In a multi-trade setting, expectations concerning the 
true asset value are updated after every trade and price errors, volatility and spreads 
can be analyzed dynamically by simulation.   
Our model clarifies and separates the two mechanisms following the 
introduction of an option that affect market quality in the underlying stock. On the one 
hand, stock dealers learn from trades in the option market and set more accurate 
prices. On the other hand, the proportion of informed trading in the stock is altered 
depending on the option's effective leverage, possibly reducing market quality. Our 
dynamic model indicates that option trading reduces price errors in the underlying. 
The impact is slightly more complicated on price volatility and on the performance of 
liquidity-motivated traders. The losses by traders with no superior information 
decrease if the option market provides considerable effective leverage and when there 
are few informed traders. At the same time, these conditions lead to larger stock price 
volatility.   
Our dynamic, but very stylized model shows that the effect of derivatives 
markets on the market quality of the underlying asset can only be judged when we 
know in what market informed traders choose to trade. It is not enough to know that 
they use derivatives (or not), but also in what proportion to stock market trading. The 
conditions for a large proportion of informed option trading are best in well-developed 
markets. In well-developed markets most trading is liquidity-based and informed 
traders are not easily detected. Moreover, in such markets the liquidity and depth in 
the derivatives market are relatively large, whereas trading costs are relatively small, 
which may induce traders with superior information to exploit the leverage of the 
option market. Our model makes clear that an option market improves informational 
efficiency in the underlying in terms of reduced price errors. Moreover, in an initial 
phase a derivatives market may be detrimental to the performance of liquidity traders 
in the stock market. In the course of its development a derivatives market will 
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however improve the stock market quality not only in terms of price efficiency, but 
also in terms of the trading performance of liquidity-motivated traders, though at a 
price of increased stock price volatility. 
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5 Conclusion of the first part 
The previous two chapters contain the results of two research methodologies 
to study the impact of an option on the price properties of the underlying asset in a 
world of asymmetric information. We end this first part of the thesis with a brief 
review and a comparison of the results. 
The differences in methodology have involuntarily created a number of 
differences in the market designs. Generally speaking, the experiments are a special 
case of all the different situations we analyzed in the model, but in a more realistic 
environment with real human subjects, and a more complete asset distribution. For 
example, in the experiments the options provide no effective leverage, since a trade in 
the option is for only one unit of the stock. This is a special case in the model, though 
with a more complete asset distribution and human traders. Similarly, the variations in 
informed and uninformed stock and option trading that we were able to analyze with 
the model were impossible in the experiments, due to a lack of time and resources. On 
the other hand, the experiments provide a more realistic view on reality. For example, 
they highlight the important and difficult tasks of the dealers, whereas we assume in 
the model that dealers are perfectly competitive and risk-neutral. Another example is 
that in the model we assume that each participant knows the exact strategy of all other 
participants, and behaves accordingly, whereas in the experiments and practice such 
foresight is unthinkable. 
The best comparison between the two methodologies can be made when we 
consider a situation of no effective leverage in the model. Both theory and 
experiments indicate that this situation leads to a relative preference of the insider for 
the stock, because the stock has a wider distribution. Both theory and experiments also 
predict an important decrease in price errors, because dealers can learn from the prices 
in the other market to set more accurate quotes.  
The methodologies differ however in their implications for some other market 
quality criteria: stock market volatility, realized spreads and losses incurred by 
uninformed traders. In the theoretical model the effects on these criteria depend on the 
fraction of informed trading and the fraction of trades that uninformed traders direct to 
the option market. Therefore, we have to align these variables with the experimental 
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design in order to make a realistic comparison. In the experiments we have an insider 
that accounts for nearly 50% of all trades and uninformed traders transacting one third 
of their volume in the option. This corresponds to a µ close to 0.50 and a ȕ between 
0.50 and 0.75. The experiments find no significant change in spreads, a significant 
drop in volatility and a significant drop in uninformed stock losses when the option 
intrinsic value is positive. In a similar situation, the model on the other hand suggests 
that with option trading realized spreads should increase, but volatility and 
uninformed losses in the stock should remain more or less constant. We believe that 
the clear decrease in volatility during the experiments highlights the significant impact 
that human behavior can have on trading outcomes, and the limitation of a theoretical 
model. With options having positive intrinsic value, dealers are more confident in 
their price setting, which has a stabilizing effect on prices. The fact that uninformed 
losses decrease in the experiments might indicate that informed traders have difficulty 
in reaping all the benefits options provide. Possibly due to risk aversion, they seem 
sometimes too eager to trade the option. With such behavior they reveal their 
intentions too easily and unwillingly support the uninformed traders.    
By abstracting from real human behaviour, we believe that the theoretical 
model somewhat underestimates the benefits of options. In the model all participants 
draw exactly the same conclusions from each trade. As a result, there are no 
differences in opinion among stock and option dealers. In the experiments, similar to 
real-world markets, those differences in opinion (and the insider response) are 
particularly informative, and speed the price discovery process.  
The two studies show the complexity of two interacting markets in a world of 
asymmetric information. Both the market microstructure as well as human behavior 
have their share in price formation, but overall lead to lower price errors. Our 
dynamic, but very stylized model shows furthermore that there may be a trade-off 
between reduced losses to uninformed traders and increased market volatility. Future 
research should therefore be devoted to a clarification of this trade-off, if possible in 
real-world markets, but otherwise in experimental markets to capture the intriguing 
subtleties of human nature that cannot be ignored in the way markets function.  
Regulators that control derivatives markets may use the results of the two 
studies to better set the standards for derivative markets. Regulators need to weigh the 
benefits of lower losses for uninformed traders against possibly increased market 
volatility. They furthermore need to decide on the effective leverage derivative 
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markets may optimally provide. According to the two studies, the benefits of 
derivative trading to improved price convergence are however without doubt. 
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Part II 
Empirical studies  
in derivatives markets
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6 Introduction to the second part 
Certainly one of the most influential innovations in finance is the famous 
Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing formula. Each day, many thousands of 
finance professionals around the world apply this formula and the related Black 
(1976) formula to price options in their day-to-day business. Its relative simplicity and 
ease of application are responsible to a large degree for the enormous growth of 
derivatives trading in the last three decades. In 1997 this was an important motivation 
for the Nobel Prize Committee to grant the innovators of this formula the Nobel Prize 
for Economics28.
One of the fundamental assumptions in the Black-Scholes model is that the 
risk-neutral expected returns on the underlying asset are drawn from a normal 
distribution. Volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the expected returns, 
determines the exact shape of this distribution. A good insight in volatility is therefore 
crucial to calculate proper option values. Since the 1987 crash however, implied 
volatilities calculated from market option prices have varied over the strike price (or 
moneyness) and time-to-maturity, instead of being constant as assumed by the Black-
Scholes model. The variation indicates that risk-neutral expected returns are not 
normally distributed. 
In this part of the thesis we empirically explore three different option pricing 
methodologies that deviate from this standard assumption of normally distributed 
returns. The first two chapters do not aim to price options, but revert the process and 
infer information from market option prices. The last chapter is a more standard 
pricing study, but applied to a very non-standard and risky commodity, electricity.  
The first chapter presents a methodology whose purpose it is to derive the 
risk-neutral distribution from option prices in a flexible and accurate manner. The 
exact shape of the implied risk-neutral distribution gives important information that 
can be used for pricing other options on the same underlying asset, for comparing 
                                                
28 Nobel Prize winners were professors Scholes and Merton; their colleague Black died some 
years before. 
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options on different assets and for closely monitoring changes in the markets 
perception of the underlying price process.   
In the second chapter we explore a method to infer from option prices a 
forecast of the actual price process. Instead of only a cross-section of option prices, 
the method employs options with different maturities. It yields a price process and not 
just a distribution at a single point in time. Combined with a risk premium parameter 
obtained from actual prices of the underlying security, we convert the risk-neutral 
process in an actual price process and assess its ability to forecast short-term volatility. 
Compared to the approach in the previous chapter, we lose some of the flexibility by 
fitting one process through options with different maturities. The extension from the 
risk-neutral world to the actual world enlarges however its scope of application.  
In the third chapter we shift attention from stock indices to electricity, a 
recently liberalized and deregulated commodity in many countries around the world. 
Most of the transactions in this market are still for the physical asset, but futures and 
other financial derivatives steadily increase in trading volume. One of the best 
examples of this is the trading volume on the Scandinavian power exchange Nord 
Pool (see Figure 6.1), which nearly doubles year on year. Moreover, a large proportion 
of electricity end user contracts contain embedded options, such as caps and swings, 
and several power generators may be valued with real option theories. Since electricity 
cannot be stored efficiently, and prices violate normality assumptions severely, pricing 
those electricity derivatives poses however a formidable task. In the third chapter we 
provide a framework based on regime switches to price a category of electricity 
derivatives, namely options on spot prices, and apply it to the Dutch power market.  
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Figure 6.1 Trading volume Nord Pool financial market
This figure shows the total annual volume and its contractual value on the Scandinavian power 
exchange Nord Pool. The value of 1 Norwegian Kronor (NOK) equals approximately € 0.135 
(October 1, 2002). Source: Nord Pool annual report 2001.
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7  The skewed-t implied distribution model 29
In the past two decades the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model has 
become the widely accepted standard to value a wide range of derivative securities. 
Despite its ease of application however, the model exhibits some well-known 
deficiencies, including its assumption of continuous and costless hedging 
opportunities and its assumption of security prices following a Brownian motion. 
These deficiencies become most clear in the model's inability to price options 
consistently across strike and maturity. For example, the model frequently misprices 
deep in-the-money and far out-of-the-money options, as was already documented by 
Black (1975). In fact, since 1987, implied volatility has been a convex function of 
strike price and referred to as a 'skew' or 'smile', depending on its exact shape (Bates 
(1991), Rubinstein (1994), Derman (1999)).  
Various changes to the Black-Scholes model have been investigated to 
account for its biases. They may for example be related to non-hedgable risks in 
relatively illiquid options. The most popular adaptation is however the use of a 
different underlying risk-neutral price process or distribution. The choice of this 
adaptation is supported by empirical distribution analysis that rejects Brownian 
motion for most traded assets. The skews and smiles are thus explained by the non-
normal characteristics of implied risk-neutral return distributions.  
Cross sections of option prices have long been used to derive implied risk-
neutral distributions. These distributions represent a forward-looking measure of 
future risk-neutral realizations of the underlying security. Option-implied distributions 
have the distinct advantage of being based on data from a single point in time, rather 
than from a historical time-series. As a result, these implied distributions are 
theoretically more responsive to changes in market's perceptions than are forecasts 
from historical time series data.  
As a drawback, the distribution inferred from option prices is risk-neutral. If 
the representative investor who determines option prices is not risk neutral and cannot 
                                                
29 This chapter is partly based on: C. de Jong and R. Huisman, 2000, “From skews to a 
skewed-t: modeling option-implied returns with a skewed Student-t”, ERIM research paper 
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hedge all exposures (as is typically the case), these distributions may not correspond 
to the market's actual forecast of the future distribution of the underlying asset. This is 
a drawback easily neglected by many researchers and may lead to incorrect 
interpretations about market expectations30. Without specifying risk premia (as we do 
for example in the next chapter), implied distributions should not be interpreted as 
unbiased predictors of future distributions.  
However, even without the specification of risk premia, the risk-neutral 
implied distribution contains useful information. First, the exact shape of the implied 
distribution can be used for pricing options on the same underlying asset, such as 
options with illiquid strikes and maturity, or otherwise exotic features. Second, the 
implied distribution can be used for comparing options on different assets. This is 
especially worthwhile when the underlying assets are regarded as having similar 
representative investors and thus risk-premia are deemed to be equal. Differences in 
implied distributions that are not present in actual distributions may hint at anomalous 
market prices. Finally, implied distributions are an excellent means for closely 
monitoring changes in the markets perception of the underlying price process31. This 
latter application is especially popular among central bankers for gauging the market’s 
expectations regarding interest rates and exchange rates (e.g. Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta (1995), Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), Campa and Chang (1995), Leahy and 
Thomas (1996), Malz (1996 and 1997), Campa, Chang and Reider (1997)). Central 
bankers and other monetary policy makers use this information among others in 
assessing monetary credibility, and the timing and effectiveness of monetary 
operations. 
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) were the first to show how the implied risk-
neutral distribution function could be derived from option prices: the densities are 
equal to the second order derivatives of call option prices with respect to the strike 
price. Shimko (1993) offers a practical application of this general idea. He proposes to 
model the volatility smile as a quadratic function of moneyness (to obtain a 
continuous volatility smile), and then to calculate the second order derivative 
numerically. This approach is simple and fast, but inaccurate outside the range of 
traded strike prices, where volatility often becomes unbounded. Other methods 
                                                
30 Anagnou, Bedendo, Hodges and Tompkins (2001) provide an excellent review. 
31 The word 'changes' should be stressed, since implied risk-neutral distributions should not be 
interpreted as absolute forecasts, as we discussed.  
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construct implied binomial (Rubinstein (1994)) or trinomial trees (Derman, Kani and 
Chriss (1996), Nagot and Trommsdorff (1999)), or estimate the end-of-term 
distribution non-parametrically (Aït-Sahalia and Lo (1995), Jackwerth and Rubinstein 
(1996)). Other methods that are suitable to infer skews and smiles can be based on any 
option-pricing model that relies on non-normal returns. Examples are the jump models 
of Merton (1975) and Amin (1993), and GARCH option pricing models (see next 
chapter). 
In this chapter we present a different methodology to infer the implied risk-
neutral distribution function from European-style options. We use a skewed version of 
the Student-t distribution, which is known to provide a good fit to historical returns on 
many financial assets (see Reiss and Thomas (1997) for an overview). The skew or 
smile pattern of implied volatility as a function of strike is a direct indication of 
skewness and excess kurtosis of the implied risk-neutral return distribution. A smile 
implies fat tails; a skew implies both fat tails and skewness. The skewed Student-t 
distribution we use, is able to capture these distributional moments, and was first 
proposed in Fernandez and Steel (1998) and later applied to financial time-series by 
Lambert and Laurent (2001). The method to obtain skewness is simple; it assigns 
unequal weights to the distribution on the left and right side of the mode. The 
advantage of this skewed-t method is that the whole distribution depends on only three 
parameters, of which two directly control for the levels of skewness and kurtosis. 
Moreover, the skewed Student-t nests the normal distribution. We can thus easily vary 
parameters to compare different distributions and use the parameters as inputs to price 
other options. Other methods to obtain a skewed Student-t distribution are given in 
Hansen (1994), Theodossiou (1998) and Mittnik and Paolella (2000).  
A method that models skewness and kurtosis even more directly than the 
skewed-t is the one in Corrado and Su (1996). This model adapts a Gram-Charlier 
series expansion32 of the standard normal density function to yield an option price 
formula that is the sum of a Black-Scholes option price plus adjustment terms for non-
normal skewness and kurtosis. Although conceptually similar to our approach in the 
sense that it has separate parameters for skewness and kurtosis, it has one important 
limitation. Implied distributions often have such pronounced tail-fatness, that the 
fourth moment is non-existent, as we will show empirically. Estimating implied 
kurtosis then yields spurious results, whereas our skewed-t method is still able to 
                                                
32 See for example Jarrow and Rudd (1982) 
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estimate a parameter (the degrees of freedom) that captures tail-fatness and thus 
describe the underlying distribution. 
In the next section we explain our method, as well as two curve-fitting and an 
implied trinomial tree method. Section 7.2 starts with an example and provides an 
empirical analysis of the methods with closing prices of European-style options on the 
FTSE 100 index from January 1995 to December 1999. We describe how we estimate 
the models weekly and compare the results. Section 7.3 concludes. 
7.1  Methodology
The skewed-t method assumes that the expected risk-neutral returns implied in 
option prices follow a skewed Student-t distribution. In this section we introduce this 
distribution and describe how it can be applied to options pricing. Then we describe 
the other methodologies with which we compare the skewed-t approach. 
7.1.1  Skewed Student-t 
Consider the probability density function f(x | Į) of the central Student-t 
distribution with α degrees of freedom. It reads: 
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where c(Į) is a constant that exclusively depends on Į and ensures the integral sums to 
unity. The central Student-t distribution is symmetric with mean equal to zero. For 
values of Į larger than two, the variance is defined and equals Į/(Į-2). The parameter 
Į is called the number of degrees of freedom and controls the level of tail fatness: the 
smaller the degrees of freedom, the fatter the tails. The Student-t distribution nests the 
normal distribution: if Į approaches infinity the Student-t converges to the normal 
distribution.  
Fernandez and Steel (1998) describe a very general method to introduce 
skewness into a symmetric distribution (around 0) by transforming the probability 
density function by the parameter Ȗ as follows:  
 87
( ) ( )( )

≥
<⋅
=
0
0
|
xxf
xxf
xg
γ
γγ       (2)  
The basic idea underlying (2) is simply the introduction of inverse scale 
factors both sides of the mode. This inverse scaling of the probability density function 
leaves the unique mode at 0, but enables control of the skewness. The density function 
is symmetric for Ȗ = 1, negatively skewed for Ȗ < 1 and positively skewed for Ȗ > 1. 
Furthermore, it can easily be seen that inverting Ȗ produces the mirror image around 0.  
( ) ( )γαγα 1,|,| xgxg −=       (3) 
One of the appealing properties of this inverse scaling method is that the 
moments can be calculated directly from the moments of the symmetric distribution, 
and that these moments exist if and only if the corresponding moment of the parent 
distribution exists. In particular (Fernandez and Steel (1998)): 
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For the Student-t the latter expression is available in closed form, and some extra 
algebraic equations lead to relatively simple equations for the mean m and standard 
deviation s (Lambert and Laurent, 2001) 
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where ī(.) is the Gamma function, and Į > į. Note that Ȗ not only influences the 
skewness, but also the mean and standard deviation of the distribution. In the option 
calculations we will need to standardize the random draws from the skewed-t, and 
expressions (6a-c) will then turn out to be extremely helpful.  
We assume that the natural logarithm of the risk-neutral return of the 
underlying asset has a standard deviation of ı and follows the above skewed-t 
distribution, where Ȗ determines the level of skewness and α  the level of kurtosis. 
The mean of this risk-neutral return should be equal to the risk-free rate (r) minus the 
continuous dividend yield (d). Under these assumptions the time T price of the 
underlying (ST) equals: 
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where x  is a random draw from the skewed-t distribution, whose mean and standard 
deviation equal m and s. Once the three parameters (ı, Ȗ, Į) of the underlying risk-
neutral process are known, calculation of European-style option prices is 
straightforward. For calls (puts), the value of the option is simply the value of the 
portion of the distribution above (below) the strike price, discounted back to the 
present by the risk-free rate. In particular, the price of a call option expiring at time T
at a strike price of K equals: 
( )[ ]0,max KSEeC TTr −⋅= ⋅−       (8) 
where the expectation refers to the risk-neutral distribution. The normal distribution is 
nested in the skewed-t, since the latter equals the standard normal if Ȗ = 1 and Į
approaches infinity. Therefore, the skewed-t option pricing methodology generalizes 
the standard Black and Scholes (1973) methodology by two extra parameters that 
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directly account for two more distributional moments33. Unlike the Black-Scholes 
formula, there is no closed form for the option price under the skewed-t distribution. 
As a consequence, the expected value in (8) has to be derived numerically.  
Although later in this section we show how to infer the parameters from 
European-style options, it is worthwhile mentioning roughly how they can be inferred 
from American-style options as well. For American-style options the relationship 
between the distribution and the option price is less direct, due to the early exercise 
premium. The option’s value will depend on the entire stochastic process of the 
underlying, not just the distribution at the option’s expiration. This early exercise 
premium however is subject to a rather strict minimum and maximum (see e.g. Melick 
and Thomas (1997)). For call options expiring at time T the bounds are:  
( )[ ]0,max KSEC Tu −=       (9) 
( )[ ] [ ]{ }KSEKSEeC TTTrl −−⋅= ⋅− ,0,maxmax     (10) 
The upper bound Cu is the undiscounted European option value, whereas at a 
minimum the lower bound Cl equals the (discounted) European value. At a maximum 
the ratio of the upper to the lower bound is thus e-rT. Although these bounds can be 
remarkably close together for reasonable interest rates, a point estimate is required in 
the inference of the distributional parameters from American options. To generate 
such a point estimate, one could weigh the upper and lower bounds by an extra 
parameter that determines where exactly between the bounds the American option is 
priced34. So, with one extra parameter any methodology could be applied to American 
options as well. 
7.1.2  Other methodologies 
With its separate parameters for the first four distributional moments, we 
expect the skewed Student-t distribution to be flexible enough to price options across 
different strike prices. The only way to assess its flexibility however is a careful 
33 As can be seen in Equation (6c) the parameter Ȗ not only influences skewness, but the 
variance and kurtosis as well. Both are minimal for Ȗ = 1. 
34 Melick and Thomas (1997) use different weights for options in- and out-of-the-money. 
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comparison to a set of other methodologies. Apart from a comparison with the 
lognormal distribution (constant volatility), we choose three main reference 
methodologies with approximately the same degrees of freedom (parameters) as our 
method: two implied curve-fitting methods plus a trinomial tree. Curve-fitting 
methods were introduced by Shimko (1993) and since become very popular among 
academics and practitioners alike. Therefore, it is a natural reference method. Of the 
various tree approaches that have been proposed for option pricing, a trinomial tree 
has proven to provide the necessary flexibility to model empirical returns (Bliss and 
Ronn (1989)) as well as option-implied returns (Derman, Kani and Chriss (1996) and 
Nagot and Trommsdorff (1999)), and is a natural candidate as well. Below we 
describe these reference methodologies in more detail.  
Shimko (1993) was the first not to model the underlying process or 
distribution, but the implied volatility curve instead. He fits a curve through the 
implied volatility curve, translates the implied volatilities into option prices and 
derives the risk-neutral distribution from the second order derivatives of the call 
option prices with respect to strike prices, following Breeden and Litzenberger (1978). 
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Shimko (1993) imposes a quadratic polynomial structure on the implied 
volatility curve. In the original paper the exercise price serves as independent variable 
in the quadratic form. This method requires no optimization, and is therefore fast and 
simple. However, it produces option prices that are inaccurate outside the range of 
traded strike prices, because implied volatilities either go to plus or minus infinity. 
Hence, tail behavior of the distribution is hard to evaluate. As a solution, it has been 
proposed to apply a lognormal structure on the tails by flattening the volatility curves 
at the endpoints. A less ad hoc solution is that of Malz (1997), who proposes to 
replace the strike price by the option’s delta as independent variable, a statistic that 
lies in the closed interval from zero to one. In our applications we will use both 
modifications: the deltas as independent variable, and the (rescaled) strike price35.
                                                
35 This rescaled strike price is the moneyness: Ke-rT/S0 - 1  
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A very flexible approach to price options is by constructing trees. Especially 
for the valuation of early exercise premia in American-style options a tree approach is 
often applied, since a well-defined tree allows for efficient backward valuation 
procedures. In a binomial tree the underlying risk-neutral process may go up or down 
in each time-step. The most well known binomial tree is probably that of Cox, Ross 
and Rubinstein (1979), in which the magnitude of a downward move is the inverse of 
the magnitude of an upward move. This relatively simple process has however proven 
to provide only limited flexibility (Bliss and Ronn, 1989). That’s why the tree process 
may be extended with a state of no or limited change in the underlying process. This 
extension enlarges its flexibility considerably and is our motivation to choose an 
implied trinomial tree as a benchmark for our skewed Student-t approach. In our 
comparison we apply the same tree as Nagot and Trommsdorff (1999). The trinomial 
tree approach captures those features of implied distributions that are most prominent 
in real-world option markets: negative skewness and excess kurtosis. In contrast to 
some other tree approaches (e.g. Derman, Kani and Chriss (1996) and Jackwerth 
(1997)) theirs requires less information, while maintaining enough flexibility: the 
underlying asset can either go up by a factor u (>1), not move at all, or go down by a 
factor d (<1), with respective probabilities of p1, p2 and 1 - p1 - p2. Because the 
downward move is not restricted to the inverse of the upward move, this tree is non-
recombining, which explains part of its flexibility36. For reasonable accuracy the 
number of time-steps should be at least 15 to 20. Going forward through the tree, the 
probabilities and terminal asset values can be expressed in terms of the four 
parameters u, d, p1, and p2.
7.2 Empirical Results 
We start this section with an example to gain some insights in the different 
methods. We proceed with a description of the FTSE-100 options data for the more 
rigorous empirical analysis. With the five years of options data we estimate the 
implied distributions and perform a comparative in-sample analysis to assess the 
appropriateness of the skewed Student-t formulation.  
                                                
36 Only one degree of freedom is left unused: the intermediate move i may be free to deviate 
from 0. 
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7.2.1  Example 
In order to gain insight in our Student-t based model, we start with an example 
that is presented both by Shimko (1993) and Nagot and Trommsdorff (1999). We 
compare our results with theirs, as well as the classical lognormal distribution.  
Table 7.1 Shimko example
This table presents the closing prices of European-style call options on the S&P 500 index with 
different strike prices on October 21, 1991. The options expire in December 1991 and prices 
are in US$. The data are taken from Shimko (1993). 
Consider the following European-style call options on the S&P 500 index. 
The prices are from October 21, 1991. The index value is 390.02, the interest rate 
5.03%, the continuous dividend yield 3.14%, and the time-to-maturity 0.16 years (40 
trading days). The prices of the call options are listed in Table 7.1. The optimization 
of the skewed-t method leads to the following estimates for the standard deviation (ı)
15.60%, skewness (Ȗ) 0.523, and degrees of freedom (Į) 15.64. The skewness 
parameter indicates pronounced negative skewness and excess kurtosis, due to a 
moderate number of degrees of freedom and Ȗ deviating from 1.  
Strike price 325 345 360 365 375 385
Option price 66.500 46.000 33.000 27.750 20.125 13.500
Strike price 390 395 400 405 410 425
Option price 9.625 7.250 5.375 3.375 1.875 0.250
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Table 7.2 Results Shimko example
This table presents the implied distribution characteristics of the logreturns from the example 
presented in Table 7.1 for five methods. Parameter estimates are obtained by minimizing the 
root mean squared error (RMSE) between actual and model call option prices, except for 
Shimko’s method. 'Normal' refers to the normal implied distribution, 'Shimko (K)' to Shimko’s 
method regressed on rescaled strike prices and flattening beyond traded strike prices, 'Shimko 
(delta)' to Shimko’s method regressed on option deltas, 'ITT' to Nagot and Trommsdorffs 
(1999) trinomial tree with 30 time-steps, and 'Skewed-t' to our method.  
Based on these data we estimate parameters for five different methods by 
minimizing the root mean squared error (RMSE). The methods under consideration 
are the standard normal, the Shimko (regressed alternatively on rescaled strike price 
and option delta), the implied trinomial tree with 30 time steps (ITT), and our skewed-
t. In Table 7.2 we compare the fit as well as the return moments (statistics are based 
on the logreturns). The fit of the skewed-t method and ITT are of comparable 
magnitude, as indicated by the root mean squared error between the actual and fitted 
prices. In this example they clearly improve upon the normal method and (to a lesser 
extent) the Shimko (delta) method. The main differences appear in the estimates for 
skewness and kurtosis. By construction, the normal distribution contains neither 
skewness nor excess kurtosis. Due to the flattening of the tails we employed, the 
estimates of skewness and kurtosis in Shimko’s approach are rather unreliable. The 
reported statistics of all methods differ quite a bit, although the shapes of the density 
functions look rather similar, except for the normal (Figure 7.1). The differences in 
moment statistics are likely to be due to the behavior in the tails, which is hard to 
judge by eye. What this example therefore clarifies, is that the option prices do not 
completely pin down the underlying distribution, a fact that Melick and Thomas 
RMSE Skewness Kurtosis
Normal 1.506 0.000 3.000
Shimko (K) 0.429 -0.348 3.327
Shimko (delta) 0.819 -0.981 4.122
ITT 0.557 -0.633 3.717
Skewed-t 0.443 -0.227 3.263
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(1997) provides an excellent graphical example of. This motivates our choice for a 
parsimonious distribution that has proven to provide a good fit to return-data. 
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Figure 7.1 Implied distributions, Skimko example
This graph shows the implied probability densities, obtained by minimizing the root 
mean squared error between actual and model option prices, as presented in Table 7.1. 
'B&S' refers to the normal (Black-Scholes) method, 'Shimko' to the quadratic curve 
fitting method with rescaled strike prices, 'Skewed-t' to our skewed Student-t method, 
and 'ITT' to the trinomial tree approach. 
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7.2.2  Description of the data 
Daily closing prices on the FTSE-100 (Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 
Index) index options, traded on Liffe (London International Financial Futures and 
Options Exchange) are used in an attempt to assess the different methods more 
rigorously than the above example. We use data from January 1995 till December 
1999. The underlying value of the options is the future on the FTSE-100 index with 
the same expiry date. The FTSE-100 index consists of the largest 100 UK companies 
by market value, and is the leading indicator for stocks that trade on the London Stock 
Exchange.  
The FTSE-100 options are European-style index options that expire on the 3rd
Friday of the expiry month. Over the past ten years, volume has continuously been 
growing to a daily level of nearly 25.000 contracts, or ǧ30 billion, at the end of 1999. 
Trading volume is somewhat higher in calls than in puts. Most active trading is in 
(close to) at-the-money series and short-term maturities. For example, nearly half the 
volume in the 1995-1999 period is concentrated in the series that expire within one 
month (20 trading days), whereas only 12% is concentrated in maturities of over three 
months (60 trading days). Similarly, 62% of the trades are at strike prices within 5% 
from the current futures price, whereas only 15% is at strike prices outside 10% of the 
futures prices. There is an apparent difference in strike preference between call and 
put trades. Most call trades are at strike prices close to or above the current futures 
price, whereas most put trades are on the other side of the strike spectrum. This shows 
that traders prefer at-the-money and out-of-the-money options: those options that are 
cheapest and have the strongest option-like characteristics. Measured by trading 
volume and open interest, the FTSE-100 options and futures markets are currently the 
most liquid derivatives markets in Europe. Therefore, they are probably the best 
markets in Europe for testing an option-pricing model. 
The data we use in the analysis are from Liffe's CD-Rom “Equity Products 
End of Day Data”, which contains options and futures data on the FTSE-100 and its 
constituents from March 1992 till December 1999. We use the closing prices on the 
FTSE-100 index from January 1995 till December 1999, because markets became 
more liquid over the years. In order to reduce the amount of calculations, we restrict 
attention to the Wednesdays37. For liquidity reasons, we restrict attention to the 
                                                
37 On Wednesday 19 May 1999 there was no trade. Hence, we used the day afterwards. 
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options whose strike prices are within a 10% range from the current futures price and 
with a time-to-maturity of at least 5 and at most 127 trading days (half a year) to 
maturity. Furthermore, since the option prices have tick size of ǧ0.50, we delete from 
the sample all quotes smaller than ǧ1.50 to avoid problems due to stale prices.  
In the option calculations a risk-free interest rate is required to discount back 
the possible payoffs. Of course, we could rely on some real-life interest series, but 
then we would need to interpolate or extrapolate interest rates from different 
maturities to get interest rates with maturities that match those of the options. Shimko 
(1993) presents an elegant method to circumvent this problem. For every maturity 
series, he estimates the discount factor that produces a put-call relation that comes 
closest to put-call parity.  
( ) KTrFPutCall ⋅⋅−+=− exp      (12) 
We estimate this relation (with F and exp(-rT) as parameters) by ordinary least 
squares and thus obtain an ‘implied’ futures price and interest rate. The implied 
interest rate may be interpreted as the lowest borrowing and lending costs that market 
participants face. As a final step in our selection process, we now discard the put 
prices, because the deviations from put-call parity are negligible. This leaves us with 
15466 call option prices, on 258 trading days, with at least 6 different exercise prices 
per maturity, and average time to maturity of 48 trading days.  
7.2.3  Estimation results 
We start estimation with the skewed Student-t method and then move forward 
to the other methods. The skewed-t attains a relatively good fit to the option price data 
(Table 7.5). Average root mean squared error between actual and fitted prices is £0.77, 
which should be judged in the light of option values averaging around approximately 
£220 and 16.5 options per maturity bucket on average. Parameter estimates are quite 
stable over the years, with the exception of volatility. As expected and in line with 
other research, volatility was considerably higher in the years 1997-1999 than in the 
two previous years (Table 7.3). The number of degrees of freedom varies widely and 
assumes sometimes very low levels (below 2) and sometimes very high levels 
(exceeding 1000). Because the estimates for the degrees of freedom are so much right-
skewed we estimated (and report) its natural logarithm instead of the degrees of 
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freedom itself. The average of this estimate is 2.63, which corresponds to 13.8 as 
degrees of freedom and suggests mild kurtosis if the distribution were symmetric. 
However, kurtosis is also influenced by the skewness parameter. This parameter 
proves that the implied returns deviate largely from normality, with average gamma 
equal to 0.69. This value is far below 1 (consistently for nearly all option series) and 
thus the distribution far from symmetric. The shape of the implied volatility curves 
supports the observed skewness in the implied distributions: implied volatility curves 
are all downward sloping in moneyness and delta. The combination of low skewness 
parameter (gamma) and moderately high degrees of freedom results in extreme 
skewness (average –2.69) and relatively high kurtosis (average 10.50).  
The left-skewness in the implied distributions far exceeds levels in actual 
return data (which hardly fall below -0.5) and is a result of out-of-the-money put 
options (and in-the-money call options) being relatively expensive. Apparently, risk-
premia (the price for protection against large negative shocks in the underlying index) 
cannot be neglected in the price formation of options and the assumptions of 
continuous and costless hedging opportunities do not even hold in this very liquid 
market of FTSE-100 index futures and options. Since parameter estimates are quite 
stable over the years (Table 7.3) and across maturity (Table 7.4), risk premia play a 
role in all option prices. Changes in the risk-neutral distribution may therefore be 
attributed to changes in market expectations as well as changes in risk aversion of 
representative agents.   
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Table 7.3 Parameter estimates skewed Student-t method per year
This table presents the average parameter estimates (standard deviation in parentheses) of the 
implied risk-neutral distribution with the skewed Student-t method. The parameters are 
obtained with call option data on the FTSE-100 index options in the period 1995 till 1999. The 
parameter σ measures the volatility of the distribution, the parameter γ determines skewness; 
ln(α) is the natural logarithm of the degrees of freedom and predominantly determines the level 
of kurtosis. The last row contains the number of option series (a certain maturity on a certain 
date) per year. 
Table 7.4 Parameter estimates skewed Student-t method per maturity bucket
This table presents the average parameter estimates per maturity bucket (in trading days) of the 
implied risk-neutral distribution with the skewed Student-t method. The parameters are 
obtained with call option data on the FTSE-100 index options in the period 1995 till 1999. The 
parameter σ measures the volatility of the distribution, the parameter γ determines skewness; 
ln(α) is the natural logarithm of the degrees of freedom and determines the level of kurtosis. 
The last row contains the number of option series (a certain maturity on a certain date) per 
maturity bucket. 
Maturity # obs
< 20 days 177 18.5% (6.1%) 0.74 (0.18) 2.39 (1.34)
20-40 days 243 19.1% (5.3%) 0.69 (0.13) 2.64 (1.04)
40-60 days 219 20.2% (5.0%) 0.68 (0.11) 2.50 (0.99)
> 60 days 297 20.6% (4.6%) 0.66 (0.10) 2.85 (1.19)
Total 936 19.7% (8.0%) 0.69 (0.15) 2.63 (1.18)
σ γ ln(α)
Year # obs
1995 176 13.9% (1.8%) 0.79 (0.07) 3.10 (1.89)
1996 184 12.7% (2.0%) 0.73 (0.08) 2.21 (1.17)
1997 192 18.7% (6.4%) 0.70 (0.08) 2.51 (1.62)
1998 197 27.7% (7.7%) 0.64 (0.09) 2.76 (2.17)
1999 187 24.9% (5.5%) 0.60 (0.10) 2.56 (1.83)
Total 936 19.7% (8.0%) 0.69 (0.11) 2.63 (1.79)
σ γ ln(α)
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The first alternative to the skewed-t under consideration is the simple 
lognormal model, where implied volatilities are the same for each exercise price. Two 
other alternatives are based on Shimko’s method. We estimate one set of parameters 
by regressing implied volatility on a quadratic function of moneyness, and another set 
on a quadratic function of the option’s delta. The final alternative is the implied 
trinomial tree approach, where we divide all times-to-maturity in 30 time steps. 
Parameter estimates for the lognormal, skewed Student-t and trinomial tree are 
obtained by minimizing the root mean squared error (RMSE) in option prices. For the 
Shimko methods we calculate an RMSE as well, by inserting the model volatility into 
the Black-Scholes formula.  
In Tables 7.5 and 7.6 we observe that all methods clearly improve upon the 
standard (log)normal model. A simple quadratic function (Shimko), instead of a 
straight line, for the implied volatility causes an enormous decline in estimation errors. 
Although the conceptual difference is minimal between the two Shimko methods, the 
results indicate it is better to regress implied volatilities on option deltas than on 
moneyness. The former outperforms all other methods in each year (except 1995) as 
well as each maturity bucket. As discussed earlier, this has the additional advantage 
that no problems will be encountered outside the range of traded options, since delta 
lies in between zero and one.  
If we look at the two more complex approaches, skewed-t and trinomial tree, 
we observe that the skewed Student-t approach is by far preferable above the trinomial 
tree in each maturity bucket and in each year. However, both methods consistently 
underperform compared to the delta curve-fitting method, although the skewed-t is 
slightly better than the original strike curve-fitting method. We checked that this 
underperformance is not a result of outliers. The skewed Student-t yields a better in-
sample fit in only 20.5% of the option series, but the implied trinomial tree has an 
even lower score of 0.4%. So the simple quadratic curve-fitting method on option 
deltas works best, and this effect strengthens over time: the Shimko (delta) method 
yields a rather stable fit over the years, but the skewed-t deteriorates considerably. 
This result is surprising at first, since the Shimko method even contains one parameter 
less than the skewed-t and trinomial tree and is thus not a priori more flexible. An 
explanation might be that the two more complex methods do not have the appropriate 
flexibility to capture the market prices (especially the implied trinomial tree). Another, 
though somewhat related explanation is that option traders have been increasingly 
using Shimko(-related) methods to price options. The existence of implied volatility 
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skews and smiles are common knowledge since the early nineties and it is known that 
many option traders use skew- and smile related ad hoc rules to price options with 
different moneyness. These ad hoc rules are often based on a certain number of 
volatility basis points above or below the at-the-money implied volatility for each 
change in moneyness or delta. In other words: option traders in majority monitor the 
implied volatility curve and interpolate and extrapolate volatilities to price options on 
different points along the curve. The best a posteriori fit is then naturally obtained by 
mimicking the trader’s practice. That may explain why methods that model the 
distribution will have a hard job to beat an implied curve fitting method.  
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Table 7.5 Empirical fit per year
This table presents the empirical fit of the skewed Student-t method and four 
alternatives. Fit is measured by the root mean squared error (RMSE) between actual 
and model call option prices. The fit is analyzed with data on the FTSE-100 index 
options in the period 1995 till 1999. 'Normal' refers to the lognormal implied 
distribution, 'Shimko (Strike)' to Shimko’s method regressed on rescaled strike prices, 
'Shimko (Delta)' to Shimko’s method regressed on option deltas, 'ITT' to Nagot and 
Trommsdorffs (1999) trinomial tree with 30 time-steps, and 'Skewed-t' to our method.
Table 7.6 Empirical fit per maturity bucket
This table presents the empirical fit of the skewed Student-t method and four 
alternatives for different maturities. See Table 7.5 for an explanation.  
Maturity Normal Shimko Shimko ITT Skewed-t
(Strike) (Delta)
<= 20 days 7.62 0.56 0.34 1.74 0.48
20-40 days 6.26 0.49 0.22 1.50 0.70
40-60 days 4.85 0.31 0.13 1.05 0.71
> 60 days 18.62 1.22 0.44 3.73 1.04
Total 13.47 0.92 0.39 2.90 0.77
Year Normal Shimko Shimko ITT Skewed-t
(Strike) (Delta)
1995 4.27 0.50 0.33 1.09 0.33
1996 5.78 0.66 0.38 1.59 0.41
1997 11.22 0.70 0.29 2.56 0.58
1998 21.24 1.39 0.48 4.08 1.28
1999 23.80 1.31 0.47 5.00 1.19
Total 13.47 0.92 0.39 2.90 0.77
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7.3  Concluding remarks 
The shape of an implied distribution gives important information that can be 
used for pricing other options, for comparing options on different assets and for 
closely monitoring changes in the markets perception of the underlying price process. 
In this chapter we proposed a new method to infer the risk-neutral distribution from 
option prices. Its main strength is its relative simplicity with separate parameters that 
directly capture the levels of skewness and kurtosis.  
In an application to several years of FTSE-100 index options we compare the 
in-sample performance of the skewed-t method with the normal method (constant 
volatility), two implied volatility curve-fitting methods and a trinomial tree. Although 
all methods clearly improve upon the normal method, the curve-fitting method that 
regresses implied volatility on option delta outperforms the trinomial tree and skewed-
t methods. Average root mean squared errors between actual and fitted prices are 
lower and this effect strengthens over time. The additional advantage of this method 
compared to the original Shimko method (that regresses volatility on moneyness or 
strike) is that it yields sensible bounded implied volatilities for any strike price. We 
therefore conclude that a curve-fitting method is preferred to price European-style 
options outside the available trading range.  
Even though their fit is outperformed by a curve-fitting method, the two 
methods that focus on modeling the distribution of asset returns do have strong 
appeals. For the pricing of American-style options, backward valuation can only be 
applied in a tree, and the trinomial tree is a reasonably flexible candidate. The skewed-
t method on the other hand has the appeal that its parameters relate directly to the 
moments of the distribution. This helps to judge whether the observed market prices 
are realistic or not. The volatility curve may for example look very smooth, but it 
might imply unrealistic levels of skewness and kurtosis, that are easily detected with 
the skewed-t method. Moreover, the parameters for skewness and kurtosis summarize 
changes in market expectations and risk awareness in a simple and direct manner. 
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8 Implied GARCH volatility forecasting 38
Repeated turbulence in financial markets incessantly reminds us that 
uncertainty is an unavoidable aspect of financial markets. With good reason the 
assessment of uncertainty, often proxied by price volatility, plays a prominent role in 
all areas of finance, ranging from investment decision-making, security valuation and 
risk management to monetary policy making. Even though the measurement and 
forecasting of volatility has attracted the interest of many researchers and 
practitioners, it remains a challenging statistical problem. Not only is it a problem of 
having a proper volatility model, but also of having a robust volatility forecasting 
method. The available models, such as GARCH or stochastic volatility, based on 
historical returns seem to work quite well in sample but generally perform poorly out-
of-sample (Akgiray (1989), Dimson and Marsh (1990), Nelson (1992), Nelson and 
Foster (1995), Franses and Van Dijk (1995), and Brailsford and Faff (1996)).  
In recent years there is some support for the hypothesis that the information 
provided by implied volatilities from daily option prices is more relevant in 
forecasting volatility than the volatility information provided by historical returns 
(Day and Lewis (1993), Jorion (1995), Christensen and Prabhala (1998), Fleming 
(1998), and Blair et al. (2001)). If option markets are efficient, option prices contain 
information about the price process of the underlying asset over the lifetime of the 
option. For the purpose of volatility forecasting this comes down to extracting the 
expectation of market participants about the development of future volatility. 
Therefore, the volatility estimate derived from option prices is a forward-looking 
(risk-neutral) estimate and eventually different from an estimate based on historical 
return data. It eliminates the choice of a particular historical sample period, which may 
result in better volatility forecasts.  
Although the idea of option-implied volatility estimates is relatively simple, 
there is not one straightforward method to extract the information. Every proposed 
method relies on a number of assumptions regarding the model underlying option 
                                                
38 This chapter is based on: C. de Jong and T. Lehnert, 2002, “Implied GARCH volatility 
forecasting”, ERIM research paper.  
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prices. In line with the large number of option pricing models, academics and 
practitioners have applied a multitude of methods to extract option-implied volatilities. 
Before the crash in 1987 the Black and Scholes (1973) model was applied 
mechanically in its original form; there was a nearly constant relationship between the 
implied volatility and the exercise price of the option. After the crash traders seem to 
adjust the volatility for moneyness and maturity before being plugged into the Black-
Scholes model. The result is an implied volatility pattern that cannot be fully 
explained by the recent option pricing literature using historical returns of the 
underlying.  
It is known that implied volatility covaries with realized volatility, but the 
major difficulty is to back out volatility information of the underlying from observed 
option prices. Since the assumptions of the Black-Scholes option-pricing framework 
are usually violated, it is a challenge to select the appropriate implied volatility. 
Previous studies try to explore information from (Black-Scholes) implied volatilities 
of traded options to estimate and forecast future volatility without explicitly modeling 
the underlying return process. A number of researchers have been extensively 
investigating the optimal weighting scheme for the different implied volatilities at 
different strikes39. A method often applied is VIX, which is an S&P100 volatility 
index that combines a number of close-to-at-the-money implied volatilities into a 
single estimate (see Fleming et al. (1995) for a description). The index is constructed 
in such a way that it represents the implied volatility of a hypothetical at-the-money 
option with 22 days to maturity. It is therefore unable to capture any smile or term 
structure effects of the whole implied volatility surface. Those methods that adhere to 
the Black-Scholes implied volatility framework are not only arbitrary and theoretically 
questionable, but also the result often turns out to be a severely biased predictor of 
future volatility (Canina and Figlewski (1993), Fleming (1998) and Blair et al. 
(2001)). 
In this chapter we present a new method to make volatility forecasts, which is 
based on a relatively recent set of option-pricing models that applies the time-series 
GARCH-methodology to option pricing (see Duan (1995), Kallsen and Taqqu (1998), 
Ritchken and Trevor (1999), Bauwens and Lubrano (2002) and Heston and Nandi 
(2000)). We construct the expected future price process by deriving the relevant 
parameters of the GARCH option-pricing model from prices of traded options with 
                                                
39 See Bates (1996) for a review. 
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different strike and maturity. In contrast to methods for estimating and forecasting 
volatility that use past index returns, this method derives anticipated parameters of a 
GARCH process and therefore market expectations about the future price process. 
Since we need a forward-looking estimate in most finance applications of volatility, 
the characteristics of the future price process should be more informative than the ones 
of the historical price process. For example, volatility forecasts are popular among 
central bankers and other monetary policy makers for closely monitoring changes in 
the markets perception on interest rates and exchange rates (e.g. Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta (1995), Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), Campa and Chang (1995), Leahy 
and Thomas (1996), Malz (1996 and 1997), Campa, Chang and Reider (1997)). 
Volatility forecasts of stock market prices are applied by an even wider number of 
financial players to investment decision-making, security valuation and risk 
management. 
There are now several GARCH option pricing models available in the 
literature, but a very flexible one is the GARCH option-pricing model of Duan (1995). 
It has shown some empirical success and it is appropriate for our study. We estimate 
the parameters of the model by minimizing the relative pricing error between the 
market prices and the theoretical option prices of the FTSE-100 and DAX index 
options. The FTSE data covers the period January 1995 till July 2000, whereas the 
DAX data covers the period January 2000 till August 2001. Once we have the 
GARCH parameter estimates we can use Monte Carlo simulations to make volatility 
forecasts some periods ahead. As a comparison, we construct a second volatility 
estimate using the same GARCH specification, but now calibrated with historical 
returns. In an out-of-sample analysis we compare our ‘implied GARCH’ model with 
the ‘historical GARCH’ and conclude which method is superior in making one-day 
ahead forecasts of the volatility of a market index. In line with recent literature on 
volatility measurement we use intraday data to calculate the daily realized volatility 
that serves as a benchmark for our forecasts.  
With this study we make several contributions to the existing volatility 
modeling and forecasting literature. First, we use a new method based on the 
informational content of option prices. With the ever-increasing trading volumes in 
derivative markets, we believe the information in derivatives will become the standard 
for making volatility forecasts. Second, we use the information contained in the whole 
implied volatility surface, both across maturity and across strike price. Third, we use 
data that have received relatively limited attention by researchers but have become 
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increasingly large in trading volume. The limited attention for part of our dataset, 
especially the DAX index options, has the advantage that it is relatively independent 
of the previously done volatility research that was mainly directed to S&P100 index 
options. 
In the next section we set up the econometric framework; in Section 8.2 we 
describe the data; Section 8.3 provides empirical results and Section 8.4 concludes. 
8.1  Methodology 
In this chapter, we focus on the GARCH option-pricing framework developed 
in Duan (1995) and implement a model based on the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) 
of Nelson (1991). Apart from the well-documented GARCH effects (see Bollerslev et 
al. (1992)), this process is also able to model the well-known leverage effect of stock 
market returns (Nelson, 1991). Volatility tends to rise in response to bad news 
(negative excess returns) and to fall in response to good news (positive excess 
returns). The form of the EGARCH specification is comparable to the non-linear 
asymmetric GARCH process of Engle and Ng (1993), the GJR-GARCH model of 
Glosten et al. (1993) and the power GARCH of Ding et al. (1993). Those studies show 
it is crucial to include the asymmetric term in financial time series models, because 
volatility shocks following negative returns are significantly larger than shocks 
following positive returns.  
The EGARCH option-pricing model assumes the risk-neutral valuation 
principle, and the standard Black and Scholes (1973) model can be derived as a 
special case. Kallsen and Taqqu (1998) develop a continuous-time version of the 
model and show that the same pricing results can be derived via an arbitrage-free 
argument. Heston and Nandi (2000) develop a closed form solution of a GARCH 
option-pricing model. Examples of alternative option-pricing models are the bivariate 
diffusion model of Hull and White (1987), the jump-diffusion model of Naik and Lee 
(1990), the variance-gamma model of Madan and Milne (1991) and the stochastic 
volatility models of Stein and Stein (1991), Wiggins (1991) and Heston (1993). 
Our choice of the GARCH option pricing model of Duan (1995) is motivated 
by its flexibility, the recent empirical successes of the model (see among others Amin 
and Ng (1994), Heynen et al. (1994), Duan (1996), and Ritchken and Trevor (1999)) 
and the emerging availability of numerical methods for this class of option pricing 
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models (see Hanke (1997), Duan et al. (1998), Ritchken and Trevor (1999), Duan and 
Simonato (1998a&b), Heston and Nandi (2000), and Duan et al. (2001)). 
For derivative valuation models with a high degree of path dependency, 
computationally demanding Monte Carlo simulations are commonly used for valuing 
derivative securities. We use a simulation adjustment method, the empirical 
martingale simulation (EMS) of Duan and Simonato (1998a), which has been shown 
to substantially accelerate the convergence of Monte Carlo price estimates and to 
minimize the so called ‘simulation error’. The EMS reproduces the martingale 
property for the simulated sample, a characteristic of all derivative pricing models. 
As a first step in our empirical analysis we derive the dividend-adjusted spot 
rate Xt. Given a discrete dividend series D and a futures price Ft, we use the equation 
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to derive the dividend-adjusted spot rate Xt. Here T-t is the time-to-maturity of the 
future, rf the risk-free interest rate, St the spot rate and PV(D) denotes the value at time 
t of the dividends in between t and T. In a discrete-time economy the value of the 
dividend-adjusted index at time t can be assumed to follow the following dynamics: 
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where µt represents the conditional mean; Ωt-1 is the information set in period t-1 and 
the combination of β and γ captures the leverage effect. Daily returns of financial time 
series may exhibit non-zero autocorrelation. One can account for this effect by 
specifying the conditional mean as an autoregressive process40 or by allowing for a 
risk premium attached to time-varying volatility. The specification for the conditional 
                                                
40 Bauwens and Lubrano (2002) and Hafner and Herwatz (2001) discuss how this affects 
option prices. 
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mean we selected, includes the second alternative advocated by Duan (1995, 1999) 
and Heston and Nandi (2000): 
2
2
1
ttft r σλσµ −+=       (3)
where the risk premium λ is a constant parameter, and the term ı2 gives additional 
control for the conditional mean. This specification completes the baseline EGARCH 
model that we use for the analysis. The parameter α measures the degree of mean 
reversion in that α=1 implies that the variance process is integrated. We also tried 
alternative specifications for the volatility dynamics, but for the ‘implied’ GARCH 
calibration we experienced frequent violations of the covariance stationary condition 
and if we control for covariance stationarity the fit was sometimes extremely bad. In 
contrast, restriction of the mean reversion parameter α in the EGARCH specification 
to values below 1 did not cause notable problems in the estimation process.  
Duan (1995) shows that under the Local Risk Neutral Valuation Relationship 
(LRNVR) the conditional variance remains unchanged, but under the pricing measure 
Q the conditional expectation of rt is equal to the risk free rate rf. Therefore, risk 
neutralization transforms the error term in the following way: 
tt
2
t2
1
ft rr εσ+σ−=        (4a) 
)1,0(~| 1 Ntt −Ωε under the risk-neutral probability measure Q (4b) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )λεγλεβσαωσ −−−++=
−−− 11
2
1
2 ||lnln tttt    (4c) 
In the equations above İt is not necessarily normal, but to include the Black and 
Scholes model as a special case we assume that İt is a Gaussian random variable. The 
shift of the error term can be interpreted as an additional modification of the news 
impact curve, therefore also modifies the asymmetry in the volatility process. The 
long run stationary volatility level can be shown to be equal to: 
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in which the expected value should be evaluated numerically. 
A European call option with exercise price K and maturity T has at time t 
price equal to: 
( )[ ]ttQttTrt KXEec f Ω−= −− |0,max)(      (5) 
We rely on Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the option numerically. Given the 
value of the index Xt, we generate N standard normal random numbers to advance the 
dynamics one period ahead and then make the empirical martingale adjustment. We 
repeat this procedure T-t times until maturity and arrive at N simulated prices XT. We 
calculate each of the N option payoffs, take the average and discount them back to 
period t of option valuation. Using this procedure we compute the value of an option 
for all exercise prices and all maturities. 
We calibrate the parameters of the EGARCH option-pricing model in (5) by 
minimizing the square root of the mean squared pricing error between the market 
prices and the theoretical call and put option prices. We use relative pricing errors as 
defined below, 
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where 2M is the total number of call and put options evaluated, the subscript i refers to 
the n different maturities and subscript j to the mi different strike prices in a particular 
maturity series i. We use relative instead of absolute pricing errors in order to give 
options with different levels of moneyness equal weight in the calibration process. As 
starting values for the calibration we use the time-series estimates from the EGARCH 
model using approximately three years of historical returns.  
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After we calibrated the time-series estimates41, we use two time-series 
parameter estimates for the option calibration: the long run volatility σ  and the risk 
premium parameter λ. We do so, because the large number of parameters to be 
estimated can make the calibration process unstable: especially the joint identification 
of λ and γ is cumbersome, since both parameters control for asymmetry in the news 
impact curve. Since this volatility (σ ) is not an explicit parameter in the model but 
can be derived directly from the other parameter estimates and vice versa, we 
constrain ω to: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]λεγλεβσαω −+−−−=
−− 11
2 ||ln1 ttE    (7) 
Our choice for fixing the stationary volatility is slightly different from that of 
Duan (1996, 1999), and Heston and Nandi (2000). They perform a constrained 
calibration in which the parameters λ and the local volatility are restricted to the time-
series GARCH-estimates. We derive the local volatility from option prices, because 
time-series models have most problems in accurately forecasting short-run volatility 
fluctuations, whereas option prices can reflect new information instantaneously. In 
return, we constrain the long-run volatility to its time-series estimate because it turned 
out to be very unstable if estimated from option prices and because news has a lower 
impact on long run than on short run volatility.  
Our approach can now be summarized as follows. First, we use three years of 
historical returns to estimate the time-series GARCH process. Second, we use option 
prices to carry out a constrained calibration by restricting the risk premium parameter 
λ and the long run stationary volatility level σ  to the estimates derived from the 
history of asset prices. The final calibration yields estimates of the parameters α, β, γ
and local volatility ıt.
Splitting the estimation of the parameters of our model in a ‘historical’ and an 
‘implied’ part has some advantages: it is more likely that option prices contain 
information about the future, but for risk management purposes it would be 
misleading to ignore all the information contained in the history of asset prices. 
Therefore, the method readily exploits the combination of information about the time 
                                                
41 In the time-series calibration with the DAX-data we restricted the parameter ω to ensure that 
the long run volatility level was equal to the relatively stable historical standard deviation. 
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series (the volatility risk premium and the long run volatility) and the information 
about the volatility dynamics contained in option prices. 
Given the parameters from the ‘historical’ and ‘implied’ calibration we use 
the EGARCH model under probability measure P in (2) to derive a volatility forecast. 
The estimated local volatility level tσˆ  is a one-day ahead forecast, which contains 
information about the expectation of market participants about tomorrow’s volatility. 
We compare the forecasting ability of this estimate with that of the time-series 
EGARCH estimate, that we denote by 
TS
tσˆ .
Since actual volatility is a latent variable, we have to construct an accurate 
method to evaluate our ‘historical’ and ‘implied’ forecasts. Different methods have 
been proposed to compute ex post estimates of it. The simplest and most common one 
is the square of realized return over the data. However, as Andersen and Bollerslev 
(1998) clearly point out theoretically, this method produces very noisy estimates of the 
actual volatility because of the randomness in the return process. By sampling more 
frequently the randomness effect can be reduced. Theoretically, the realized volatility 
is then closer to the actual volatility. Empirically, this is confirmed in our dataset, 
where we use 5-minute intraday returns to construct a volatility estimate, denoted by 
real
tσ . This estimate is much more stable than squared returns (see also Andersen et al. 
(2001a and 2001b)). It is based on the 5-minute log-returns of the closest-to-maturity 
index future. We use a 5-minute interval, because that yields a relatively large number 
of returns per day without notable bid-ask bounce problems, and because it is the 
frequency that Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) propose. Our first index level is the 
opening price. All subsequent levels are the closest to each 5-minute mark, ending 
with the closing price.  
There is some controversy about whether or not to include the overnight 
return. Overnight returns are relatively large in magnitude compared to the 5-minute 
returns and may disproportionately impact realized volatility. On the other hand, 
excluding overnight returns may yield a downwardly biased estimate. Since we do not 
want our definition of realized volatility affect our results, we decided to compare all 
forecasts to realized returns both including (as do Blair et al. (2001)) and excluding 
the return over the previous night.  
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8.2 Data 
We use European-style options and futures price data from the two most 
liquid European derivatives markets: the Frankfurt-based EUREX European Futures 
and Options Exchange and the London International Financial Futures Exchange 
(Liffe). A fully electronic exchange, EUREX was formally established in 1998 
following the merger of DTB Deutsche Terminbörse (German Options and Futures 
Exchange) and SOFFEX (Swiss Options and Financial Futures Exchange). In total 
number of transactions EUREX claims to be the most liquid derivatives bourse in 
Europe, but in the value of the trading volume Liffe is leading. Liffe’s successful 
trading system Liffe-Connect is largely responsible for this success and one of the 
motives for the take-over by Euronext in 2001. The two main indices of the German 
and UK stock market are the DAX-30 and the FTSE-100 respectively. The options 
and futures on these indices are the subject of our research and traded on the EUREX 
and Liffe exchanges. Below we give a description of the data, starting with the DAX-
30.  
We use closing prices of DAX-30 index options and transaction prices of 
DAX-30 futures for a period from January 2000 until August 2001. For the time-series 
analysis we need daily index levels for a period from January 1997 until August 2001. 
The raw data set is directly obtained from EUREX European Futures and Options 
Exchange. For index options the expiration months are the three nearest calendar 
months, the three following months within the cycle March, June, September and 
December, as well as the two following months of the cycle June, December. For 
index futures the expiration months are the three nearest calendar months within the 
cycle March, June, September and December. The last trading day is the third Friday 
of the expiration month, if that is an exchange trading day; otherwise it is on the 
exchange-trading day immediately prior to that Friday.  
The FTSE-100 data are similar in many respects, including the expiration 
months and last trading day regulations. From Liffe we purchased the daily option 
closing prices and intra-day transaction prices, covering the period January 1995 till 
July 2000. The futures transaction prices were downloaded from their Internet-set; the 
option closing prices were delivered on CD-ROM, but can now also be accessed 
through the Internet. For the time-series analysis we rely on Datastream FTSE-100 
index levels, including three earlier years of data as well. Figure 1 shows the daily 
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development of the DAX and FTSE-100 index levels in their respective analysis 
periods. 
Before we run the 'implied' calibration, we compute the implied interest rates 
and implied index rates from the observed put and call option prices using the method 
of Shimko (1993) based on put-call parity (see Equation (12) in the previous chapter). 
It can be shown that the put-call parity holds sufficiently well for our data. 
Alternatively, for the option calculations we could have chosen index levels from 
futures closing prices. This method would be equally safe since both markets are 
closely integrated. 
Index Levels
2300
2800
3300
3800
4300
4800
5300
5800
6300
6800
7300
7800
8300
1
-1
-9
2
1
-7
-9
2
1
-1
-9
3
1
-7
-9
3
1
-1
-9
4
1
-7
-9
4
1
-1
-9
5
1
-7
-9
5
1
-1
-9
6
1
-7
-9
6
1
-1
-9
7
1
-7
-9
7
1
-1
-9
8
1
-7
-9
8
1
-1
-9
9
1
-7
-9
9
1
-1
-0
0
1
-7
-0
0
1
-1
-0
1
1
-7
-0
1
DAX
FTSE
Figure 8.1 Index levels
The graph shows the DAX index levels for the period January 1997 until August 2001 and the 
FTSE-100 index levels for the period January 1992 until July 2000.  
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For the ‘implied’ calibration, we estimate our model using the closing prices 
of traded call and put options every day in our sample period. We exclude options 
with less than 5 and more than 75 trading days until maturity. Furthermore, instead of 
using a static rule and exclude options with absolute ‘moneyness’ (distance between 
strike and futures price) of more than 10% (see previous chapter), we use a volume 
rule. We exclude DAX-30 options with a daily Euro turnover of less than 10,000 Euro 
and a price of less than 2 Euro. In order not to lose too much FTSE-data, especially in 
the earlier years with relatively limited trading volume, we set the trading volume 
limit for the FTSE-100 options lower. We just require that at least 10 contracts of a 
particular option series must have been traded during the day, and furthermore exclude 
options with a price below £20. The choice of these particular filter rules can be 
motivated as follows. Since we are interested in short term volatility forecasting of the 
underlying index, we are interested in the information content of short term options. 
Second, we exclude options with less than 5 trading days to avoid liquidity-related 
biases. We furthermore exclude options with a price of less than 2 Euro (DAX) and 
less than £20 (FTSE42) to avoid problems due to stale prices and problems in the 
minimization of relative pricing errors. Finally, we don’t automatically eliminate 
options whose absolute moneyness is greater than 10%, because deep in- and out-of-
the-money options may still contain useful information when they are actively traded. 
That's why we control for active trading by only using those options with a certain 
trading volume over the day. Other studies in contrast, that use a moneyness rule, run 
the risk of including options that are actually not actively traded and contain no 
information on volatilities.  
Imposition of the aforementioned filtering rules reduces the average number 
of DAX options per trading day (puts and calls) in our dataset to around 22% of the 
originally more than 580 options. On average we have 124 DAX-options (puts and 
calls) per trading day that meet the criteria, with a minimum of 56 and a maximum of 
226 options, which is by far sufficient for a reliable estimation of the four parameters. 
On every trading day we have at least two and at most four maturities with liquid 
options. On the FTSE we have fewer options per trading day, and sometimes options 
with just one maturity, especially in the early years of 1995 and 1996, where trading is 
                                                
42 The lower limit of £20 may appear high, but is not really so, because average FTSE-100 
option prices were £240. Options with a relatively low price receive a relatively large weight in 
the minimization of relative squared pricing errors. We encountered several optimization 
problems when we did not exclude them. 
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much thinner. On average there are 49 options per trading day, with a minimum of 6 
and a maximum of 152. Together with the long run stationary volatility level and the 
risk premium parameter that we estimate from the time-series of historical returns, we 
ensured that a sensible estimation of the implied price process was possible.  
The implied calibration is executed with the well-known Newton-Raphson or 
the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno procedure programmed in the statistical 
software package GAUSS. We use the time-series estimates as starting values in the 
estimation and simulate ten thousand price paths. Although this large number of 
simulations caused the procedure to need sometimes several minutes of computation 
time per trading day, it appeared to be necessary to ensure stable option values. Local 
optima are always possible with this type of large-scale optimizations, but 
convergence was nevertheless seldom a problem.  
As a benchmark for our volatility forecasts we use a volatility metric based on 
5-minute intra-day returns. Those returns are constructed from the contemporaneous 
index futures transaction prices. Every day in our sample there are several traded 
futures, each with a different time-to-maturity. We select the future closest to 
maturity. Since we are using transaction prices, negative autocorrelation may be 
present due to the bid-ask bounce. However, the bid-ask spreads in the two very liquid 
futures series are minimal, normally a fraction of a percentage. We do find some 
evidence for negative autocorrelation, but it is very low in magnitude and unlikely to 
have impacted the realized volatility estimates much. On the FTSE-100 for example, 
the average daily serial autocorrelation equals only –1.64%.  
FTSE-100 options and futures are traded from 8:30 till 17:30 in the first part 
of our sample till July 17, 1999. At that date trading hours were extended to 18:00. 
DAX options and futures are traded from 9:00 till 17:30 in the first part of our sample 
(January - June 2000), and till 20:00 in the rest of the sample. The first option trade 
generally takes place several minutes after opening. Therefore, for the calculation of 
FTSE-100 realized volatility we take as the first return the difference between the 
opening price and the price at 8:40. Similarly, for the DAX we take the difference 
between the opening price and the 9:15 trading price as the first return. For the rest of 
the day we take the subsequent 5-minute returns. Since there are trading prices 
available just before and just after every 5-minute stamp, we had to make some 
selection. For the FTSE-100 realized volatility we take the price just following the 5-
minute mark, whereas for the DAX we use the average of the prices preceding and 
following it. The realized volatility is computed as the square root of the sum of the 
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squared intra-day returns. We tested that other methods for defining the 5-minute 
interval return yield similar realized volatility estimates. Moreover, we constructed a 
second estimate of realized volatility that includes the return from the closing of 
previous day to the first price of that day. Obviously, overnight returns are on average 
quite a bit larger in absolute terms than intra-day 5-minute returns, so the realized 
volatility that includes the overnight return is higher on average. For the FTSE-100 the 
annualized volatility based on squared daily returns is on average 15.8% compared to 
14.1% based on 5-minute returns and 16.2% including overnight returns. For the DAX 
the statistics are 18.2% based on squared daily returns, compared to 19.3% based on 
5-minute returns and 21.7% including overnight returns. With the DAX-data as an 
example, Figure 8.2 shows that daily squared returns are a noisy estimate of volatility 
and using it as a benchmark for the forecasting exercise in Section 8.3 would be 
inappropriate (see Blair et al. (2001)). 
Figure 8.2 Squared return versus realized volatility
This figure shows the comparison of a volatility estimate based on daily squared returns and a 
volatility estimate based on intra-day returns. The graph is based on DAX-30 futures prices in 
the period January 2000 until August 2001.  
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8.3  Empirical results 
This section describes the parameter estimates and comparisons of 
explanatory power between the ‘implied’ and historical’ GARCH model.  
8.3.1 Parameter estimates 
The ‘historical’ and ‘implied’ GARCH models are estimated daily using the 
implied index levels from futures prices and index option prices, respectively. As a 
benchmark for the in-sample fit of our GARCH option-pricing model, we use the ad-
hoc Black-Scholes model of Dumas, Fleming and Whaley (1998). We allow each 
option to have its own Black-Scholes implied volatility depending on the exercise 
price K and time-to-maturity T, and use the following quadratic functional form for 
σij:
ji5
2
j4j3
2
i2i10ij TMTTMM ω+ω+ω+ω+ω+ω=σ    (8) 
where σij denotes the implied volatility and Mi the moneyness
43 of an option with the 
i-th exercise price and j-th maturity. For every exercise price and maturity we compute 
the implied volatility and derive option prices using the Black-Scholes model.  
                                                
43 Moneyness is defined here as Ki/Fj, with Fj being the futures price with maturity Tj.
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Table 8.1 Parameter estimates
This table reports mean and standard deviations of the parameter estimates from the daily 
maximum likelihood or least squares estimation. Panel A contains the statistics for the DAX-
30 (January 2000 – August 2001), panel B for the FTSE-100 (January 1995 – July 2000). For 
the implied GARCH model, ω is actually a result of setting the long run volatility equal to the 
long-run volatility from the time-series estimation and therefore updated but not estimated. For 
the implied GARCH model the risk-premium parameter Ȝ is directly taken from the time-series 
estimation. Note that for the GARCH models the conditional variance (not reported) is 
estimated simultaneously with the other parameters in the optimization procedure. RMSE is 
the root mean squared error of relative pricing errors. Number of observations for the time 
series calibration = 753 trading days. 
‘Historical’ GARCH ‘Implied’ GARCH Ad-hoc Black-Scholes
Parameter Mean (SD) Parameter Mean (SD) Parameter Mean (SD)
λ 0.067 (0.044) λ 0.067 (0.044) ω0 1.615 (0.504)
ω -0.409 (0.041) ω -0.556 (0.562) ω1 -2.318 (0.931)
α 0.965 (0.004) α 0.958 (0.054) ω2 0.936 (0.456)
β 0.144 (0.013) β 0.240 (0.144) ω3 -1.202 (1.482)
γ∗β 0.050 (0.008) γ∗β 0.118 (0.063) ω4 0.735 (2.929)
ω5 1.007 (1.051)
RMSE 0.0786 (0.043) 0.0664 (0.034)
λ 0.056 (0.019) λ 0.056 (0.019) ω0 2.073 (2.008)
ω -0.246 (0.087) ω -0.813 (1.107) ω1 -3.241 (3.989)
α 0.981 (0.008) α 0.927 (0.107) ω2 1.344 (1.984)
β 0.083 (0.038) β 0.142 (0.175) ω3 -0.724 (1.407)
γ∗β 0.067 (0.017) γ∗β -0.220 (0.155) ω4 -0.128 (0.561)
ω5 0.818 (1.370)
RMSE 0.0198 (0.019) 0.0126 (0.011)
Panel B: FTSE-100
Panel A: DAX-30
 121
Table 8.1 reports the parameter estimates for the time-series GARCH, the 
implied GARCH and the ad hoc Black Scholes model. Note that the implied GARCH 
risk premium is taken from the time-series calibration. The results show that the 
parameter estimates vary over time, though most estimates are relatively stable. It can 
be shown that pre-specifying the mean in the mean-reverting volatility model 
stabilizes the estimation process and therefore the estimates. For the time series 
GARCH calibration the effect is known and the results are not surprising, but for the 
option implied GARCH calibration the method might be appropriate to estimate the 
parameters more efficiently and to avoid local maxima. The evaluation criteria for the 
option pricing models, the root mean squared error (RMSE) defined earlier is on 
average lower for the ad-hoc Black-Scholes model44. However, the GARCH option-
pricing model with the constraint that the long run volatility is equal to the sample 
standard deviation has a competitive fit in-sample. The results of Heston and Nandi 
(2000) show that the ad-hoc Black-Scholes model might achieve better in-sample fit 
only by overfitting the data, but underperforms GARCH option pricing models out-of-
sample. An out-of-sample pricing analysis is beyond the scope of this study, but we 
can conclude that the pricing performance of our method is reasonably accurate. The 
resulting one day ahead volatility forecast produced by the ‘historical’ and ‘implied’ 
GARCH models are presented in Figure 8.3.  
                                                
44 This is similar to the results in Chapter 7, in which we showed that the volatility curve-fitting 
methods achieved a better in-sample fit than distribution-based methods. 
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Figure 8.3 Option implied volatility forecast vs. time series volatility forecast 
The graphs show the annualized one-day ahead volatility forecasts of the option implied 
GARCH model and the time series GARCH model. The first graph is based on the DAX-30 
data in the period January 2000 until August 2001. The second graph is based on the FTSE-
100 data in the period January 1995 until July 2000.  
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8.3.2 Lead-lag relations 
It can be seen from the DAX-graph that in general both methods lead to 
different volatility predictions, but move fairly well in line. On the German market 
most of the time the ‘implied’ GARCH volatility forecast (average = 22.1%) is lower 
compared to the ‘historical’ GARCH forecast (average = 23.7%), but during some 
periods the ‘implied’ is exceeding the ‘historical’. In the UK market we observe the 
opposite: the average implied forecast (18.3%) exceeds the ‘historical’ forecast 
(16.9%). Another difference is the much lower stability of the implied forecasts on the 
UK market than on the German market. Especially during the financial turbulence in 
the second half of 1997 and 1998 we obtain largely fluctuating implied forecasts, 
sometimes exceeding 50%. This is however in line with the realized volatility 
estimates, which are high and fluctuating as well in those periods. 
Visual inspection of the first graph suggests that whenever news is entering 
the market leading to a rising volatility estimate for the ‘historical’ GARCH model 
over the following days, this news is already incorporated in the ‘implied’ volatility 
forecast and the ‘implied’ forecast is suddenly exceeding the ‘historical’ one. 
Therefore, a positive or negative jump in ‘implied’ volatility forecast seems to indicate 
that there is new information in the market, but the ‘historical’ GARCH model needs 
some days to update the volatility estimate. As a result the time series of both local 
volatility estimates suggests that the ‘implied’ forecast is leading the ‘historical’ 
forecast on the German market, but possibly not on the UK market. We want to test 
this hypothesis by conducting a Granger causality test (Granger (1969)). The method 
determines the causal directions between two variables by indicating if changes in one 
variable induce changes in the other variable or if both variables are jointly 
determined. Under the hypothesis of one variable not Granger-causing the other 
variable, the test statistic has the F-distribution and a rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicates causality. Table 8.2 reports the results for the Granger causality test.  
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Table 8.2 Granger causality test
This table presents the results of a Granger causality test for ‘historical’ and ‘implied’ volatility 
forecasts. Panel A contains the statistics for the DAX-30 (January 2000 – August 2001, 424 
observations), panel B for the FTSE-100 (January 1995 – July 2000, 1394 observations). ‘Lag’ 
is the number of lags used in the regression. ‘F-stat’ is the Wald F-statistic and ‘Prob.’ is the 
corresponding p-value. The p-values for the DAX-30 indicate that the ‘implied’ is leading the 
‘historical’, but no such relation can be established for the FTSE-100. 
The test results on the UK market have somewhat contradictory outcomes for 
the different lag lengths. It seems most safe to interpret this as that no series leads the 
other. Since the FTSE-100 covers a relatively long history with much lower liquidity 
in the early years, we performed the Granger causality test also on (roughly) the 
second half of our dataset, from January 1998 onwards. Then results point weakly to 
the implied leading the historical forecast. We can reject with p-values of 7%, 6% and 
20% the second hypothesis, while we can only reject the first hypothesis at higher p-
values of 8%, 17% and 74%. The results are not convincing enough to draw any 
definitive conclusions, but we will explore this issue further when we formally 
analyze the predictive power of the different volatilities.   
Null Hypothesis F-stat Prob. F-stat Prob. F-stat Prob.
'Historical' forecast does not Granger 
cause 'implied' forecast 1.22 0.27 1.81 0.15 2.20 0.05
‘Implied’ forecast does not Granger 
cause ‘historical’ forecast 96.30 0.00 56.20 0.00 33.40 0.00
‘Historical’ forecast does not Granger 
cause ‘implied’ forecast 12.85 0.00 0.92 0.43 0.88 0.49
‘Implied’ forecast does not Granger 
cause ‘historical’ forecast 2.85 0.09 1.54 0.20 0.99 0.42
Panel A: DAX-30
Panel B: FTSE-100
Lag = 1 Lag = 3 Lag = 5
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On the German market the results are clearer. The test strongly suggests that 
our conjecture about a causality in the German market is statistically significant: the 
hypothesis that the option implied forecast does not cause the time series forecast can 
be rejected of all reasonable significant levels, while we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the ‘historical’ forecast does not cause the ‘implied’ forecast on a 10% 
significance level for lags equal to 1 and 3 and on a 5% significance level for a lag 
equal to 5 trading days.  
So far we conclude that the volatility estimate derived from option prices 
seems the volatility estimate using historical return data on the German market, but 
does not seem to lead nor lag in the UK market. This would mean that the options 
market is more informative when forecasting DAX-30 volatility than FTSE-100 
volatility, which we test below. 
8.3.3 Forecasting power 
In the following the out-of-sample accuracy of the volatility forecasts is 
compared. Given the ‘historical’ volatility forecast xTS,t+1 and ‘implied’ volatility 
forecast xOPT,t+1 made at time t of the realized volatility yt+1 known at time t+1, we can 
evaluate both models by comparing the multiple R2 statistics from the regression 
1t1t,OPTOPT1t,TSTS1t uxxy ++++ +β+β+α=     (9) 
The multiple R2 statistics can be interpreted as a measure of information content of the 
mixture of forecasts, which have more predictive power than univariate forecasts (Day 
and Lewis (1992)). Table 8.3 reports the (multiple) squared correlation R2 from 
regressions of realized volatility on one or two volatility forecasts. Table 8.4 reports F-
statistics of the test that only one of the predictors forecasts equally well as both the 
predictors. The results are very much in line with the Granger causality test statistics. 
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Table 8.3 Regression results
This table reports parameter estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from regressions of 
‘historical’ and ‘implied’ GARCH forecasts on realized volatility, both including and 
excluding overnight returns. The parameter βTS is the coefficient of the historical time-series 
GARCH volatility, βOPT of the implied GARCH local volatility (see regression 9). Panel A 
contains the statistics for the DAX-30 (January 2000 – August 2001, 424 observations), panel 
B for the FTSE-100 (January 1995 – July 2000, 1394 observations). The R2 measures the 
explanatory power of the different predictors. 
Forecasting aim Forecasting method α βTS βOPT R2
Realized vol. excl. overnight  'Historical'  0.035   (2.4)  0.668 (11.2) 23.00%
 'Implied'  0.030   (2.9)  0.738 (16.0) 37.90%
'Historical' + 'Implied'  0.008   (0.6)  0.194   (2.8)  0.630 (10.5) 39.00%
Realized vol. incl. overnight  'Historical'  0.013   (0.8)  0.859 (11.6) 24.20%
 'Implied'  0.002   (0.2)  0.973 (17.4) 41.90%
'Historical' + 'Implied' -0.023  (-1.4)  0.218   (2.6)  0.851 (11.7) 42.80%
Realized vol. excl. overnight  'Historical'  0.026   (7.8)  0.678 (36.5) 48.80%
 'Implied'  0.059 (21.9)  0.452 (34.1) 45.50%
 'Historical' + 'Implied'  0.025   (8.0)  0.430 (17.0)  0.238 (13.7) 54.90%
Realized vol. incl. overnight  'Historical'  0.019   (3.7)  0.848 (29.6) 38.60%
 'Implied'  0.053 (13.5)  0.602 (31.0) 40.80%
'Historical' + 'Implied'  0.017   (3.6)  0.456 (11.8)  0.375 (14.0) 46.10%
Panel A: DAX-30
Panel B: FTSE-100
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Table 8.4 Additional Forecasting Power
This table reports the results of an F-test to determine whether the two regressors 
‘historical’and ‘implied’ in equation (7) explain realized volatility better than only one 
regressor. We report the statistics for the DAX-30 (January 2000 – August 2001, 424 
observations) and the FTSE-100 (January 1995 – July 2000, 1394 observations). The p-value 
indicates the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. 
First, it can be observed that the predictors are able to explain a large chunk of 
realized volatility. The squared correlation R2 coefficients are above or in the upper 
range of the usually reported levels of around 10-40%. We believe this is partly due to 
our definition of implied volatility, but also due to the definition of realized volatility 
that is much more accurate than squared daily returns.  
Second, we analyze whether the predictors are unbiased or not. For the 
predictors to be unbiased the regression coefficients should be equal or sum up to 
unity and the constant should be undistinguishable from zero. On the FTSE we find 
that none of the predictors is unbiased, which is in line with the existing research on 
the forecasting power of implied volatility (Fleming (1998) and Blair et al. (2001)). 
This does not mean that the historical or implied forecasts consistently over- or 
undershoot the actual volatility: their averages do not deviate much from the average 
realized volatility, as shown earlier. Biased in this setting means that in times of high 
predicted volatility actual volatility can be expected to be somewhat lower and vice 
versa in times of low predicted volatility. On the DAX however, our predictors are 
much less biased, especially if we include overnight returns. In the latter case we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the implied and time-series forecasts are unbiased: 
the constants are close to one, and the two coefficients equal or sum up to a value 
close to one.  
Forecasting aim Null hypothesis F-stat Prob. F-stat Prob.
Realized vol. excl. overnight 'Historical' does not improve forecast 6.17 0.23% 143.65 0.00%
'Implied' does not improve forecast 147.42 0.00% 86.25 0.00%
Realized vol. incl. overnight 'Historical' does not improve forecast 4.56 1.09% 91.40 0.00%
'Implied' does not improve forecast 161.99 0.00% 136.75 0.00%
DAX-30 FTSE-100
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It is seen finally that on the German market (DAX-30) the ‘implied’ forecast 
clearly outperforms the ‘historical’ forecast. The historical GARCH method performs 
rather poorly and the incremental information of the implied method is striking: the 
value of R2 increases by 16-18% when the realized volatility estimate is regressed on 
the historical and implied forecasts instead of historical forecast alone, whilst the 
increase is only 1% when the realized volatility estimate is regressed on the historical 
and implied forecasts instead of implied forecast alone. Therefore, the information 
from the time-series provides hardly any additional information compared to the 
option-implied information (see also Table 8.4). On the UK market however, both 
predictors perform comparably well and none of the two should be disregarded in 
making volatility forecasts, since a weighted combination drives the predictive ability 
up by 5-10% to around 50%. We suspected that this difference between the German 
and UK market might have something to do with the longer history of the FTSE-data, 
but results are qualitatively unchanged in the second half of our FTSE-dataset. An 
alternative explanation is that the London option market is less efficient than the 
market in Frankfurt and does not incorporate all the information that can be inferred 
from standard time-series models, even though the predictive power of the implied is 
relatively high. However, with most experienced European traders working in 
London, this does not sound very plausible and leaves us with a puzzle. 
8.4  Concluding remarks 
This chapter is concerned with short-term volatility forecasting. We compare 
and combine the information in historical returns and the information in option prices 
to investigate what source contains most valuable information in forecasting FTSE-
100 and DAX-30 volatility in the period of January 1995 till July 2000 and January 
2000 till August 2001 respectively. More particularly, we compare the forecasts of a 
time-series EGARCH model to the forecasts of an EGARCH model whose main 
parameters are derived from contemporaneous option prices. We use the Duan (1995) 
option-pricing model to identify an option-implied EGARCH process and the 
corresponding 1-day ahead volatility forecast. A large number of simulations and 
optimizations is required to identify the parameters of the 'implied' model. Those 
parameters vary over time, but are relatively stable and provide an accurate fit to the 
option prices.  
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Our results yield different outcomes on the two markets. In the German 
market (DAX-30), the implied volatility forecast is leading the historical forecast. The 
first forecast Granger-causes the second, but not the other way round. This is an 
indication that information is more quickly compounded in option prices than in the 
most recent returns. In the UK market (FTSE-100) to the contrary, we do not find 
convincing evidence for any lead-lag relation.   
This lead-lag intuition is confirmed in the out-of-sample 1-day ahead 
volatility forecasts. We test the implied and historical forecast accuracy against a 
realized volatility estimate that is constructed with 5-minute intra-day returns. This is 
a more reliable estimate of actual volatility than the very noisy squared returns. In the 
German market, the historical forecast is able to explain around 23% of realized 
volatility, whereas the same ability of the implied estimate is 1.5 times larger. In the 
UK market both predictors perform equally well and explain between 39% and 49%, 
depending on whether we include or exclude overnight returns in constructing realized 
volatility. In the UK market it is wise to construct a weighted combination of the two 
predictors, since that explains even 8% extra, but in the German market the implied 
forecast alone contains nearly all information. Moreover, in the German market the 
implied forecast, alone or combined with the historical forecast, is a relatively 
unbiased predictor of realized volatility including overnight returns. We believe this is 
a new and important result. Our result is also new that options on the leading German 
index DAX-30 contain more (if not all) information than the history of prices, 
contrary to the UK market. Options on the main UK index FTSE-100 do not contain 
more valuable information than the history of prices, although both yield powerful 
forecasts.  
Another contribution of this study is that we introduce a different and 
theoretically sound methodology to extract the information from the option prices. 
Previous studies try to explore information from Black-Scholes implied volatilities of 
traded options to estimate and forecast future volatility without explicitly modeling the 
underlying return process. In those studies various optimal weighting schemes are 
being proposed for the different implied volatilities at different strikes. In doing so, 
those methods ignore the information contained in the volatility smile pattern, and 
probably more importantly, in the volatility term structure. We do not compare our 
method to any such method, because a severe selection bias would be in place. Since 
different Black-Scholes implied volatilities could be combined in so many ways, the 
choice for one particular method would largely impact our comparison. 
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Apart from their theoretical drawbacks, we believe the ignorance of smile and 
term structure information by Black-Scholes-based methods may hurt their forecasting 
ability, especially at longer horizons. Therefore, in further research we will extend the 
forecasting to longer horizons of up to several weeks ahead. This opens up new 
interesting fields of research that are not solely focused on the second moment. For 
example, as an application of return distribution forecasting, we plan to calculate 
Value-at-Risk estimates and analyze their accuracy. 
Another extension that we plan to make in future research is a comparison of 
our implied GARCH volatility forecasts with a forecast based on high-frequency data. 
Such a comparison seems logical given the benchmark of realized volatility (based on 
high-frequency data) we employ. Although such a high-frequency forecast is solely 
based on historical returns, it has very recently shown to yield good forecasting results 
(Martens and Zein (2002), Li (2002), Pong et al (2002)). High-frequency models are 
able to respond more quickly and accurately on market movements than GARCH-type 
specifications with returns that are aggregated on a daily basis. When a long memory 
effect is incorporated in these models, they can even compete with and sometimes 
outperform implied volatility models at longer horizons. This makes them a natural 
challenger of the implied GARCH model in future research.  
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9 Pricing the spikes in power options 45
Since the early 90’s electricity markets are being reformed worldwide from a 
highly government controlled and vertically integrated environment into competitive 
markets. Before the deregulation, government authorities fixed prices based on 
(marginal) production costs in a very predictable manner. Now that many wholesale 
markets are deregulated, market participants have to get used to an environment with 
very volatile prices and high uncertainty. Participants face the additional complexity 
that volatility far exceeds the volatility in markets that are considered relatively risky, 
such as those for stocks, bonds, and other commodities. At the same time, the number 
of available instruments to control risks has grown radically. Markets gradually extend 
trading in day-ahead physical deliveries (spot or pool), and forward contracts with 
physical deliveries, to more advanced physical and financial products, such as swaps, 
futures, options, caps, floors and spark spreads. Most derivatives trade in over-the-
counter markets, but increasingly on exchanges as well. Examples of such trading 
venues are the NYMEX, Nord Pool, European Energy Exchange, Chicago Board of 
Trade, Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Sydney Futures Exchange, and New Zealand 
Futures Exchange.  
In this chapter we focus on the valuation of options on spot46 prices. Although 
options on spot (day-ahead) electricity form only a subcategory of tradable electricity 
contracts, their valuation is an economically important topic. First, options on spot 
prices are embedded in many contracts. For example, floating-price contracts with a 
minimum or maximum (cap or floor) contain in fact a series of call or put options, and 
are increasingly popular products among end users. Their tradable counterpart is a 
daily exercisable option, with exercise opportunities each day for a period of weeks, 
                                                
45 This chapter is partly based on: C. de Jong and R. Huisman, 2002, “Option Formulas for 
Mean-Reverting Power Prices with Spikes”, ERIM research paper.  
46 With spot electricity prices, we mean the prices for electricity that are determined one day in 
advance on spot exchanges, in pool systems or over-the-counter markets. We can have prices 
for time periods ranging from individual quarters of an hour, hours, blocks of hours (e.g. peak 
and off-peak) to daily averages (baseload). 
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months or year47. Finally, the valuation of options on spot electricity is important in 
valuing real assets. Flexible energy production capacity provides an option to produce 
or not in the hours or days ahead. The value of such flexible capacity is therefore 
equal to the value of a series of call options on the spot (short-term) price48, and our 
framework provides a basis to value those assets.  
For the valuation of electricity derivatives we cannot simply rely on models 
for financial and other commodity contracts. Electricity is a pure flow commodity 
with limited storability and transportability that strongly affect the behavior of 
electricity spot and derivatives prices. This lack of flexibility causes spot prices to 
depend largely on local and temporal supply and demand conditions. If demand and 
supply would respond promptly to price movements, prices would not deviate much 
from other commodity prices. The elasticity of both supply and demand however is 
relatively limited (see for example Pirrong and Jermakyan, 2000). Only a few large 
industrial customers have the flexibility to vary their power demand in response to 
market conditions, whereas most power plants can gear up generation only with a 
significant time lag. This time lag causes occasional extreme prices, called spikes, 
which revert within hours or days to a more stable level. All this results in the well-
documented characteristics of electricity spot prices, including spikes, mean-reversion, 
large seasonal variations and extremely high volatility. 
These peculiar characteristics of electricity prices have induced researchers to 
develop special models for electricity prices. Such models are the basis for risk 
management applications, for the pricing of physical and financial contracts, and for 
the valuation of real assets. With the increasing number of tradable contracts, the main 
challenge for researchers is the development of models to price those contracts. We 
recognize two different sets of electricity contract valuation approaches. The first 
approach is most popular among academics and consists of modeling simultaneously 
spot and forward contracts. Examples are Schwartz (1997), Hilliard and Reis (1998), 
Pilipovic (1998), Pirrong and Jermakyan (1999, 2000), Deng (2000), and Lucia and 
                                                
47 Daily exercisable options are the only tradable spot option contracts (to our knowledge). 
They can either be for physical delivery or financially settled. Typically, the holder of the 
option needs to indicate in the morning before the delivery day whether to exercise or not. This 
may be before or after settlement of the spot market. In the latter case, suboptimal exercise is 
possible.  
48 If fuel costs are volatile as well, then a generation asset can be considered an option on the 
difference between the electricity price and fuel costs, the spark spread. 
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Schwartz (2002). This approach faces the difficulty that standard arbitrage principles 
cannot be applied to map spot prices to forwards and futures. Therefore, the proposed 
solutions are naturally derived from the bond or storable-commodity pricing literature. 
Risk-neutral processes are obtained either through the specification of risk premia or 
convenience yields. A theoretical drawback of models based on convenience yields is 
that electricity is not storable, and therefore the interpretation of convenience yields is 
questionable. Moreover, fitting the theoretical forward curve to market data is a 
serious problem, since data is limited and several institutional factors influence power 
forward price dynamics.  
The second approach describes how to price options on spot, forwards or 
futures, and takes the forward curve as given. We take this approach that makes option 
valuation consistent with market prices, and we believe this is necessary to bridge the 
gap between academic theory and the derivative models that are predominantly being 
used in practice (Black & Scholes (1973) and Black (1976)). For option valuation we 
simply need models that adequately describe the dynamics of spot or forward prices, 
align them with the market forward curve, and then use arbitrage or “fair-pricing” 
principles to derive option prices49. Other examples of this approach are Miltersen and 
Schwartz (1998), Clewlow and Strickland (1999), Bjerksund, Rasmussen and 
Stensland (2000) and Koekebakker and Ollmar (2001). 
Price returns of longer-term futures and forwards fulfill the conditions for 
normality relatively well, and hedging related options with forwards or futures is often 
feasible. Consequently, standard arbitrage-based pricing-formulas may yield reliable 
results for options on longer-maturity forwards and futures. Spot returns however are 
clearly not lognormally distributed (see e.g. Lucia and Schwartz, 2002) and the 
standard option pricing formulas may yield totally incorrect outcomes. That’s why we 
need a different type of pricing approach, especially for further in-the-money and out-
of-the-money options.  
This chapter presents such an approach for determining the ‘fair value’50 of 
options on electricity spot prices. It is similar in spirit to Clewlow and Strickland 
                                                
49 It should be noted that forward trading is often liquid for only a few maturity series, but 
combinations of market prices with bottom-up models (see e.g. Fleten and Lemming (2001)) 
may be used to complete the forward curve. 
50 Since spot price risk cannot be hedged (at least not financially), no arbitrage-free pricing 
results can be obtained. The pricing approach thus yields ‘fair values’ instead of ‘arbitrage-free 
values’. 
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(1999), and Lucia and Schwartz (2002) but extends their mean-reverting framework 
with the necessary spikes, modeled as a separate and independent regime51. At the 
same time it keeps the attractive feature of closed-form formulas, where other spot 
price models (Bhanot (2000), Deng (2000), Knittel and Roberts (2001), Huisman and 
Mahieu (2001), and Escribano, Pena and Villaplana (2002)) would require extensive 
simulations. The two regimes (one for the ‘normal’ process, one for the spikes) 
capture the systematic alternations between stable and unstable states of demand and 
supply. The price process takes the main dynamics of electricity prices into account, 
such as seasonality, mean-reversion and, most importantly, spikes. Furthermore, a 
major contribution of the model is that it allows for multiple consecutive spikes, 
which is important for risk management and derivative pricing purposes. Based on this 
spot price model we present closed-form formulas to price European-style options on 
spot electricity prices. We furthermore show how the underlying spot price model can 
be aligned with the observed forward curve in the market, which makes the option 
valuation consistent with market data. 
The chapter is built up as follows. First, we present a spot price model that 
incorporates the most prominent features of electricity spot prices: mean-reversion and 
spikes. Next, in Section 9.2 we estimate the model parameters for Dutch APX 
baseload, peakload and off-peak spot prices. Section 9.3 first describes how the model 
can be aligned with market forward curves in a practical manner that avoids the 
separate modeling of seasonalities and risk premia. Then it presents closed-form 
formulas for European-style options and describes how other types of options can be 
priced. We end with some concluding remarks.  
9.1  The two regimes model for spot electricity prices 
A standard mean-reverting specification is relatively successful in modeling 
commodities such as oil and gas52, but not in modeling electricity, due to the existence 
of spikes. This 'spiky' behavior of electricity prices has mainly to do with the non-
                                                
51 Deng (2000) also proposes to model spikes in a regime-switching model. He derives 
formulas for pricing futures, forwards and standard options, but requires simulations to 
evaluate the outcomes. 
52 See for example Pindyck (1999). 
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storability of the commodity and the relative inelasticity of demand and supply, as we 
discussed in the introduction. Parameter calibration generally leads to unrealistically 
high volatility, incorrect mean reversion parameters and too high levels to which the 
spot prices would converge. 
Modeling spikes in a satisfactory framework has turned out to be a major 
challenge for researchers and practitioners in electricity markets. The most common 
approach is the addition of a jump diffusion process to the mean-reverting process. 
Stochastic jump models allow for sudden extreme returns that lead to long-term shifts 
in price levels. They are quite successful in stock markets, but do not incorporate an 
important characteristic of electricity prices: spikes are relatively short-lived. A jump 
diffusion process model allows for large price movements, but does not deal well with 
the fact that after a spike prices quickly bounce back to normal levels. In a mean-
reverting jump diffusion process this can only be achieved by an unrealistically high 
mean reversion parameter that forces prices back to normal levels after a spike. 
9.1.1  Regime-switch models 
Regime-switch models have the potential to solve some of these deficiencies, 
since they allow for distinct time-series behavior in different periods of time. The 
basic regime model has the following specification (Hamilton, 1989): 
( ) ( )( )2,0~ln ttttt NwhereS λλ σεεµ +=     (1) 
Here λ(t) is a latent variable representing the regime of the process in time period t. 
The process can thus be in one of the regimes at each time t. Huisman and Mahieu 
(2001) propose a regime-switch model with three regimes: there is a mean-reverting 
regime with moderate mean-reversion and volatility, an initial jump regime that 
models the process when prices suddenly increase or decrease, and a subsequent jump 
regime, that describes how prices are forced back to the stable regime. The two jump 
regimes both have a more extreme expected return and volatility than the mean-
reverting regime. The subsequent jump regime has a zero probability of occurrence if 
prices in the previous time period are in the mean-reverting regime, but a probability 
of one if they are in the initial jump-regime. The main drawback of this model is that 
it does not practically allow for multiple consecutive jumps, which are a frequent 
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phenomenon in electricity markets (see Figure 9.2) and crucial for risk management 
purposes and derivative valuation. Therefore, we introduce a model with only two 
regimes: a stable mean-reverting regime, and a spike regime. It might seem surprising 
that the omission of one regime gives the model the flexibility to capture consecutive 
jumps. However, we don’t need a third regime to pull prices back to stable levels, 
because we assume that prices in the two regimes are independent from each other. 
Put differently, if there is a generator outage for example, prices may be high for some 
time period, but once the generator is repaired, prices continue as normal. We believe 
this regime specification fits well with the structure of electricity markets and is 
confirmed in the data. As a side effect of the independence of the two processes, we 
can combine closed-form formulas of mean-reverting time series, with those of 
lognormally distributed spikes to simplify derivative valuations and to circumvent 
time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations.  
9.1.2  The two-regime framework 
The first step in modeling electricity spot prices, Pt, is the separation of the 
predictable component from the stochastic component (Hamilton, 1994).  
( ) ttt xtfPp +== ln        (2) 
The first component, f(t) accounts for predictable regularities, such as any genuine 
periodic behavior and any trend, and is a deterministic function of time. Seasonalities 
can be modeled with for example sinusoidal functions or with dummy’s for different 
seasons, to which we come back in Section 9.2. The stochastic second component, xt,
is the more interesting and we continue with its specification below. In the remaining 
we refer to the stochastic part xt as the “log spot price”, but remember that in fact it is 
the log spot price from which predictable trends are removed. 
In the two-regime framework, we assume that the spot price of electricity can 
be in one out of two regimes at each time period t. The first regime reflects the normal 
behavior of electricity prices and the second reflects dynamics in case of spikes. We 
assume that the deterministic trend f(.) in (2) remains the same across regimes, since 
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spike data is too limited to warrant a separate seasonal specification. We then specify 
the two-regime model as follows: 
( ) ( ) ttt xtfp ,λ+=        (3) 
where t = 1,…,T and λ(t) = M,S. The latent variable λ(t) may assume two values. We 
refer with λ(t) = M to the mean-reverting regime and λ(t) = S to the spike regime. So, 
tMx ,  is the stochastic process for the mean-reverting regime and tSx ,  is the stochastic 
process for the spike regime. For the first regime we specify a standard mean-
reverting process. 
Mean-reverting regime: ( ) tMtMMtMtM xxx ,1,1,, εµα +−+= −−   (4) 
),0(~ 2
...
, M
dii
tM Nwhere σε
The parameter µM is the long-run stationary level for the natural logarithm of spot 
prices. It determines to what value spot prices converge. The parameter Į measures the 
speed of convergence from the current to the long-run level and is related to the 
concept of half-life, a well concepts in physics: the time it takes to move on average 
halfway from the current level to the long-term level53. The spikes of the second 
regime are modeled with a simple lognormal distribution whose standard deviation 
and mean54 are higher than those of the mean-reverting process. We have the 
following specification: 
Spike regime:  tSStSx ,, εµ +=     (5) 
),0(~ 2
...
, S
dii
tS Nwhere σε
53 Half-life = ln(0.5)/(1-Į)
54 So-called off-peak hours (when demand is low) are characterized by negative spikes, due to 
the abundance of supply relative to demand during those periods of the day. In those cases the 
mean of the spike becomes negative.  
138
At any point in time the price process is either in regime M or regime S. 
However, the model specification does not end with the two regimes, since we haven't 
defined the transition process yet. For this we use a Markov transition matrix, which 
contains the probabilities of switching from one regime to the other. With two 
regimes, the Markov transition matrix Ȇ is a 2x2 matrix. The element in column j and 
row i contains the probability ʌij of going from regime i in period t to regime j in 
period t+1 (i,j = M,S).  






−
−
=Π
SMMS
SMMS
ππ
ππ
1
1
      (6) 
If spot prices are in the mean-reverting regime today, we know that with probability 
ʌMS the next day is a spike, and with probability 1- ʌMS the mean-reverting regime 
continues. Similarly, we know that a spike is followed by another spike with 
probability 1- ʌSM, and otherwise the mean-reverting regime resumes. 
We stated earlier that the two regimes are independent, which holds true for 
the prices in each regime. The above probability structure however ensures that there 
is a relation between the two regimes in terms of the probability that they occur. For 
example, when we observe a spike today, then we expect a spike tomorrow with a 
larger probability than when prices were normal. This is the type of relation we 
observe in electricity markets, but does not prevent us from disentangling option 
prices into two components, as long as prices are independent.  
9.1.3  Parameter estimation 
The parameters of the two regimes can be calibrated by maximum likelihood 
when we condition on the regimes. Based on the normal distribution of the error 
terms, the loglikelihoods have the following form: 
( )( )
πσ
σ
µα
2lnln
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1
2
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The two-regime specification for spot prices introduces a technical complexity 
in the calculation of the mean-reverting loglikelihood: the Equation (7) depends on the 
mean-reverting price of the previous period, which does not exist if the previous 
period was a spike. This means that if prices were in a spike yesterday, we do not 
know from what level they have to revert today (if today is a ‘normal regime’ period). 
We solve this issue as follows. First, we rewrite the loglikelihood function (7) in a 
more general form: 
( ) [ ]( )[ ] [ ] π2lnln2 21,21,
2
,,
, −−
−
−=
−
−
−
− tMit
tMit
tMittM
ittM xVar
xVar
xEx
xLL   (9) 
Conditional on information about xM,t-i, the above equation gives the loglikelihood for 
an observed price xM,t  in the mean-reverting regime. We now use the model’s 
posterior probabilities to calculate for each of the k last prevailing log spot prices (xt-1,
…, xt-k) the probability that it was the last (observed) mean-reverting price. Next, we 
calculate the loglikelihood in Equation (9) assuming alternatively that the price in 
period t-1, …., t-k was the last mean-reverting price. If we look i periods back, in the 
likelihood equation we use Et-i[xM,t] and the appropriate (higher) variance Vart-i[xM,t] to 
capture the effect that prices are stochastically mean-reverting. These expected values 
and variance can be determined recursively as follows: 
[ ] ( ) [ ]1,2,1 1 −−− ⋅−+= tMtMtMt xExE ααµ     (10) 
[ ] ( )( ) [ ]1,22,1 11 −−− ⋅−+= tMttMt xVarxVar α     (11) 
and the loglikelihood of the mean-reverting regime equals the probability weighted 
sum of the conditional loglikelihoods: 
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We set k equal to 5, because the sum of the posterior probabilities then approaches 1 
well enough in our data. This solves the latent variable problem in the original 
Equation (7). 
The likelihood of the whole process equals the weighted sum of the 
likelihoods of the two regimes. The weights are determined by each regime's prior 
probability. If we denote the prior probability of prices being in the mean-reverting 
regime at time t by Prt-1[Ȝ(t) = M] and of being in the spike regime by Pr t-1[Ȝ(t) = S], 
then the likelihood function equals: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]∑ ⋅=+⋅== −−
t
tSttMt LLStLLMtLL ,1,1 PrPr λλ   (13) 
This completes the specification of the mean-reverting regime model with 
independent spikes. In the next section we evaluate the parameters estimated from 
Dutch day-ahead prices.  
9.2  Model estimation results 
This section reports the estimation results of the two-regime model presented 
in the previous section, as well as the Huisman-Mahieu (2001) and a standard mean-
reverting model. We discuss some data issues and evaluate the parameter estimates to 
see whether the two-regime model picks up mean-reversion and spikes sufficiently 
well. We use those parameter estimates to price options on Dutch APX55 spot prices in 
the next section. 
                                                
55 See www.apx.nl 
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9.2.1  Data 
The Dutch power market was liberalized for large consumers on January 1st
2001. From that day onwards the wholesale day-ahead prices on the Amsterdam 
Power Exchange (APX) reflect the forces of demand and supply. Trading volume on 
this electronic exchange has increased steadily, notably since January 2002, when 
medium-sized consumers became free to choose their energy-supplier as well. By 
June 2002 the APX-volume represented approximately 14% of total electricity 
consumption. We use data from January 2nd 2001 till June 30th 2002 of baseload, peak 
and off-peak day-ahead prices, totaling 545 observations for each index. The exchange 
defines baseload prices as the equally weighted average of the 24 individual hourly 
prices. The peak prices are the average of hour 8 till 23 (7:00 – 23:00); the off-peak 
prices are the average of the 8 remaining hours 1-7 and 24 (0:00 – 7:00, 23:00 – 
24:00).  
Figure 9.1 Weekday averages of APX prices
Average APX prices on individual weekdays in the period 2 January 2001  
till 14 June 2002 for baseload, peakload and off-peak hours. 
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The division in baseload, peakload and off-peak prices reflects part of the 
seasonality during a day, but prices also exhibit considerable seasonality during a 
week (see Figure 9.1). In general, prices (and electricity consumption) are lower 
during the weekend, especially on Sundays. At first sight there seems to be a 
downward trend from Monday to Friday, but this is probably due to some outliers56. If 
we deseasonalize the natural logarithm of spot prices by reducing them with their 
weekday average, total variance is reduced on average with 20%: weekday influences 
explain about one fifth of total variance. In terms of our mathematical equation (2) f(t) 
includes a dummy for Saturdays, and a dummy for Sundays (including public 
Holidays). In the Dutch spot prices we found only very weak evidence of seasonality 
over the year, so no specification is included for it. The seasonal component f(t) is 
estimated jointly with the stochastic model parameters.  
Prices in the Dutch market have witnessed already some serious spikes (see 
Figure 9.2). For example, the summer of 2001, which was expected to be a quiet 
period, contained some unexpected price movements. Those spikes even triggered an 
official investigation, but no irregularities were found: it was reported to be a simple 
coincidence of generator outages. Another series of high prices were observed close to 
the end of the year 2001. Since January 2002 prices were relatively stable till the 
second week of June, but June ended with some high prices.  
                                                
56 Median prices for each weekday are very stable from Monday to Friday, so the differences in 
average prices are mainly a result of a few outliers (or spikes). 
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Figure 9.2 APX baseload prices 2 January 2001 – 30 June 2002
APX prices are no exception to the phenomenon that prices in electricity 
markets are different from those in most other financial markets. This is clearly 
reflected in the summary statistics for the baseload, peakload and off-peak returns (see 
Table 9.1). All three series are characterized by a relatively high daily standard 
deviation of between 35 and 42%. For comparison: most individual stocks have daily 
standard deviations of 1-2% and only exceed 5% for the most risky stocks. The daily 
fluctuations in APX-prices can be enormous, reaching levels of over 200%. Especially 
the off-peak hours, with sometimes very low price levels, exhibit tremendous outliers. 
The extraordinary high kurtosis level of off-peak returns indicates that the fourth 
moment is probably not even defined. Returns are left-skewed, which may be 
surprising at first sight, since prices are clearly right-skewed due to the spikes. This 
indicates that prices do not only spike upwards very fast, but come down even faster, 
as the minimum and maximum returns indicate as well. This supports our choice to 
model spikes as a truly separate regime. 
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Table 9.1 Summary statistics APX returns
This table presents summary statistics for the daily logreturns of APX day-ahead baseload, 
peak and off-peak indices in the period 2 January 2001 till 30 June 2002. Weekday influences 
(see Figure 9.1) were first removed from the price series before calculating the statistics. 
9.2.2  Results 
We use the sample with one and a half year of daily observations and three 
time-series to estimate model parameters. Even though the loglikelihoods of the 
regime-switching models are relatively complex, convergence was never a problem 
and independent of starting values. Results (Table 9.2) indicate that the regime models 
improve the fit considerably compared to the mean-reverting specification. 
Apparently, spikes that destroy the loglikelihood in the mean-reverting model are 
‘transferred’ to the different spike and jump regimes where they fit considerably 
better.  
Our model picks up on average 50% more spikes than the Huisman-Mahieu57
model. This is most likely explained by the fact that their model requires that an up-
jump is immediately followed by a down-jump, and is thus more restrictive on jumps. 
The speed of mean-reversion in both regime models is below that of the mean-
reverting model; it is also lower for our model than for the Huisman-Mahieu model. 
Apparently, if strikes are not (or not so often) being detected, than a strong mean-
reversion is required to pull prices back to normal levels. So the omission of spikes in 
the model specification leads to a misspecified mean-reverting process. Moreover, 
                                                
57 In the Huisman-Mahieu (2001) model we count the frequency of spikes as the sum of the up-
and down-spikes. 
Baseload Peakload Off-peak
Standard deviation 35.9% 39.5% 41.2%
Minimum -204.4% -186.2% -452.3%
Maximum 161.3% 179.0% 396.3%
Skewness -0.17 -0.07 -0.78
Kurtosis 4.60 3.80 45.19
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since the regime models remove spikes from the stable process, their volatilities are 
considerably lower compared to the pure mean-reverting model. The mean-reverting 
volatility in our model is by far the lowest, because it transfers most erratic prices to 
the spike regime. The regime models indicate that the long-run average target levels 
for the baseload and peak spot prices are 5 and 8 €/MWh lower compared to the pure 
mean-reverting model.  
Our regime specification picks up spikes well: expected spikes are positive for 
baseload and peakload, negative for off-peak, and have a much higher volatility than 
the stable mean-reverting process. When prices were mean-reverting on the previous 
day, a spike can be expected with a probability between 8 and 14%. Overall, between 
15 and 27% of the prices are spikes, since spikes last on average around 2 days. For 
the pricing of far-out-of-the-money options, it might be considered that our regime 
model picks up small spikes too easily, and thus underestimates the magnitude of 
‘real’ spikes. This is a common problem as well for stochastic jump models, and 
partly related to parameter calibration with maximum likelihood. It is possible to 
mitigate this problem with simple weights in the likelihood function58.
The spikes in both regime models have an expected magnitude E[St | Ȝ(t) = S]  
of 53-57 €/MWh, and exhibit large possible swings. There is no doubt that the spikes 
deviate largely from the stable price levels and the data show it is crucial to separate 
them properly. For example, in the mean-reverting model a baseload price of over 100 
€/MWh is nearly impossible (around 0.01% probability). In our regime-switch model 
its probability of 1.9% is much closer to the observed frequency of 2.6%.  
For risk management purposes and derivative pricing, it is important that a 
model not only allows for spikes, but also for multiple consecutive spikes, a feature 
that is not contained in the Huisman-Mahieu model. In the estimation process the 
model assigns to each price a probability of being a mean-reverting price or a spike. 
The clustering of these ex post probabilities are informative to analyze, as we did in 
Figure 9.3 for baseload prices in the period June-August 2001. This was a turbulent 
period with several high spot prices, peaking even above 250 €/MWh on 3 July 2001. 
The graphs show several clusters of spikes. Examples are the periods 25-27 June, 2-7 
July and 26-28 August 2001. Not surprisingly, these high spot prices are in general 
                                                
58 We tested that a very small adaptation to the loglikelihood function, that disfavours spikes, 
can reduce the frequency of spikes by over 50%, while at the same time keeping the 
loglikelihood within a few basis points from its maximum. We disfavoured spikes, by 
increasing the volatility in the ln(ıt) term by 25% in the loglikelihood specification (8). 
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labeled a spike with a higher probability than low spot prices. For example, if a trader 
had sold a daily callable option for the first week of July, a considerable loss would 
have been his fate, and the outcome would have been overlooked by a risk 
management system that ignores the clustering of spikes over time. 
Table 9.2 Estimation results (next page)
This table presents the parameter estimates and loglikelihoods of three different time series 
models for APX day-ahead baseload, peakload and off-peak hours. Estimates were obtained by 
maximum likelihood using data from 2 January 2001 till 30 June 2002. See the text for an 
explanation of all parameters and symbols.
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α 0.414 (0.035) 0.421 (0.035) 0.576 (0.040)
µ 3.414 (0.035) 3.609 (0.037) 2.795 (0.025)
σ 0.323 (0.010) 0.353 (0.011) 0.307 (0.009)
E[St] 32.018 39.292 17.154
Sunday -0.569 (0.035) -0.613 (0.038) -0.388 (0.035)
Saturday -0.231 (0.036) -0.274 (0.039) -0.058 (0.036)
loglikelihood -0.288 -0.377 -0.237
α 0.404 (0.045) 0.399 (0.029) 0.273 (0.033)
µM 3.332 (0.030) 3.496 (0.028) 2.851 (0.028)
ıM 0.207 (0.011) 0.209 (0.011) 0.155 (0.007)
E[St | Ȝ(t) = M] 28.589 33.727 17.509
µS 0.590 (0.202) 0.583 (0.089) -0.668 (0.109)
ıS 0.559 (0.136) 0.570 (0.053) 0.667 (0.069)
E[St | Ȝ(t) = S] 59.046 69.565 11.074
Sunday -0.501 (0.025) -0.528 (0.027) -0.284 (0.019)
Saturday -0.230 (0.026) -0.266 (0.026) -0.093 (0.018)
ʌMS 0.066 (0.018) 0.092 (0.021) 0.071 (0.014)
% spikes 11.6% 15.6% 12.4%
loglikelihood -0.109 -0.191 0.086
α 0.356 (0.056) 0.243 (0.027) 0.170 (0.031)
µM 3.289 (0.028) 3.433 (0.029) 2.858 (0.035)
ıM 0.157 (0.019) 0.123 (0.008) 0.116 (0.008)
E[St | Ȝ(t) = M] 27.157 31.209 17.542
µS 3.829 (0.131) 3.841 (0.058) 2.392 (0.077)
ıS 0.674 (0.065) 0.539 (0.039) 0.551 (0.048)
E[St | Ȝ(t) = S] 57.760 53.826 12.728
Sunday -0.468 (0.027) -0.474 (0.019) -0.280 (0.021)
Saturday -0.217 (0.021) -0.252 (0.019) -0.100 (0.015)
ʌMS 0.084 (0.028) 0.139 (0.025) 0.110 (0.022)
ʌSM 0.473 (0.096) 0.385 (0.076) 0.599 (0.087)
% spikes 15.1% 26.6% 15.6%
Loglikelihood -0.075 -0.137 0.166
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Figure 9.3 Ex post spike probability
Baseload APX prices and their ex post probability of being a spike in the period 1 June-31 
August 2001.
9.3  Option valuation 
In this section we present a methodology for the pricing of European-style 
options on spot prices using the proposed two-regime spot price model. We present 
closed-form formulas for standard calls and puts; pricing of caps, floors and swaptions 
is then straightforward. Closed-form formulas are important for various reasons. First, 
closed-form formulas may be more insightful than simulation-based calculations. For 
example, we will obtain two option value components: one related to the mean-
reverting process, one to the spikes. Second, electricity traders often need to get quick 
answers in their day-to-day activities on the relative pricing of different options in the 
market. For them speed is often so important that it is necessary to use closed-form 
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formulas instead of simulation-based methods. Finally, closed-form formulas are very 
useful if options are being valued in a risk management application. Risk management 
statistics, such as Value-at-Risk can be computed much faster if no simulations are 
needed for the valuation of individual products in the portfolio.  
Our results apply to European-style options on the spot price, which excludes 
a range of options that are traded in the marketplace. In electricity markets we also 
observe for example options on (average-price) forwards59, and early exercise is 
sometimes allowed (American-style options). In the section with concluding remarks, 
we briefly describe how these kinds of options can be valued, within or without our 
regime framework. 
9.3.1  Option valuation in a mean-reverting framework 
For a better understanding of our approach, and to make meaningful 
comparisons between the two models, it is worthwhile to first review option valuation 
in a mean-reverting framework. Valuation of European-style options in a continuous 
time mean-reverting framework is for example described in Clewlow and Strickland 
(1999). A problem with continuous-time models is however that they cannot be 
perfectly estimated with discrete time data. Moreover, since a regime-switch model is 
inherently discrete (due to the regime switches), we have to make some adjustments to 
the aforementioned model. 
In continuous time the mean-reverting model is formulated as follows (with 
dzt a random draw from the standard Normal distribution): 
( ) tt
t
t dzdtx
x
dx
σµα +−=
−1       (14) 
                                                
59 In most markets a forward contract for the period of July-02 for example, entails the delivery 
of a constant electricity flow during the whole month of July at a fixed price. The value of the 
forward does therefore not only depend on the price on some particular day in July, but on the 
average price during the whole of July. 
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For the variance of xĲ (the variance of the log spot price Ĳ periods from now) there 
exists a very elegant formula. Its properties are informative to analyze and similar to 
those of the variance in the discrete time model: 
( )( )ατ
α
σ
τ 2exp1
2
)(
2
−−=xVar      (15) 
Without mean-reversion, the variance of a process converges to a level equal to the 
instantaneous variance multiplied by the time to maturity. With mean-reversion, the 
future distribution remains within stricter bounds: the higher the level of mean-
reversion, the narrower is the future distribution. On forward prices this mean-
reversion has the effect that the volatility of forward prices decreases exponentially 
from the current spot price volatility towards (almost) zero for longer maturities.  
In Figure 9.4 the differences in volatility behavior are clarified between a 
standard Brownian motion and a mean-reverting time-series. In a world of Brownian 
motion the instantaneous volatility of a forward contract is independent of maturity60.
This culminates in a forward distribution at maturity with a standard deviation that is 
equal to the instantaneous volatility times the square root of maturity. In a mean-
reverting model on the other hand, this standard deviation equals the square root of 
Equation (15) for a forward with maturity Ĳ. Since the last term in (15) converges to 
unity for longer maturities, this standard deviation converges to a constant. 
                                                
60 See for example stock (index) futures whose volatility is nearly constant across maturity. 
This can simultaneously be explained by arbitrage and the non-existence of mean-reversion. 
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Figure 9.4 
Forward volatilities of a Brownian motion (A) and a mean-reverting (B) continuous time 
process. The instantaneous volatility is the volatility of the forward at time 0. The end of term 
volatility is the standard deviation of the forward return from time 0 till maturity.  
Returning to the discrete time world, no elegant formulas as Equation (15) for 
the variance are available. Instead, the variance of the process must be determined 
recursively from the variance one period back. The mean-reverting model assumes 
that the one period ahead variance equals ı2.  By taking the variance of Equation (4) 
we obtain the variances of xĲ for maturities Ĳ = 1, 2, …. : 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) 212
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2
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)1(
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−
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               (16a) 
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σ
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∞
w                   (16b)
Similar to the variance in the continuous time model, this variance converges to a 
constant as well (Equation 16b). For small mean-reversion parameter Į the difference 
between the two approaches zero, but for increasing levels of mean-reversion, it pays 
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off not to treat a discrete time model as a continuous time model. For example, with 
mean-reversion parameter Į equal to 1/2, the stationary variances are a non-negligible 
factor 1/3 apart. 
If spot prices are mean-reverting (so without spikes yet), then all ingredients 
to value options on forward contracts are now available (Clewlow and Strickland, 
1999): an end-of-term forward distribution being lognormal, market forward prices 
and the variance as defined in Equation (16). Application of the Black’s (1976) 
formula for the valuation of a European call option with maturity Ĳ and strike price K 
thus yields (N(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function): 
τ
τ
τ
w
w
K
F
d
2
1ln +





=                   (17a) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }ττττ wdKNdNFrKCall −−⋅−= exp,               (17b) 
9.3.2    Option valuation in the regime switch model 
The idea behind the option valuation in the proposed regime switch model, is 
to split up the option price in a mean-reverting component and a spike component. We 
use the feature that the prices in both regimes are independent and lognormally 
distributed, even though the volatilities of both regimes may be wide apart. The 
volatility of the mean-reverting price distribution changes with maturity, as explained 
earlier, but the spike distribution is independent of maturity. Since the prices in the 
two distributions are independent an option value can be calculated for each regime, 
conditional on the price process being in that regime. The weight that each component 
receives, is determined by the probability of a spike. The reason that the two option 
components can be added up, is that the spikes are independent from the mean-
reverting prices. For example, a European-style call option on the spot Pt, with 
maturity τ and strike K has a ‘fair’ value of (ignoring time-value): 
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where πM,τ and πS,τ are the prior probability of a mean-reverting regime and spike 
regime at maturity τ respectively and λ indicates the type of regime. CallM and CallS
are the values of a call option if the process would be in the mean-reverting and spike 
regime. It is important to understand that the value of a call option is a weighted 
average of these two regime-dependent call options, because τ periods from now, the 
spot price is not a weighted combination of mean-reverting price and spike price, but 
either a mean-reverting price or a spike price61. How to calculate the values of the two 
regime-dependent call values is defined below. 
Variances in each regime 
 For the valuation of the mean-reverting component (CallM), we apply Black’s 
(1976) formula as explained in the previous section (Equation 16 and 17). For the 
valuation of the spike-component (CallS) we apply Black’s (1976) result again, 
because the spikes are lognormally distributed as well. The inputs to both formulas are 
the forward prices and the variances of the price processes in the two regimes. The 
variance of the log spot price in the spike process is independent of maturity and 
equals ıS2. For the variance of the mean-reverting component we rely on the recursive 
formula in Equation (16a).  
( ) 2,, SSS xVarw σττ ==                  (19a)
( ) 21,2,, )1( MMMMM wxVarw σα τττ +−== −               (19b)
                                                
61 The expected spot price however is a weighted combination. 
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Forward price levels in each regime 
In order to determine the forward price in the mean-reverting and spike 
regime, the expected spot prices in both regimes could be used. However, it is 
preferable to take account of market forward prices, because we don’t want our 
derivative values to deviate from market prices because we have a different view on 
forward prices, but because we have a different view on the spot price process, such as 
its volatility and level of mean reversion. Therefore, the spot price level needs to be 
aligned with market expectations. Moreover, this avoids the tedious modeling and 
estimation of all seasonal influences and risk premia. For example, in our spot price 
data we could not find significant seasonal variations over the year, but the current 
forward curve indicates that traders believe prices in the winter to be higher than in the 
summer.  
While employing market forward prices, we have the choice to adjust either 
the expected spike level to market forward price levels or to adjust the mean-reverting 
level or to adjust the relative probabilities of the regimes (or both). Each of these 
changes is defendable. We choose to adjust the expected spike level, because we 
believe it’s especially the risk of spikes that justifies risk premia in forward markets. 
Such a risk premium may cause a possible mismatch between market forward prices 
and expected spot price levels in our model.  
Our procedure works as follows. Suppose we observe market forward prices 
FĲ with maturities Ĳ = 1, …, N. Then we need to find the appropriate spike and mean-
reverting forward prices FM,Ĳ and FM,Ĳ such that the probability-weighted sums equal 
the market forward prices: 
τττττ ππ ,,,, MMSS FFF +=       (20) 
where πM,τ and πS,τ are the posterior probabilities of a mean-reverting regime and spike 
regime at maturity τ respectively. These probabilities of a future regime depend on the 
regime today and the regime switching probabilities. They can be calculated by τ
times premultiplying today’s posterior regime probabilities with the transition matrix 
Ȇ, defined in Equation (5). We then determine recursively the mean-reverting forward 
price level, based on the result that it equals the expected spot price level in the mean-
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reverting regime (see Equation 21a below). The remaining part of the market forward 
price belongs to the spike regime (Equation 21b). 
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Option values in each regime 
With their means and variances specified, the lognormal distributions of the 
spot price processes are now completely defined. The option values conditional on 
each regime, CallM and CallS are obtained with the Black (1976) formula, as defined in 
equation (17). We thus obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( )τπτπτ ττ ,,, ,, KCallKCallKCall SSMM ⋅+⋅=    (22) 
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This completes the derivation of a European-style option value on a spot electricity 
price, where the exercise price is K and the option matures at maturity Ĳ.
9.3.3 Option valuation example 
As an example we apply the above-described procedure to the forward curve 
in the Dutch market on 30 June 2002. Forward contracts in electricity markets apply to 
delivery of the commodity during a certain period. So, the forward prices depend on 
the expected average spot prices in those periods. In our model however, we need the 
price of a forward maturing on one single day. We calculate the value of options on 
the spot that mature in the middle of each delivery period and calculate the number of 
days (Ĳ) till those dates (see Table 9.3). With the moderate preceding weekend prices, 
the model produces a spike probability of 9.0% on the first day of July for baseload 
prices and 15.5% for peakload prices. These prior probabilities are obtained by pre-
multiplying them iteratively by the transition matrix Ȇ, and converge relatively fast to 
a stable 15.1% for baseload and 26.6% for peakload.  
Next, we derive the forward prices and variances for each regime. The model 
(Equation 21a) determines the mean-reverting forward price. These mean-reverting 
forward prices are some Euros below the market forward prices (Table 9.3). The 
difference between the two is due to the expectation of occasional spikes (Equation 
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21b), which lie in the range of 50-90 €/MWh for baseload and 75-120 €/MWh for 
peakload. The variance of the spike forward price is stable across maturity, but the 
variance of the mean-reverting forward converges to a level of 4.2% for baseload and 
3.5% for peakload.62 This is considerably lower than the spike variances of 45.5% and 
29%. Therefore, combined with their considerably higher expected level, it is not 
surprising that the spikes form an important ingredient of the option values.  
Figure 9.5 Mixture of lognormals
Probability density functions for the spot price regimes on 15 July 2002,  
based on the model estimated on 30 June 2002. 
                                                
62 The slightly higher mean-reverting variance for baseload than peakload prices may be 
explained by the relatively high frequency of spikes obtained from the peakload estimates.  
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Table 9.3 Forward curve construction
This table describes the process of moving from market forward prices to a spot price model 
that is in lign with the market. The first column contains the contract type, the second column 
the time-to-maturity in days. The third column lists the Dutch forward prices in €/MWh on 1 
July 2002 for baseload and peakload electricity respectively. Source: Platts Dutch Power 
Assessments delivered through Moneyline/Telerate. The other columns combine the parameter 
estimates with the market prices to show the probability of a spike (Pr[Spike]), and the forward 
prices and variances of each regime. 
Contract Ĳ Price Pr[Spike] FM,Ĳ FS,Ĳ wM,Ĳ wS,Ĳ
Day ahead 1 27.00 9.0% 22.27 74.57 2.5% 45.5%
Week ahead 7 32.50 15.0% 24.17 79.59 4.2% 45.5%
July 15 30.25 15.1% 24.32 63.66 4.2% 45.5%
August 46 28.43 15.1% 24.32 51.56 4.2% 45.5%
Q4-02 138 30.13 15.1% 24.32 62.84 4.2% 45.5%
Q1-03 230 31.55 15.1% 24.32 72.26 4.2% 45.5%
Q2-03 319 34.25 15.1% 24.32 90.17 4.2% 45.5%
Day ahead 1 38.00 15.5% 25.79 91.58 1.5% 29.0%
Week ahead 7 41.75 26.4% 27.51 81.41 3.5% 29.0%
July 15 40.75 26.6% 27.88 76.36 3.5% 29.0%
August 46 41.25 26.6% 27.92 78.12 3.5% 29.0%
Q4-02 138 43.00 26.6% 27.92 84.71 3.5% 29.0%
Q1-03 230 46.25 26.6% 27.92 96.95 3.5% 29.0%
Q2-03 319 52.13 26.6% 27.92 119.09 3.5% 29.0%
Panel B: Peakload contracts
Panel A: Baseload contracts
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In Figure 9.5 we plot the distributions of each regime for expected 15-day 
ahead baseload prices, based on the parameter estimates in Table 9.2. The actual 
distribution is a weighted average of the two individual regime-dependent probability 
density functions. In the example this means approximately 85% weight for the mean-
reverting and 15% for the spike regime. Although a 15-day maturity is not particularly 
long, we observe in Figure 9.5 that the mean-reverting regime prices have a very 
narrow distribution, which is due to a low daily standard deviation of 20.5%. The 
expected mean-reverting spot price is with 99% probability in the range of 14 to 40 
€/MWh. The spike regime prices in contrast are much wider distributed with a 
standard deviation of 67.5%. Here a 99% confidence interval covers a range as wide 
as 9-288 €/MWh. Prices reaching very high levels are thus far more likely in the 
regime-switch model (where they occur in the spike regime) than in the mean-
reverting model (without spikes).  
In the mean-reverting model the standard deviation of the expected spot price 
is somewhere in between the mean-reverting regime and the spike regime at a level of 
39.8%. This implies that spot prices 15 days in the future will leave a bandwidth of 
20-46 €/MWh only once in 100 years. That’s why the option values that result from 
our regime-switch spot price model largely deviate from options in a mean-reverting 
framework. In Table 9.4 we make a comparison. Option values were calculated of call 
options that mature in 1, 7, 15 and 46 days, with strike prices of 20, 30, 40 and 50 
€/MWh. We take the parameter estimates and forward values of 30 June 2002 (Table 
9.2 and 9.3) and assume an interest rate of 4%. 
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Table 9.4 Call option values  
This table shows values of European-style options on power spot prices according to the mean-
reverting model (panel A) and the regime-switch model (panel B). Parameter estimates are 
taken from Table 9.2 and forward prices from Table 9.3. Option values are calculated for four 
different maturities and strikes of 20, 30, 40 and 50 €/MWh. 
For low strike prices, there is very little difference between the mean-reverting 
and the regime-switch option values. Their main value driver for low strikes prices is 
the current forward price, which explains the differences between maturities. 
Increasing the strike level progressively from 20 €/MWh to 50 €/MWh option values 
in the mean-reverting model quickly decline towards zero. As we saw earlier, there is 
not much weight in the right tail of the mean-reverting distribution, resulting in hardly 
any value for deep out-of-the-money options. In the regime-switch model however, 
the spikes take account of the right tail, which explains that option values are 
substantial even for far out-of-the-money options. This clearly leads to more realistic 
option values that take into account that spot prices can be very erratic. 
The difference between the two models is best understood if we consider 
options with a strike price of 50 €/MWh. The mean-reverting model indicates those 
options are close to worthless, although we know that it is certainly not impossible 
Maturity 20 30 40 50 20 30 40 50
1 7.71 2.34 0.57 0.13 7.46 4.18 3.43 2.84
7 12.50 4.00 0.61 0.06 12.90 7.96 6.40 5.35
15 10.27 2.59 0.28 0.02 10.66 5.73 4.30 3.43
46 8.46 1.68 0.14 0.01 8.89 4.09 2.83 2.14
1 18.13 9.77 4.52 1.90 18.01 11.72 10.08 8.68
7 21.73 11.87 4.14 0.86 21.79 14.47 11.31 9.18
15 20.71 10.87 3.41 0.59 20.77 13.32 10.11 8.05
46 21.12 11.30 3.68 0.67 21.18 13.73 10.50 8.41
Panel B: Peakload options
Mean-Reverting Model Regime-Switch Model
Strike (€/MWh)
Panel A: Baseload options
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that spot prices will reach levels above 50 €/MWh on individual days. As an 
illustration, in our sample baseload prices exceeded this level on more than 8% of the 
days and peakload prices on more than 13% of the days. So even options with high 
exercise prices have substantial value, which is entirely ignored by the mean-reverting 
model.  
For example, the costs of a maximum price (cap) would severely be 
underestimated with the mean-reverting model. Caps are equal to a series of call 
options and frequently embedded in retail electricity contracts, where they form a 
bridge between fixed and floating price contracts. Let’s consider a contract where the 
end-user pays the daily baseload APX-price on each day in July, but with a cap of 50 
€/MWh. If we take the possibility of spikes into account, such a cap would cost 
approximately 3.43 €/MWh (based on an average maturity of 15 days), whereas a 
supplier would give it away for free if the wrong model were being used.  
9.4  Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we presented a model to value options on electricity spot 
prices. It takes into account the two main features of electricity prices: strong mean-
reversion and occasional ‘spikes’. Closed-form formulas for European-style options 
were obtained by disentangling the mean-reverting spot prices from the spikes, such 
that option values can be broken down in two components that were each valued with 
Black’s (1976) formula for options on forwards and futures. We showed that it is 
crucial to include spikes in any option price formula, since they represent substantial 
value, especially for far out-of-the-money options. 
Our results apply to European-style options on the spot price, which excludes 
a range of other tradable options. In electricity markets we also observe for example 
options on individual hours, options on forwards, and early exercise is sometimes 
allowed (American-style options). We believe a regime model could work well for 
individual hours, since these are characterized by periods of spikes and stable periods 
of mean-reverting prices as well. A difficulty here is that individual hours are even 
more volatile and spiky than daily averages, exhibit strong seasonality, and that prices 
on the same day strongly interact.  
Forwards whose value depend on the average price during a certain period on 
the other hand are hardly affected by the presence of spikes, as long as the averaging 
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period is long enough. The pricing of options on those forwards can therefore best be 
done by modeling the forwards directly, instead of aggregating spot prices into 
average price forwards. Moreover, the main uncertainty for options on forwards 
emanates from variations in the long-run average price. Our model is a one-factor 
model, which means that the long-run average price is not stochastic. This is not so 
relevant for the valuation of options on the spot, but it would be incorrect to use the 
same one-factor model for long-term options on forwards.  
Early exercise is not really an issue in valuing options on spot prices. 
Naturally, the holder of the option will wait till the last moment before deciding to 
exercise or not. Therefore, in practice American-style options on the spot will behave 
like European-style options.  
Our application of Black’s formula implies that the risks of the mean-
reverting prices and the spikes can be hedged, which is not completely realistic. With 
increasing liquidity in most electricity forward markets, it might be possible to hedge 
some part of the uncertainty in option prices, but the largest uncertainty of options on 
the spot result from the spikes, and there are no financial63 strategies to hedge spikes 
properly. Therefore, the derived option values can best be regarded as fair prices if 
uncertainty is ignored64. However, market participants might be willing to price 
options somewhat higher, because spikes make especially selling options risky. The 
model makes such an adjustment relatively easy, since it yields an explicit value for 
the spike component of the option value, which may be adjusted to include a risk 
premium.   
The separation of the spikes from the mean-reverting prices ensures that only 
a limited number of parameters needs to be estimated. This is important in electricity 
markets where we have only a relatively short history of reliable prices, and markets 
are in constant change. As markets become more mature, it may be worthwhile to 
include more electricity price characteristics, such as time-varying volatility and time-
varying spike intensities. That will be the subject of future research. 
                                                
63 A way to hedge spikes physically is by keeping some reserve capacity to use when prices are 
unexpectedly high. 
64 While using market forward prices, we incorporated the risk premium in the forwards. 
Options might however justify an even larger risk premium. 
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10 Conclusion of the second part 
In the last three chapters we presented three different option pricing 
methodologies that all deviate from the standard assumption of normally distributed 
returns. We end this second part of the thesis with a brief comparison and an analysis 
of their applicability in real-world markets.  
Since the stock market crash in 1987 option prices seem to deviate from the 
assumption of constant volatility across strike and maturity. A large number of 
researchers have since investigated explanations for the observed skews, smiles and 
term structure effects. In the chapter 7 and 8, we explored two econometric 
methodologies that assume that these deviations can be explained by different 
expected distributions or price processes than the standard normal (or Brownian 
motion). Other plausible explanations were not directly dealt with in the two chapters. 
For example, transaction costs, different risk premia across strike or maturity, 
difficulties to hedge options properly, and general inefficiencies in market prices may 
just as well explain implied volatility patterns. These alternative explanations are for 
example studied in Jackwerth (2000), and Ait-Sahalia, Wang and Yared (2001). 
Indirectly however, we did investigate the role of these alternative explanations and 
even found some support for them. In Chapter 7 for example it appeared that methods 
which model the volatility curve obtained a better fit to market option prices than 
methods that model the underlying risk-neutral distribution, such as the skewed 
Student-t method we proposed. This result may lead to the conclusion that the 
distribution-methods analyzed are not flexible enough, but we believe that the focus of 
option traders on volatility numbers is a more creditworthy explanation. Volatility 
numbers are easier to understand and better comparable across different options, and 
therefore an important statistic in day-to-day trading. We believe a small 
‘inefficiency’ in market prices is the result of this, although exploiting it may be hard 
or impossible with bid-ask differences and other transaction costs in place. 
In Chapter 8 we investigated the information content of option prices relative 
to time-series data in forecasting short-term volatility. Although a more direct test on 
the efficiency of option prices, we did not label it an efficiency test, because we 
incorporated time-series information (risk parameter and long term volatility) into the 
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implied estimates as well. We did so because both options and time-series may 
contain information about future prices. Options are explicitly forward looking and 
may respond quickly to news regarding the future price process. Option prices are on 
the other hand not solely determined by the expected future distribution, but also by 
risk preferences and other ‘inefficiencies’. The implied GARCH method we proposed 
aims at using both information sources to its best, but other approaches that combine 
option and time-series information may also perform well. Especially promising in 
this area are approaches that combine both high-frequency data with implied option 
data. From a practitioner’s viewpoint however, there are still many hurdles to take. 
Huge data sets, careful data management and complicated estimation procedures of 
only the most liquid instruments will yield satisfactory outcomes. Application in day-
to-day business and beyond a few currency pairs, stock indices and commodities 
seems a long way to go. 
In electricity markets it is equally tempting, but not always practical due to 
data limitations, to employ the most advanced techniques in option pricing. In Chapter 
9 we proposed a relatively parsimonious model that describes electricity spot prices. 
Its regime switches build upon the foreign exchange literature, where this type of 
model has originally been proposed. The model fits electricity markets well, because 
the lack of storage opportunities makes spot prices largely dependent on demand and 
supply conditions at that particular point in time, creating different regimes on 
different days. On most days price formation is a rather predictable stable mean-
reverting process, but every now and then generation problems, network congestions 
or unexpectedly high demand cause prices to spike to very unpredictable levels. In a 
market that is still in a very early development phase, we hope our model adds to the 
correct management of uncertainty and pricing of real and financial assets. Correct, 
reliable and practical models may ultimately lead to greater confidence, lower risk 
aversion and a better functioning of markets in general.  
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11 Summary and concluding remarks 
This thesis provides the results of five studies on financial derivatives. In this 
final chapter we briefly summarize the results of each study and formulate some 
general conclusions.  
11.1  Summary first part 
In the first part of this thesis we investigate the impact of options trading on 
the time-series properties of the underlying asset. More precisely, we test the 
hypothesis that a derivative asset improves the efficiency in the underlying asset such 
as a stock. The two studies presented largely support this hypothesis, and clarify the 
mechanisms that lead to this result. A plausible explanation is that the presence of a 
correlated asset permits the sharing of effective price discovery across markets. 
Market makers in the stock can set more accurate prices if they learn from transactions 
in the option. 
In Chapter 3 we use a controlled trading environment, where students trade in 
a stock and a call option on the stock in markets with asymmetric information. This 
allows the observation of all information sets and all actions in a setting based on the 
Kyle (1985) framework, but beyond the reach of tractable modeling. Repeated trading 
rounds with different groups of students and different asset values make clear that an 
insider trades aggressively in both the option and the stock, with most trades directed 
to the asset that affords the most profitable trading opportunity. This leads to price 
discovery occurring in both markets, and hence important feedback effects: trades in 
the stock market imply quote revisions in the options market and vice versa. Because 
the comparison of a market with and a market without options trading leads to control 
problems (due to a different number of market participants) we decided to study the 
effect of options trading indirectly by analyzing the impact of the option’s moneyness. 
We find a significant impact of moneyness on the time-series properties of the 
underlying: when the option is in-the-money the convergence to informationally 
efficient pricing is more rapid and the volatility of transaction prices is lower. The 
tendency of insiders to trade where the magnitude of the profitable trading opportunity 
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is greatest, provides a richer set of signals to dealers than when there is only a single 
asset in which the insider can trade profitably. We show therefore that not only does 
the presence of a correlated asset effectively split price discovery across markets; it 
also fundamentally changes the process by which conditional expectations are 
updated. We furthermore show that the less strategic the insider (due to risk-aversion, 
impatience, or noisy signals), the more powerful we expect this effect to be. 
Our model in Chapter 4 provides two important extensions to the existing 
theoretical models. First, we extend a single-trade model to a dynamic multi-trade 
environment. Second, we analyze market quality under different levels of option 
leverage, the main distinguishing property of options. We start with a standard 
sequential trade model, and show that it is inherently dynamic. Because expectations 
are updated after every trade, we can simulate a sequence of trades and derive more 
precise criteria for market quality. Our model clarifies and separates two mechanisms 
following the introduction of an option. On the one hand, stock dealers learn from 
trades in the option market and set more accurate prices. On the other hand, the 
proportion of informed trading in the stock is altered depending on the option's 
effective leverage, possibly reducing some market quality statistics. Our dynamic 
model indicates that option trading always reduces price errors (difference between 
the intrinsic value and the traded price) in the underlying, because an option serves as 
an extra source from which information can be inferred. Uninformed traders benefit 
most from this reduction in price errors in a derivatives market that allows for 
relatively large (informed) trades, and in a market where the number of informed 
traders is relatively small. This corresponds to well-developed derivatives markets 
where options provide important leverage. In terms of price volatility, effective 
leverage has the opposite effect: trading in well-developed derivatives markets leads 
to higher volatility.  
11.2  Summary second part 
In the second part of this thesis we present three empirical studies on option 
pricing for assets with non-normal returns. In the first two studies we explore methods 
to infer information from market option prices. The last chapter is a more standard 
pricing study, but applied to a very non-standard and risky commodity, electricity.  
Chapter 7 presents a methodology to derive the risk-neutral distribution from 
option prices in a flexible and accurate manner. The exact shape of the implied risk-
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neutral distribution gives important information that can be used for pricing other 
options on the same underlying asset, for comparing options on different assets and 
for closely monitoring changes in the markets perception of the underlying price 
process.  We apply a skewed version of the well-known Student-t distribution to 
capture the smiles and skews frequently observed in implied volatility curves. Its main 
strength is the direct parameterization of skewness and kurtosis. In an application to 
several years of FTSE-100 index options we compare the in-sample performance of 
the skewed-t method with the normal method (constant volatility), two implied 
volatility curve-fitting methods and a trinomial tree. Although they all clearly improve 
upon the normal method, the volatility curve-fitting method that regresses implied 
volatility on option delta outperforms the trinomial tree and skewed-t methods: 
average root mean squared errors are lower and this effect strengthens over time. We 
conclude that a curve-fitting method with the option’s delta as explanatory variable is 
preferred to price European-style options outside the available trading range. 
However, even though their fit is inferior, the two methods that focus on modeling the 
distribution of asset returns do have strong appeals. The skewed-t method in particular 
has the appeal that its parameters relate directly to the moments of the distribution. 
This makes it possible to accurately monitor changes in market expectations about the 
underlying asset.  
Chapter 8 presents a method to infer from option prices a forecast of the actual 
price process, instead of the distribution at a single point in time. We use the Duan 
(1995) option-pricing model to identify an option-implied EGARCH process and the 
corresponding 1-day ahead volatility forecast. For this implied process we estimate the 
stable long-term volatility and the risk premium from the time-series of daily index 
returns. We compare the implied forecast to the forecast of a (pure) time-series 
EGARCH model on FTSE-100 and DAX-30 index data. Our results yield different 
outcomes on the two markets. In the German market (DAX-30), the implied volatility 
forecast is leading the historical forecast, but no such relation is found in the UK 
market (FTSE-100). In the German market, the historical forecast explains around 
23% of realized volatility (constructed from intraday data), whereas the same ability 
of the implied estimate is 1.5 times larger. In the UK market both predictors perform 
equally well and explain a large fraction of around 44%. In the UK market a weighted 
combination of the two predictors explains even 8% extra, but in the German market 
the implied forecast alone contains nearly all information. Finally, in the German 
market the implied forecast is a relatively unbiased predictor of realized volatility 
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including overnight returns, but not so in the UK. So even though the implied forecast 
in the UK explains a large fraction of actual volatility, it does no better than a time-
series EGARCH model. In the German market on the other hand, the implied forecast 
is clearly preferred. 
Chapter 9 presents a regime-switch model for the pricing of options on spot 
electricity prices. The spot price model incorporates the main features of electricity 
prices: seasonality, mean-reversion, high volatility and occasional spikes. A major 
contribution of the spot price model is that it allows for multiple consecutive spikes, 
which is important for risk management and derivative pricing purposes. Based on this 
spot price model we present closed-form formulas to price European-style options on 
spot electricity prices. Because the regime-switch model contains two independent 
regimes, option prices can be split up in two components: one for the stable mean-
reverting process, one for the spikes, which can both be valued with the Black (1976) 
model. Application to the Dutch APX market shows the importance to include spikes 
properly in valuing options: option prices are considerably higher and closer in line 
with historical pay-offs with the regime-switch model than with a mean-reverting 
model. This effect is especially strong for the popular out-of-the-money call options.  
11.3  Concluding remarks and future research 
Both studies in the first part of this thesis reveal the complex relations and 
dependencies with trade in two correlated assets. The experimental study indicates 
that efficiency improves, but the theoretical study clarifies that part of this result may 
depend on the exact characteristics of a market. By abstracting from real human 
behaviour, we believe that the theoretical model somewhat underestimates the benefits 
of derivatives. In the model all market participants draw exactly the same conclusions 
from each trade. As a result, there are no differences in opinion among stock and 
option dealers. In the experiments, similar to real-world markets, those differences in 
opinion (and the insider response) are particularly informative, and speed up the price 
discovery process. For a better understanding of human behavior in a market with 
correlated assets, future research should therefore be devoted to the development of 
models that allow for more realistic human behavior. Alternatively, new experiments 
can be set up with more variations in control variables.  
Regulators that control derivatives markets may use the results of the two 
studies and future research to better set the standards for derivative markets. For 
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example, regulators need to weigh the benefits of lower losses for uninformed traders 
against possibly increased market volatility. They furthermore need to decide on the 
effective leverage derivative markets may optimally provide. According to the two 
studies, the benefits of derivative trading to improved price convergence are however 
without doubt.  
In the second part of the thesis we build upon the positive conclusion of the 
first part and analyze three different option-pricing methodologies for three different 
applications. Although the seminal work of Black, Scholes and Merton has greatly 
stimulated the development of derivative markets, we show that the assumptions in 
their models need to be adjusted for more realistic option pricing. With a recent 
modeling approach we show for example that options may contain valuable 
information beyond the information in time-series returns. In the very peculiar 
electricity markets we develop a model for spot electricity prices, derived from a 
popular foreign exchange model, that yields realistic option prices. Since option 
pricing techniques and data quality are constantly evolving, future research based on 
the second part of the thesis is relatively easy to formulate. In mature markets 
especially the incorporation of high-frequency data is a promising way to go, with the 
danger however that results can be applied to only a few highly liquid commodities. In 
electricity markets option pricing and risk management are still in their infancy and 
many new techniques need to be developed to price the different types of assets. With 
better models we aim to improve the quality of derivatives markets, and enhance 
confidence among participants that should ultimately lead to a better diversification of 
risks. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
Dit proefschrift beschrijft vijf onderzoeken op het gebied van financiële derivaten. 
Hier volgt een samenvatting.  
deel I: de microstructuur van derivatenmarkten 
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift onderzoeken we de invloed van de 
handel in derivaten (zoals opties) op de handel in het onderliggende waardepapier 
(zoals aandelen). We toetsen in het bijzonder de hypothese dat een derivaat de 
efficiëntie in het onderliggende waardepapier verbeterd. De twee gepresenteerde 
studies ondersteunen grotendeels deze hypothese en verduidelijken de mechanismen 
die hiertoe leiden. Een plausibele verklaring is dat een gecorreleerd waardepapier 
ervoor zorgt dat prijsontwikkeling op twee markten tegelijkertijd plaatsvindt. Market 
makers in het onderliggende waardepapier kunnen betere prijzen afgeven als ze leren 
van de ontwikkelingen in de optiemarkt.  
In hoofdstuk 3 maken we gebruik van experimenten, een gecontroleerde 
handelsomgeving waarin studenten handelen in een aandeel en een call optie op dat 
aandeel. De handel vindt plaats onder asymmetrische informatie, wat concreet 
betekent dat maar een handelaar (de insider) de werkelijke waarde van het aandeel 
weet. De experimenten maken het mogelijk om alle informatie en alle handelingen 
nauwkeurig te observeren in een opzet die lijkt op het theoretische model van Kyle 
(1985), maar veel realistischer is dan enig theoretisch model. Herhaalde handelsrondes 
met verschillende groepen studenten en verschillende aandeelwaarden maken 
duidelijk dat een insider actief in beide markten handelt, met een voorkeur voor de 
markt die op dat moment de meeste winstpotentie biedt. Beide markten hebben zo hun 
aandeel in het naar de oppervlakte komen van de werkelijke waarde van aandeel en 
optie. Tussen beide markten vindt namelijk een continue interactie plaats: transacties 
in de ene markt leiden tot aanpassingen in de geboden en gevraagde prijzen in de 
andere markt.  
Doordat een vergelijking tussen een markt met en een zonder opties leidt tot 
controleproblemen (vanwege een verschillend aantal marktdeelnemers), hebben we 
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ervoor gekozen om de invloed van opties indirect te bestuderen. Dit bereiken we door 
onderscheid te maken tussen handelsrondes waarin de optie geen waarde heeft en 
handelsrondes waarin de optie wel een waarde heeft.  De resultaten laten zien dat dit 
onderscheid een grote invloed heeft op de prijzen in de aandelenmarkt: als de optie in-
the-money is (waarde heeft), convergeren de prijzen veel sneller en met minder 
volatiliteit naar hun werkelijke waarde. De neiging van insiders om daar te handelen 
waar de grootste winst te behalen is, zorgt voor een rijker scala aan signalen waarop 
de market makers hun prijzen kunnen baseren, dan wanneer de insider in maar een 
markt winstgevend kan handelen. Daarmee laten we zien dat een optie niet alleen het 
prijsontwikkelingsproces in tweeen splitst (aandeel is meer of minder waard dan de 
uitoefenprijs van de optie), maar ook het proces verandert waarmee de 
marktdeelnemers hun verwachtingen aanpassen. We laten bovendien zien dat dit 
effect sterker is bij een minder strategisch handelende insider (vanwege risico-aversie, 
ongeduld of slechte informatie bijvoorbeeld).  
Het model in hoofdstuk 4 biedt twee belangrijke toevoegingen aan de 
bestaande theoretische modellen over de interactie tussen aandelen en opties. Ten 
eerste breidt het de bestaande enkelvoudige handelsmodellen uit tot een meervoudig 
handelsmodel (waarbij meerdere transacties kunnen plaatsvinden). Ten tweede 
analyseren we met het model verschillende hefboomniveaus van opties; het 
hefboomeffect is immers een belangrijke onderscheidende eigenschap van opties ten 
opzichte van aandelen.  We beginnen met een standaard sequentieel handelsmodel en 
laten zien dat het dynamisch is. Doordat handelaren hun verwachtingen na iedere 
transactie aanpassen, kunnen we een reeks transacties simuleren en preciezere 
maatstaven voor marktefficiëntie bestuderen.  Het model verduidelijkt en scheidt twee 
mechanismen die volgen op het introduceren van een optie. Enerzijds leren handelaren 
en market makers van de transacties in de optiemarkt en kunnen nauwkeurigere 
prijzen afgeven. Anderzijds beïnvloedt de introductie van een optie de samenstelling 
van de handelaren: het aantal insiders verandert het aantal insiders, wat mogelijk leidt 
tot een slechter functionerende markt, afhankelijk van de gebruikte maatstaf. De 
resultaten van ons dynamische model duiden op een afname in prijsfouten (verschil 
tussen werkelijke waarde en handelsprijs) onder alle onderzochte 
parameterinstellingen. Ongeïnformeerde handelaren profiteren hiervan het meest in 
een markt waarin grote transacties kunnen worden uitgevoerd en in een markt met 
verhoudingsgewijs weinig insiders. Dit komt overeen met een goedontwikkelde 
derivatenmarkt waarin opties voor een belangrijk hefboomeffect zorgen. Dezelfde 
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kenmerken van een goed ontwikkelde derivatenmarkt hebben op de volatiliteit van het 
aandeel juist een tegengesteld (negatief) effect: de volatiliteit neemt toe.   
Deel II: Empirische studies in derivatenmarkten  
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift komen drie empirische derivatenstudies 
aan bod die alle uitgaan van niet-normaal verdeelde rendementen. In de eerste twee 
studies onderzoeken we methoden om informatie te af te leiden uit marktprijzen van 
opties. Het laatste hoofdstuk behandelt een traditioneel optiewaarderingsonderzoek, 
maar toegepast op een ongewoon en grillig onderliggend goed, namelijk elektriciteit. 
Hoofdstuk 7 behandelt een flexibele methode om de risico-neutrale verdeling 
van het onderliggende waardepapier uit optieprijzen te herleiden. De exacte vorm van 
deze geïmpliceerde verdeling geeft belangrijke informatie die ingezet kan worden om 
andere opties op het onderliggende waardepapier te waarderen, om vergelijkingen te 
maken tussen opties op verschillende onderliggende waardepapieren, en om 
nauwgezet het sentiment in de markt te volgen. We passen een scheve variant van de 
welbekende Student-t verdeling toe om de veelvoorkomende vormen ('smiles' en 
'skews') in de de geïmpliceerde volatiliteitcurve te modelleren. De belangrijkste kracht 
van deze methode is de directe parametrisering van scheefheid en dikstaartigheid in de 
geïmpliceerde verdeling. In een toepassing op verschillende jaren van FTSE-100 
index opties vergelijken we de geschiktheid van deze methode met de normaal-
verdelingsmethode (constante volatiliteit), twee curve-methoden (die de geïmpliceerde 
volatiliteitcurve modelleren en daaruit risico-neutrale verdelingen afleiden) en een 
trinomiale boomstructuur.  
Van de onderzochte methoden levert de (standaard) normaal-
verdelingsmethode veruit het slechtste resultaat. Van de overige methoden levert de 
curve-methode (met optiedelta als verklarende variabele voor geïmpliceerde 
volatiliteit) het beste resultaat: optieprijzen uit dit model komen het sterkst overeen 
met werkelijke prijzen en dit effect bestendigt in latere jaren. Hoewel de scheve 
Student-t methode en de trinomiale boom een minder goede benadering geven van 
werkelijke prijzen, hebben ze beide belangrijke toepassingsmogelijkheden. De 
trinomiale boomstructuur is geschikt om Amerikaanse-type opties te waarderen, 
terwijl parameters van de scheve Student-t methode direct gerelateerd zijn aan de 
momenten van de onderliggende verdeling, waardoor veranderingen in 
marktsentiment goed gevolgd kunnen worden..  
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Hoofdstuk 8 beschrijft een methode om uit optieprijzen een voorspelling af te 
leiden van het werkelijke prijsproces van het onderliggende waardepapier, in plaats 
van slechts een verdeling op een enkel moment in de toekomst (zoals de methode in 
hoofdstuk 7). Aan de hand van het optiewaarderingsmodel van Duan (1995) bepalen 
we een geïmpliceerd EGARCH-proces en op basis daarvan een eendaagse 
voorspelling van de volatiliteit van de onderliggende index. We vergelijken deze 
voorspelling vervolgens met een voorspelling die geheel gebaseerd is op historische 
rendementen. Dit doen we voor de Engelse FTSE-100 en de Duitse DAX-30 index, 
waar ze tot verschillende resultaten leiden. Op de Duitse markt lopen de 
voorspellingen van het geïmpliceerde proces vooruit op de voorspellingen uit 
historische rendementen, maar dit is niet het geval op de Engelse markt. In de Duitse 
markt verklaren de historische rendementen ongeveer 23% van de werkelijke 
gerealiseerde volatiliteit (die we construeren met intra-dag rendementen), terwijl de 
geïmpliceerde voorspelling anderhalf keer meer verklaart. In de Engelse markt 
verklaren de historische en geïmpliceerde voorspelling beide niet minder dan 44% van 
de gerealiseerde volatiliteit. Hier bovenop verklaart een gewogen gemiddelde 
voorspelling in de Engelse markt zelfs nog 8% extra. In de Duitse markt daarentegen 
bevat de geïmpliceerde voorspelling nagenoeg alle informatie over de toekomst. 
Tenslotte is het vermeldenswaard dat de geïmpliceerde voorspelling in de Duitse 
markt nauwelijks vertekening vertoont in het voorspellen van gerealiseerde volatiliteit 
(inclusief nachtrendementen), maar wel vertekent is in de Engelse markt. 
Samenvattend kunnen we concluderen dat de geïmpliceerde voorspelling in Engeland 
een goede voorspeller is van gerealiseerde volatiliteit, maar niet beter is dan een 
historische voorspelling en bovendien vertekend is. In de Duitse markt verdient de 
geïmpliceerde voorspelling duidelijk de voorkeur.  
In hoofdstuk 9 beschrijven we een zogenaamd regime-switch model om opties 
te waarderen op spot elektriciteitsprijzen (prijzen voor levering een dag nadien). Het 
model bevat de belangrijkste eigenschappen van spot elektriciteitspijzen: 
seizoensafhankelijkheid, middelpunt-tenderend (mean-reverting), hoge volatiliteit en 
plotselinge pieken. Een belangrijke bijdrage van het model is dat het meerdere pieken 
na elkaar toelaat, wat belangrijk is voor risico-management toepassingen en 
waardering van derivaten. Uit dit spot prijsmodel leiden we formules af voor de 
waardering van Europese-stijl call en put opties. Doordat het regime-switch model 
bestaat uit twee onafhankelijke regimes kunnen we optieprijzen in twee componenten 
opsplitsen: een voor het stabiele middelpunt-tenderende proces, en een de pieken. 
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Beide componenten waarderen we met het model van Black (1976). In een toepassing 
op Nederlandse APX spot prijzen verduidelijken we het belang van een juiste 
modellering van pieken voor de waardering van opties: optieprijzen van het regime-
switch model zijn beduidend hoger en komen beter overeen met historische 
uitbetalingen dan prijzen van een model zonder pieken. Dit effect is het duidelijkst 
voor de veelverhandelde out-of-the-money call opties.  
Conclusie
Beide studies in het eerste deel van dit proefschrift verduidelijken de 
complexe relatie en afhankelijkheid tussen twee gecorreleerde waardepapieren, een 
aandeel en een optie. De experimenten tonen aan dat een optie ervoor zorgt dat de 
efficientie in de markt verbetert, maar het theoretische model plaatst hier de 
kanttekening bij dat dit resultaat gedeeltelijk af kan hangen van de karakteristieken 
van de markt. Zonder rekening te houden met natuurlijk menselijk gedrag onderschat 
het theoretisch model echter enigszins de zegeningen van een optiemarkt. In het model 
trekken bijvoorbeeld alle deelnemers aan een markt dezelfde conclusies uit iedere 
transactie. Daaruit volgt dat er geen verschillen van inzicht bestaan tussen market 
makers in de aandelenmarkt en die in de optiemarkt. In de experimenten, net als in de 
praktijk, zijn die verschillen (en de reactie hierop van insiders) juist erg informatief en 
bespoedigen een juiste prijsontwikkeling.  
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift bouwen we voort op de positieve 
conclusie van het eerste gedeelte en presenteren drie optiewaarderingsmethoden. 
Hoewel het vroege werk van Black, Scholes en Merton de ontwikkeling van 
derivatenmarkten enorm gestimuleerd heeft, laten we zien dat de veronderstellingen in 
hun modellen aangepast dienen te worden voor realistischere optieprijswaarderingen. 
Op basis van een recente innovatie herleiden we bijvoorbeeld uit marktprijzen van 
opties een prijsproces dat belangrijke informatie kan bevatten over de toekomstige 
ontwikkeling van een marktindex. Voor de zeer specifieke elektriciteitsmarkt 
ontwikkelen we bovendien een model om opties op spotprijzen adequaat te waarderen. 
Met de ontwikkeling van dergelijke modellen beogen we derivatenmarkten beter te 
laten functioneren, wat leidt tot een groter vertrouwen in deze markten en een betere 
spreiding van risico's onder marktdeelnemers.  
194
 195
Curriculum vitae 
Cyriel de Jong was born on 19 July 1976 in Valkenburg aan de Geul, the 
Netherlands. From 1994 till 1999 he studied econometrics at Maastricht University. 
During this time he spent half a year as an exchange student at the Universität Wien in 
Vienna. He furthermore completed an internship on mortgage prepayment modelling 
at De Nationale Investeringsbank in The Hague and a research project on European 
Corporate Bonds at Maastricht University. He obtained his MSc in econometrics in 
1999 with honour.  
From February 1999 onwards Cyriel de Jong has been a PhD student at the 
Financial Management department of the Rotterdam School of Management at 
Erasmus University. During this period he has taught several executive and non-
executive courses. From 2001 till 2003 he furthermore worked for the consultancy 
firm FinEdge, where he was responsible for the subsidiary Energy Global. His 
research was published in Energy Power Risk Management, Bedrijfskunde and 
various Dutch journals. Since 1 May 2003 he has been assistant professor at the 
Financial Management department at Erasmus University, where his research interests 
focus on commodity markets in general and derivative valuation in particular. Besides 
his academic career he continues working part-time as a consultant in financial and 
commodity markets.  
196
 197
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT  (ERIM) 
ERIM PH.D. SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
Title:  Operational Control of Internal Transport
Author:  J. Robert van der Meer 
Promotor(es):  Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker 
Defended: September 28, 2000 
Series number: 1 
ISBN: 90-5892-004-6 
Title:  Quantitative Models for Reverse Logistics
Author:  Moritz Fleischmann 
Promotor(es):  Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, dr. R. Kuik  
Defended: October 5, 2000 
Series number: 2 
Published:  Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,  
 Volume 501, 2001, Springer Verlag, Berlin,  
ISBN: 3540 417 117 
Title:  Optimization Problems in Supply Chain Management
Author:  Dolores Romero Morales 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, dr. H.E. Romeijn 
Defended: October 12, 2000 
Series number: 3 
ISBN: 90-9014078-6 
Title:  Layout and Routing Methods for Warehouses
Author:  Kees Jan Roodbergen 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen 
Defended: May 10, 2001 
Series number: 4 
ISBN: 90-5892-005-4 
198
Title:  Rethinking Risk in International Financial Markets
Author:  Rachel Campbell 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk 
Defended: September 7, 2001 
Series number: 5 
ISBN: 90-5892-008-9 
Title:  Labour flexibility in China’s companies: an empirical study
Author:  Yongping Chen 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. A. Buitendam, Prof.dr. B. Krug 
Defended: October 4, 2001 
Series number: 6 
ISBN: 90-5892-012-7 
Title:  Strategic Issues Management: Implications for Corporate 
Performance 
Author:  Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch, Prof.dr. C.B.M. van Riel  
Defended: October 19, 2001 
Series number: 7 
ISBN: 90-5892-009-7 
Title:   Beyond Generics; A closer look at Hybrid and Hierarchical 
Governance
Author:  Roland F. Speklé 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. M.A. van Hoepen RA 
Defended: October 25, 2001 
Series number: 8 
ISBN: 90-5892-011-9 
Title:   Interorganizational Trust in Business to Business  
  E-Commerce 
Author:  Pauline Puvanasvari Ratnasingam 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. K. Kumar, Prof.dr. H.G. van Dissel 
Defended: November 22, 2001 
Series number: 9 
ISBN: 90-5892-017-8 
 199
Title:  Outsourcing, Supplier-relations and Internationalisation: 
 Global Source Strategy as a Chinese puzzle 
Author:  Michael M. Mol 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder 
Defended: December 13, 2001 
Series number: 10 
ISBN: 90-5892-014-3 
Title:  The Business of Modularity and the Modularity of Business 
Author:  Matthijs J.J. Wolters 
Promotor(es): Prof.mr.dr. P.H.M. Vervest, Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck 
Defended: February 8, 2002 
Series number: 11 
ISBN: 90-5892-020-8 
Title:  The Quest for Legitimacy; On Authority and Responsibility in 
Governance 
Author:  J. van Oosterhout 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. T. van Willigenburg, Prof.mr. H.R. van Gunsteren 
Defended: May 2, 2002 
Series number: 12 
ISBN: 90-5892-022-4 
Title:  Information Architecture and Electronic Market Performance
Author:  Otto R. Koppius 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. P.H.M. Vervest, Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck 
Defended: May 16, 2002 
Series number: 13 
ISBN: 90-5892-023 - 2 
Title:  Planning and Control Concepts for Material Handling Systems
Author:  Iris F.A. Vis 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker 
Defended: May 17, 2002 
Series number: 14 
ISBN: 90-5892-021-6 
200
Title:  Essays on Agricultural Co-operatives;  
 Governance Structure in Fruit and Vegetable Chains
Author:  Jos Bijman 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. G.W.J. Hendrikse 
Defended: June 13, 2002 
Series number: 15 
ISBN: 90-5892-024-0 
Title:  Analysis of Sales Promotion Effects on Household Purchase 
Behavior 
Author:  Linda H. Teunter 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga, Prof.dr. T. Kloek 
Defended: September 19, 2002 
Series number: 16 
ISBN: 90-5892-029-1 
Title:  Incongruity between Ads and Consumer Expectations of 
Advertising
Author:  Joost Loef 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. W.F. van Raaij, Prof.dr. G. Antonides 
Defended: September 26, 2002 
Series number: 17 
ISBN: 90-5892-028-3 
Title:  Creating Trust between Local and Global Systems
Author:  Andrea Ganzaroli 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. K. Kumar, Prof.dr. R.M. Lee 
Defended: October 10, 2002 
Series number: 18 
ISBN: 90-5892-031-3 
Title:  Coordination and Control of Globally Distributed Software 
Projects
Author:  Paul C. van Fenema 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. K. Kumar 
Defended: October 10, 2002 
Series number: 19 
ISBN: 90-5892-030-5 
 201
Title:  Improving the flexibility and profitability of ICT-enabled  
 business networks: an assessment method and tool.      
Author:  Dominique J.E. Delporte- Vermeiren 
Promotor(es): Prof.mr.dr. P.H.M. Vervest, Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck 
Defended: May 9, 2003 
Series number: 20 
ISBN: 90-5892-040-2 
Title:   Organizing Knowledge in Internal Networks. A Multilevel Study
Author:  Raymond van Wijk 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch 
Defended: May 22, 2003 
Series number: 21 
ISBN: 90-5892-039-9 
Title:  Cyclic Railway Timetable Optimization
Author:  Leon W.P. Peeters 
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon, Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen 
Defended: June 6, 2003 
Series number: 22 
ISBN: 90-5892-039-9 

Dealing with Derivatives:
Studies on the role, informational content and pricing of financial
derivatives
The aim of this thesis is to improve the understanding of derivatives
markets, which should ultimately lead to a better diversification of
risks among market participants. The author first analyzes the impact
of derivatives on the market quality of the underlying asset. With
experiments and a theoretical model it is shown that derivatives
generally make markets more efficient, although volatility may
increase, depending on the exact market structure. Next, the author
presents two methods that derive information about the underlying
price process from traded options. The models approximate the option
prices well and the extracted information explains future volatility
better than historical data. Finally, a model for the valuation of
options in electricity markets is presented that deals with the special
characteristics of electricity spot prices and may serve to value
electricity generation plants. 
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research
School (Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the
Rotterdam School of Management and the Rotterdam School of
Economics. ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by
the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The
research undertaken by ERIM is focussed on the management of the
firm in its environment, its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its
business processes in their interdependent connections. The objective
of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer
an advanced graduate program in Research in Management. Within
ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and Ph.D. candidates are
active in the different research programs. From a variety of academic
backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving
for excellence and working at the forefront of creating new business
knowledge.
The ERIM Ph.D Series contains Dissertations in the field of Research in
Management defended at Erasmus University Rotterdam. The Disser-
tations in the Series are available in two ways, printed and electronical.
ERIM Electronic Series Portal: www.research-in-management.nl.
www.research-in-management.nl/ ISBN 90-5892-043-7
CYRIEL DE JONG
Dealing
with Derivatives:
Studies on the role, informational
content and pricing of financial
derivatives
C
Y
R
IE
L
 D
E
 JO
N
G
D
e
a
lin
g
 w
ith
 D
e
riv
a
tiv
e
s
23
Erim - 03 omslag deJong  29-04-2003  14:27  Pagina 1
